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I. THE CRUSADE DOWN THE PATH OF GENUINE JUSTICE
Many fraudulent conveyances emerge from the
catastrophes that cause great financial and sometimes
personal losses. Two antagonistic parties emerge from the
debris of civil litigation. The first is the defendant who has
defaulted on an obligation, or worse, committed some
grievous wrong, including a sexual assault, maiming of a
person, brazen theft, infringement, swindle or cheat. The
second is the plaintiff who won a big-dollar judgment, but
finds that the defendant, now called a debtor, is
unresponsive, unwilling, or unable to pay the civil
In other cases, a financial catastrophe
judgment. 1
produces legions of victims who have suffered at the
hands of a Ponzi operator or peddler of defective products
on a wide scale. 2 Other victims include victims of
Homeowner's insurance typically provides the cost of defense,
but not the indemnity. "Even conduct that is traditionally
classified as ‘intentional’ or ‘wilful’ has been held to fall within
indemnification coverage." Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168,
177 (Cal. 1966).
2 See Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1587 (2016),
which held that fraudulent conveyance (siphoning off corporate
assets) is fraud and nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Code
Section 523(a)(2) (fraud). Fraudulent conveyances typically
1
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investment schemes, real estate frauds, stock follies, and
pyramid schemes, among other large-scale wrongs. 3
While the misery level might ascend or descend for each
victim, the end result is the same in each case. The debtor
owes a large sum of money, including punitive damages,
arising from an egregious wrong and refuses to
compensate the victims that are cast as the creditors in an
ensuing fraudulent conveyance action. 4
These creditors seek payment of their judgments.
Payment is more than just recompense for personal and
financial losses that might include the loss of a
breadwinner, loss of life savings, enormous financial
damage or harm, damage to property, or the inability to
engage in meaningful employment. Payment restores the
personal dignity and self-esteem suffered by the victim at
the hands of malevolent individuals who committed the
wrong for their own self-aggrandizement, greed, or malice.
Getting paid is more than getting even. Getting paid is
getting back a life, and no less.
The quest to seek compensation as restorative of
personal esteem is the starter's pistol down this marathon.
Astute to the personal anger and unrequited rage of the
victim who is now a creditor under fraudulent conveyance
involve “a transfer to a close relative, a secret transfer, a transfer
of title without transfer of possession, or grossly inadequate
consideration.”
3 "What are the obligations of class counsel when he learns that
the defendant in the class action he is prosecuting has ceased
operations, sold its assets to a third party, and intends to file for
bankruptcy?" Barboza v. W. Coast Digital GSM, Inc., 102 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 295, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
4 See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439 et seq. Civil Code Section 3439.01(b)
(stating claim includes tort claim, without regard to being
reduced to a judgment). FRCP 69 compels the court to follow the
state law remedies of the domicile state where the court sits, save
discovery. The substantive body of fraudulent conveyance law
is state law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Interest
accrues at the federal (.6%), not state rate (10% plus). See also,
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.05 (West) (discussing balance sheet
fraudulent conveyance) or Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04 (West)
(discussing conveyance with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud, and other claims).
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laws, the debtor commences his or her (or its) campaign of
asset protection to shield any assets from civil enforcement
under the judgment. 5 To avoid any doubt, a fraudulent
conveyance is a fraud upon the creditor, even without the
necessary representation. 6 Asset protection means that the
debtor either: changes the form or names on the title; or
hides, conceals, transfers, buries, or reconfigures assets. 7
Asset protection cloaks the assets with a veil that conceals
the asset from discovery and hides the assets from plain
sight. 8 Even if the assets are discovered, lifting the veil to
reach the assets compels the creditor to spend real money
to seize the debtor's assets through legal process. 9 At some
point, the financial toll to reach these assets becomes
intolerable, which forces the creditor to abandon the
quest. 10 All parties are sensitive to the fact that the creditor
"A. cannot lay a trap for B., secure his confidence, induce him
to make a conveyance of his property in the expectation that it
will be returned, and thereafter retain the fruits of his perfidy on
the ground that B. too readily yielded to temptation to save
himself at the possible expense of creditors." Chamberlain v.
Chamberlain, 95 P. 659, 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908).
6 "The degree to which this statute remains embedded in laws
related to fraud today clarifies that the common-law term
“actual fraud” is broad enough to incorporate a fraudulent
conveyance." Husky, 136 S.Ct. at 1587.
7 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.
527 U.S. 308, 338–39 (1999) (stating "Moreover, increasingly
sophisticated foreign-haven judgment proofing strategies,
coupled with technology that permits the nearly instantaneous
transfer of assets abroad, suggests that defendants may succeed
in avoiding meritorious claims in ways unimaginable before the
merger of law and equity").
8 "It is in the acts of concealment and hindrance." Husky, 136 S.
Ct. at 1587.
9 The Uniform Voidable Transactions Act succeeded the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, which is successor to the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Courts still apply the UFCA. " . .
.UFTA [history] . . . makes clear its remedies are cumulative to
pre-existing remedies for fraudulent conveyances." Cortez v.
Vogt, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 841, 849 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
10 "Appellants correctly state that the UFTA does not itself
authorize a fee award . . ." Cardinale v. Miller, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d
546, 550 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). However, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
5
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will expend enormous sums to unwind the debtor's
fraudulent conveyance. The ultimate barrier that shields
the debtor's assets is the financial burden incurred by the
creditor in dismantling the veil to reach the assets. Every
dollar that the debtor spends in lifting the veil of asset
protection is an additional expense that deters the creditor
from reaching the asset. Making the creditor spend money
is the debtor’s goal. The more that is spent, the closer the
debtor comes to shielding all assets, assuming that
sometime in the future the creditor will run out of money
and quit. In addition, many debtors perceive that the trial
courts and appellate courts treated them unfairly in the
original proceedings. The debtor seeks to nullify this
"unjust result" through asset protection by rendering the
judgment uncollectible. Asset protection litigation is the
continuation of the prior litigation by other means. 11
The battle to recover attorney's fees incurred by a
creditor in a fraudulent conveyance action or enforcement
takes center stage. 12 Under Cardinale v. Miller, the creditor
would not collect fees in the fraudulent conveyance action
per se, but the creditor could recover fees against the debtor
(or third party) in the original action, assuming that the
judgment itself provides for an award of attorney's fees. 13
In response, the debtor will necessarily engage in various
machinations to prevent the creditor from recovering fees
based on the fraudulent conveyance litigation by a timely
and precipitous cash payment of the underlying
judgment. 14
Section 685.040 imposes fees arising from the fraudulent
conveyance actions upon the judgment debtor.
11 "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Carl von
Clausewitz. Clausewitz: War on Politics by Other Means, ONLINE
LIBRARY OF LIBERTY: A COLLECTION OF SCHOLARLY WORKS ABOUT
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND FREE MARKETS (Apr. 13, 2016),
http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/clausewitz-war-as-politics-byother-means.
12 See Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(a) (avoid the conveyance), (b)
(attachment of asset), (c) (execute on fraudulently conveyed
asset).
13 Cardinale, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 550.
14 See In re Conservatorship of McQueen, 328 P.3d 46, 55 (Cal.
2014). (holding that by timely payment before filing of cost bill
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Here are few example of how asset protection
accrues an expense that deters enforcement:
1. Facing civil claims arising from sexual assault
charges, the perpetrator transferred his home to third
parties. In ensuing civil litigation, the victim sought, and
was granted, an injunction against the further transfer of
the property. 15
2. In the face of a $78,000,000 liability, the
corporate defendant deeded property to the insiders and
related parties. The creditor proceeded to attach the
property, but the third parties (the conveyees and
company insiders) filed a third party claim that the court
denied. The appellate court reversed based on the trial
court's error in failing to compel the creditor to prove a
fraudulent conveyance. 16
3. Husband, a doctor, engaged in an extra-marital
affair that produced a daughter. The wife filed for a
divorce that culminates in a marital settlement agreement
that rendered the husband impecunious. The paramour
filed suit to vacate the MSA that landed in the California
Supreme Court. 17

or fee motion, debtor avoided liability for post-judgment fees
arising from fraudulent actions).
15 "The timing of defendant's conveyance of his personal
residence to a trust after he was arrested on charges of
molestation may be indicative of an intent to protect his assets
against creditors." Oiye v. Fox, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 84 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012).
16 "A creditor wishing to pursue a fraudulent transfer theory
may not escape the burden of proving its claim merely because
the contest is played out in a third party claim proceeding."
Whitehouse v. Six Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995).
17 "They entered into an M.S.A. under which Husband conveyed
all his interest in the couple's real estate to Wife, and she
conveyed her interest in Husband's medical practice to him. The
M.S.A. provided that Husband would be solely responsible for
his extramarital child support obligation . . . By June 1997,
Husband had abandoned his medical practice. He now lives
with his mother. He has no assets and little income." Mejia v.
Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 168 (Cal. 2003).
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The simple fact-pattern in these cases illustrates
that the victims, including the victim of a sexual assault, a
commercial creditor cheated out of payment, and an
aggrieved mother, confronted a fraudulent conveyance
that was intended to hinder, delay or defraud the plaintiff
out of payment of a just liability. 18

II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACTION AND
ENFORCEMENT ACCRUE EXPENSE AND EFFORT AND
REQUIRE SKILL
Cardinale v. Miller shoulders attorney's fees upon
each party in a fraudulent conveyance action. 19 Given the
proclivity of the debtor to hide and conceal assets, the
creditor must take pro-active steps to lock down the assets,
lest the debtor launders the property through a bona fide
sale or loan transactions that is called "safe harbor." 20 To
insure that the conveyee will not dispose of the property
pending the outcome of the UVTA, the creditor can record
a lis pendens. 21 The creditor can attach the fraudulently
conveyed property. 22 The creditor can execute upon the
Fraudulent cases abound in bankruptcy court. In re High
Strength Steel Inc., 269 B.R. 560 (USBC, D. De, 2001) (discussing
the right of receivable owed by related party); In re Bernard, 96
F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing cashing out account in the
face of attachment); In re Wilbur, 211 B.R. 98, 104 (USBC, M.D.
Fla, 1997) (stating that post judgment, debtor converts accounts
into cashier's check); In re Schafer, 294 B.R. 126, 128 (USDC, ND,
CA 2003) (discussing changing banks in the face of attachment);
See Bankruptcy Code Sections 548 and 544(b) (discussing
incorporating state remedies under the UVTA seq.).
19 Cardinale v. Miller, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 550 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014).
20 "Thus, a showing of good faith and reasonably equivalent
value is all that is required to defeat a creditor's action based on
Civil Code section 3439.04, subdivision (a)." Annod Corp. v.
Hamilton & Samuels, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 929 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
21 "We believe that this broad language [of the UFTA] allows a lis
pendens remedy." Kirkeby v. Super. Ct. of Orange Cty., 93 P.3d
395, 401 (Cal. 2004).
22 Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(a)(2) (West).
18
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fraudulently conveyed property. 23 In response, the third
party (i.e., the conveyee) can file a third party claim which,
as in Whitehouse v. Six Corp., compels the creditor to prove
up a fraudulent conveyance. 24 To obtain information to
prosecute a fraudulent conveyance claim, the creditor
would proceed with an examination of the debtor and
even compel production of records. 25 Judgment debtors
are less than forthcoming at a debtor's examination. 26
Fraudulent conveyances are built on circumstantial
evidence based on a conveyance with the intent to hinder,
delay, and defraud. 27 All of this legal activity accrues
attorney's fees and expenses including experts. 28
A creditor can enforce a judgment upon entry. 29 A
judgment creditor must pre-pay the sheriff in order for the
sheriff to enforce the judgment under a writ of execution. 30
The creditor must identify the property and location of the
property in the sheriff's instructions. 31 While the sheriff is a
law enforcement officer, the sheriff is not a detective and
Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(c) (West).
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 720.360 (West) [Burden of proof].
25 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 708.110(a) and 708.130 (West).
"Generally, there is no opportunity for discovery." Whitehouse v.
Six Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
26 "And the sanctity of the oath, by itself, does not ensure that all
judgment debtors will be completely forthcoming during a
judgment debtor examination." Jogani v. Jogani, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d
792, 813 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
27 Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b) (badges of fraud); Neumeyer v.
Crown Funding Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 366, 369 (Cal. Ct. App.
1976), overturned due to legislative action on other grounds (stating
fraudulent conveyance cases based on fraud are supported by
circumstantial evidence).
28 Mehrtash v. Mehrtash, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802, 805 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (describing necessity to prove "leviable interest in real
property through an appraisal of the real property”). Court
cannot judicial notice of appraisal from Zillow. In re Marriage of
Trejo, No. E054775, 2013 WL 1779606, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.
26, 2013).
29 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 683.010 (West).
30 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 683.100(a)(1) (West) (sufficient deposit
sheriff to pay the costs of enforcement).
31 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 687.010(a) (West) (adequate description
of any property to be levied upon).
23
24
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has no obligation to ferret out assets. 32 Upon entry of a
judgment, the debtor is still free to dispose of assets, but
the judgment creditor can impose a lien on the judgment
debtor's assets. 33 The creditor is entitled to a turnover
order at the conclusion of an examination of the debtor or
third party. 34 These remedies enable a creditor to reach all
property of the debtor but only if the creditor seeks to
Enforcement is statutory. 36
initiate enforcement. 35
However, a court can order extraordinary relief in the
preservation of property or order the sheriff to take
exceptional steps. 37
Given the financial burden of the creditor to
enforce the judgment, and the complexity and expense of
legal process to recover a fraudulent conveyance or any
other asset, the debtor is motivated to hide, conceal, or
secret assets solely for the purpose of increasing the
creditor's absolute expense. Without a description of the
assets in the sheriff's instructions, the sheriff will not
enforce a judgment.
In the event of a fraudulent
conveyance, the creditor must "lock down" the property
and therefore plead and prove a fraudulent conveyance by
a preponderance of the evidence. Absent affirmative
action by the creditor, and subject to the distraint, if at all,
arising from any liens, the debtor is free to sell, dispose

The sheriff follows the written instructions of the creditor. Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 687.010(b) (West).
33 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 697.340 (West) (regarding real property);
id. § 697.530 (allows filing of JL-1, which is similar to a UCC, to
encumber certain personal property); id. §§ 708.110(d), 708.120(c)
( allowing liens on personal property of the debtor and lien on
personal property of the debtor in the hands of the third party),
among other liens.
34 Id. §§ 708.180, 708.205(a); Id. § 699.040 (describing a turnover
order).
35 Id. § 695.010(a) (stating that all property of a judgment is
subject to enforcement, unless declared immune or exempt).
36 Imperial Bank v. Pim Electric, Inc. 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 432 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
37 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 699.070(a) (West) (stating a court may
issue extraordinary relief as circumstances might warrant).
32
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transfer or liquidate any assets. 38 Consider the judgment,
absent enforcement, in a state of stasis and subject to
renewal. 39
Given this expense and effort, and burden befalling
upon the creditor to prove a fraudulent conveyance, the
debtor has every motive in the world to hide, conceal or
secret assets. 40 A conveyance, even if fraudulent, is still a
valid conveyance between the parties. 41 The purpose of a
fraudulent conveyance is to hinder, delay, and defraud the
creditor that deters the creditor from enforcement the
judgment itself by concealing accessible assets. 42

III. THE UNIVERSAL EQUATION OF IMMUNITY FROM
ENFORCEMENT
Compelled to finance enforcement, much less a
fraudulent conveyance action and its inherent burden of
proof, the conundrum for the creditor and counsel is
weighing the likelihood of success. This test is more than a
legal analysis of the UVTA and related claims, but rather

The UVTA enables a creditor to set aside a conveyance. Id. §
3439.07(a) (stating that a "creditor" has standing).
39 Id. § 683.020.
40 Fraudulent conveyance is potential a nondischargeable debt.
Husky Int'l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1581 (2016). A
fraudulent conveyance within one year of the bankruptcy might
bar the entire discharge. Bernard, 96 F.3d at 1279; see also, Cal.
Bankr. Code § 727(a)(2)(A) (West).
41 "As Annod points out, a fraudulent conveyance is void as
against the transferor's creditors and title remains in the
transferor as if no conveyance had been attempted." Annod
Corp. v. Hamilton & Samuels, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 924, 934 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002). (emphasis added); see also, Slater v. Bielsky, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 683, 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). Absent timely action, the
conveyance becomes immune from enforcement under the
UVTA statute of limitations. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439.09(a)-(c)
(West) (setting the statute of limitations and statute of repose at 7
years).
42 Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587 (holding that fraudulent conveyance
as concealment).
38
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an analytical analysis of the financial return to the client
after expending time, effort, and most important, money. 43
The test is to predict of efficiency of the asset
protection scheme. For example, if the debtor successfully
hid all assets that renders the assets immune from any
enforcement, the efficiency of the asset protection scheme
is 100%, or even greater, if the creditor expended money,
no matter the cost and whether the outcome was
unsuccessful. From these facts, the asset is 0% accessible to
the creditor. If, on the other hand, the asset protection
scheme immediately failed, and without any expense, the
asset fell into the lap of the creditor, the efficiency of the
asset protection is 0%, or flipped around, the asset was
100% accessible.
By framing a fraudulent conveyance as an act of
concealment, Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz
casts assets as inaccessible because these assets are
concealed and therefore unavailable to the creditor, absent
a fraudulent conveyance action or enforcement. When and
if the creditor reaches the "concealed assets," as framed by
Husky, the asset, in the hand of the creditor, is "accessible."
What moves the asset from inaccessibility to accessibility,
or not at all, involves an anagram of hard and soft factors,
as follows: the hard factor is the dollar value of the
concealed asset that has been found or targeted and
therefore subject to some type of enforcement, whether
successful or not; and second, the burden of the
enforcement. The next hard factor is the "burden." The
burden means the legal fees, court costs, expert fees, and
soft costs (overnight charges, title reports, appraisals etc.)
necessarily expended to prosecute the fraudulent
conveyance action or enforcement proceeding. Add to the
burden the lost opportunity costs, given that the creditor
will advance funds and forego another investment
opportunity for the funds. Consider the burden an
These claims include UVTA, resulting trust theories (no
conveyance was made), common law fraudulent conveyances,
unlawful corporate distributions under California Corporations
Code § 316(a), 506(b), and 2009(b), violation of the Bulk Sales Act
(Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code), and breach of
fiduciary duty if an improper corporate distribution.

43
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element of legal "energy" or "work" that is expended to
reach an accessible asset, if possible. The soft factors,
which are difficult, but not impossible, to calculate, are the
skills of the attorneys (on both sides of the equation), the
devotion of each attorney to the case at hand, the
availability of capital to prosecute or defend a case, the
reputations of the attorneys, the personal and professional
risks assumed in reaching property from the grip of an
unstable person, the disposition of the particular judge,
and the particular body of law (pro debtor or pro-creditor).
The factors are incorporated into the attorney's fees that
are part of the burden and, therefore, calculable in part.
While bankruptcy would stop nearly all state court
fraudulent conveyance actions given that the trustee is the
owner of the claims, bankruptcy is generally irrelevant
because the trustee subsumes the position of the creditor. 44
Here is the equation that measures the fraudulent
conveyance. Under Husky, the court frames a fraudulent
conveyance as a tool of concealment. 45 The converse is
that the legal action is to reach the fraudulent conveyed
property, now reframed as inaccessible, and thereby lift
the veil of the concealment. The fraudulent conveyance
action filed by the creditor attacks an asset subject to
concealment, reveals its existence as property of the
debtor, and makes it accessible to enforcement. 46
The denominator is the total of the claim, i.e.,
$1,000,000.00. 47 The numerator is the following: the dollar
value of the recovered asset minus the burden equals the
net recovery. This is what the equation looks like:
1- Total Cash Recovery-Total Burden =Net due the Client ÷
Total Dollar value of the Claim= Inaccessibility rate @(%).
Cal. Bankr. Code §§ 548, 544(b) (West) (stating trustee stands
in shoes of creditors).
45 Husky, 136 S. Ct. at 1587 (describing fraudulent conveyance as
concealment).
46 Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.07(a)(1) (West) (describes avoiding the
transfer of obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the
creditor's claim).
47 The hypothetical is that the judgment is in the amount of
$1,000,000. The accrual of interest is irrelevant for these
calculations, but when factored in, would necessarily alter the
outcome on an incremental basis.
44
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#1.
If the claim is $1,000,000, the cash recovery
is $252,000, the fees are $151,000.00, the inaccessibility
efficiency of the asset protection scheme is 89.9% and the
accessibility efficiency is 10.1%.
#2.
If the claim is $1,000,000, and the cash
recovery is $1,000,000, but the burden is $500,000, the
inaccessibility efficiency is 50%, even though the creditor
collected 100% on the dollar.
#3.
If the claim is $632,000, and the cash
recovery is $185,000, but the burden is $100,000.00, the
inaccessibility efficiency is 86.6%. 48
#4.
What if the creditor spent more money that
the amount of the gross collection? The claim is
$1,000,000.00. The creditor collected $353,000, but spent
$500,000.00. The inaccessibility efficiency is 114.7% or
14.7% above 100%, which means that the asset protection
further damaged the creditor by increasing the creditor's
net loss.
#5.
Sometimes the debtor succeeds under Husky
in concealing all assets that leaves the creditor penniless,
even for costs. The claim is $1,000,000. The recovery due
the creditor is zero, but the creditor spent $500,000.00. The
inaccessibility efficiency rate is 150%, or increasing the
creditor's damages by another $500,000.
#6.
What if the creditor spent just $1,000 to
collection $1,000,000? The inaccessibility efficiency is .01%
and the accessibility efficiency is 99.9%.
The equation establishes a realistic market pricing
for any civil judgment. For example, take hypothetical #6
that sounds like an attorney writing up the payoff of the
judgment that the judgment debtor or insurance company
will pay. The market value of the judgment in #6 is 99.9%
or par. 49 For another example, take hypothetical #5. This is
To be really exact the inaccessibility efficiency is 86.55363912%.
The accessibility efficiency is 13.449367088%
49 Par means the face amount of the judgment that includes the
principal damages, pre-judgment interest under the California
Civil Code § 3287 (West) ( describing the right to pre-judgment
interest if the amount is fixed] or § 3289(a) (describing the
interest on contract debt), court costs and potentially prejudgment attorney's fees, if any. Wisper Corp. v. California
48
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a judgment, which is cloaked under the veil of asset
protection. The market value of the judgment in #5 is a
negative $500,000.00, i.e. toxic value.
This equation proves that, at a given time the
market value of judgment appreciates, or depreciates,
based on the total recovered less the burden and divided
by the total. However, should the creditor later discover
the hidden "treasure map" that reveals the debtor's secret
bank account, or box of gold doubloons, the probable
recovery skyrockets accompanied by an increase, or maybe
decrease, in costs to collect the judgment itself. Given that
enforcement is linear (i.e., from event to another event),
and that the debtor might dance around each act of
enforcement, this equation can predict the future value. If
the debtor ramps up an asset protection campaign by
opening the closing bank accounts, or cashing out bank
accounts, the response by the creditor is to levy every bank
in town, and likewise serve a subpoena on every bank. 50
Unstated, but part of the equation, is the fact that
the debtor might be incurring attorney's fees in fending off
enforcement. The equivocation in this sentence is not by
happenstance. The fact that the debtor files papers with
the sheriff or court in pro per, while the creditor has to pay
for an attorney to likewise file papers with the sheriff or
the court, is part and parcel of all asset protection which is
to bleed the other party to death. The more polite
language is a "war of attrition," which should not be
understated. A famous New Yorker cartoon stated "You
have a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much justice can
you afford?" 51 The wonderful expression applies to both
parties, but the judgment debtor needs not to retain an
attorney to exchange in penny-ante tricks, including
Commerce Bank, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(describing entitlement to prejudgment interest).
50 $40.00 for the sheriff's fee per bank; $100.00 for the process
server to serve the levy; and $100.00 to serve the subpoena for
each bank for a total of about $240 per package. Given 10 banks
in town, the total burden is $2,400.00 to reach all banks to serve
the levy and subpoena, plus paying for the subpoena charges
incurred by the bank.
51 Cartoon by J.B. Handelsman. Copyrighted The New Yorker
Collection, 1973.
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moving funds from bank to bank or opening bank
accounts in the name of newly minted LLC's which are
domestic, out-of- state, or even offshore. The debtor need
not spend too much money in depositing cash into the
bank account of a related entity that provides unrestricted
access to the debtor. With little or virtually no effort, the
debtor can: transfer title in real property to family
members; record false and fraudulent mortgages, deeds of
trust and financial statements; create promissory notes and
bogus contracts that would make the debtor look
insolvent; or establish "trusts" that warehouse all assets.
While the debtor might fill out the asset protection forms
or hire an attorney, the burden on the debtor is a trifle
when compared to the time, effort, and energy of the
creditor and attorney, given that the burden of proof falls
upon the creditor to prove a fraudulent conveyance. 52
Should the creditor engage in a relentless and
highly aggressive campaign to collect a judgment, a
judgment debtor might raise the white flag of surrender
and offer a cash settlement that be the 100% of the
judgment or a cash settlement. This equation still applies,
because the debtor would not have settled unless the
creditor had expended a lot money, time, and resources to
bring the debtor to the bargaining table.

IV. PRICING THE JUDGMENT PRICES THE
SETTLEMENT
Everything has a price including civil judgments.
Absent judgment for the recovery of personal property,
consent decrees, or injunctive relief; nearly all judgments
award money damages to the plaintiff for a precise and
specified sum of money. 53 All judgments accrue interest
that range from less than 1% for federal judgment to about
10% in most states. 54 Given the accrual of interest, and the
Whitehouse v. Six Corp., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 600, 604 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
53 "In any judgment, or execution upon such judgment, the
amount shall be computed and stated in dollars and cents,
rejecting fractions." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 577.5 (West).
54 Id. § 685.010(a) (listing 10% for California).
52
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statutory right to recover post-judgment attorney's fees
and costs, the debtor is motivated to pay off the judgment
in order to shrink the liability footprint. 55 This judgment,
given the absence of any burden and its appreciating
value, is priced at 100% or even more should the debtor
"dally," which enables the creditor to collect accrued
interest. A delay in payment penalizes the solvent debtor
given the accrual of interest in state court but not federal
court. 56
On the other hand, the debtor is recalcitrant. 57
Recalcitrance causes the creditor to accrue fees and costs
which resets the price of the judgment. Take the example
of the $632,000 civil judgment that produces a net return of
$85,000.00. The market price of the judgment is 13.4% of its
face value. 58 What does 13.4% really mean? The equation
that the defendant successfully shrunk the liability
footprint by 86.6%, even though losing the original [tort]
case at the jury trial. This victory replicates a jury award
for $85,000 when in fact the damages equaled $632,000.00.
Better stated, the 13.4% price recalibration of the judgment
is a repudiation of the original jury award. Granted that a
judgment for $85,000 is an affront to the plaintiff, much
less to the court itself, but the inaccessibility at 86.6% of
enforcement resets the price of the judgment.
This equation accurately monetizes the efforts of a
debtor to frustrate the efforts of a creditor in seeking to
enforce a judgment in the face of robust asset protection
strategies. Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz resets
the price of every judgment. Asset protection renders
inaccessible the debtor's assets that shrink to a finite
number the debtor's liability under the civil judgment of
this equation. Alternatively, a robust campaign, wellId. § 685.040 (enables the creditor to collect post-judgment
attorney's fee if the judgment allows fees as a line item).
56 The daily rate of interest for $1,000,000 is $273.97 in state court,
and $16.44 in federal court.
57 Family law courts are common forums for fraudulent
conveyances. See In re Marriage of Dick, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 743 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) (optimizes offshore asset protection schemes).
The family law court awards attorney's fees. Id. at 168 (granting
$750,000-in part related to asset protection).
58 This number is rounded to the nearest 10th of a decimal point.
55
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financed and with competent representation, alters the
pricing of the judgment, which would, of course, expand,
or even exceed, the debtor's true liability footprint under
the original judgment. 59 This equation prices to the
judgment all "price points" up and down this asset
protection continuum. The efforts to hide, and the efforts
to seek, assets are now calculated to 7th decimal point,
which includes, for example, the net payment of
$84,999.999691 due the creditor based on the $632,000
judgment. 60
Pricing through this equation is more than just
quantifying the success or failure of asset protection
campaign. The pricing of judgment through this equation
takes center stage in the medium of settlement, whether by
direct contact, a judicially mandated settlement conference,
or mediation, when the parties have a good idea in pricing
the potential judgment at par. After years of litigation, and
rounds of discovery, chances are that the parties can
reasonably predict the outcome of the case. Clearly,
parties and their attorneys are sometimes surprised, but
generally experienced attorneys have a good grip on the
final "price" of the judgment. Absent a fully insured
defendant for the costs of defense and indemnity, or a very
solvent defendant, the equation becomes part of, if not
overwhelms, all dispute resolutions. Nothing is more
important than getting paid and paid without further
litigation, expensive enforcement or toppling asset
protection schemes. This imperative drives all settlements
and the respective strategies of the warring parties that
reveal themselves in settlement "Technicolor."
The
erstwhile defendant boasts that the plaintiff never collects
come "hell or high water" or, alternatively, the plaintiff
If the creditor collected interest, costs and attorney's fees, and
tort damages that arise out of the fraudulent conveyance action,
the price of the original judgment would exceed its par value. A
creditor can recover damages arising from a fraudulent
conveyance and even punitive damages. Cardinale v. Miller, 166
Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (granting
compensatory damages of $2,170,593; punitive damages of
$900,000; and $293,937.50 in attorneys' fees). The accessibility
quotient might exceed 100%.
60 Based on hypothetical #3.
59
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threatens that "no stone shall be unturned." 61 Based on the
risk of nonpayment of a settlement and applying this
equation, the plaintiff's counsel is instructed to: demand
security to insure performance under a payment program
given the risk of a later asset protection or debtor fatigue;
agree to accept a cash sum to avoid the risk of the preordained default under the payment program; or demand
and receive a personal guaranty from a solvent party. 62
Other settlement options abound.
Whatever the charges or counter charges in the
medium of a settlement, the parties and their attorneys
apply this equation to reach, if possible, a number that
fairly reflect the true price of the judgment and settle the
case accordingly.

Hooser v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 341 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
62 Debtor fatigue means that the debtor defaults because the
debtor decides that "enough money has been paid." This term is
common in Chapter 13s.
61
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I. INTRODUCTION
Standard 1 of the 2013 Business Accreditation
Standards of the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of
Business (“AACSB”) regards the mission, impact, and
innovation of a college of business:
The school articulates a clear and
distinctive
mission,
the
expected
outcomes this mission implies, and
strategies outlining how these outcomes
will be achieved. The school has a history
of achievement and improvement and
specifies future actions for continuous
improvement and innovation consistent
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with this mission, expected outcomes,
and strategies.1
In view thereof, salutary support of a practical
teaching-enhancement device is discussed herein: the Certified
Commercial Contracts Manager (“CCCM”) credential. The
CCCM
is
awarded
by
the
National
Contract
Management Association (“NCMA”). Tomorrow, the
CCCM increasingly could serve as a signaling tool for
business school-graduates in their challenging employment
market. This business title constitutes a Uniform
Commercial Code-focused credential. As such, today it
appears particularly relevant to classroom teachers of
business law.
Business schools’ law professors’
summoning students’ attention toward the CCCM appears
particularly timely for 2018 in light of America’s evercommercializing employment market.

II. BUSINESS
SCHOOLS’ LAW PROFESSORS, AND
ACCOUNTANCY
It was Germany wherein developed the intial model
for the research-based college of business. 2 In Germany,
business education and research proved accountancyoriented. 3 Modern America’s business law professors have
adopted curricula comporting with AACSB International goals
and objectives for years, while perceiving a duty to train their
accounting students for public accounting careers. 4 A law
school’s graduates’ capacity to surmount the bar examination
squares with the institution’s own educational goals;
naturally, the legal curriculum typically suffices (assuming a
1AACSB

INTERNATIONAL, ELIGIBILITY PROCEDURES AND
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS FOR BUSINESS ACCREDITATION (2016),
http://www.aacsb.edu//media/aacsb/docs/accreditation/standards/businessstds_2013_u
pdate-3oct_final.ashx.
2 Kimmo Alajoutsijärvi, et al., The Legitimacy Paradox of Business
Schools: Losing by Gaining? 14 ACAD. OF MGMT. LEARNING & EDUC.
277, 279 (2015).
3 Id. at 280.
4 M.C. Kocakulah, et al., The Present State of the Business Law Education
of Accounting Students: The Business Law Professor’s Perspective, 26(1) J.
OF LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 137, 139 (2009).
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reasonable review-effort by just-graduated Juris Doctors) to
arm graduates for that ordeal.5
Consequently predictable is a vision of themselves,
held by most professors of business law as preparers of
accounting students aspiring to the Certified Public
Accountant (“CPA”) credential:
Just as lawyers receive training within the
three-year law school curriculum that helps
them to pass their state bar examinations,
accounting
students
who
master
a
comprehensive curriculum in business law and
the regulatory environment will find the
business law portion, or law-related questions
on the CPA examination a much less significant
hurdle than those who have had no curriculum
in law.6
In other words: “The law courses that business schools
offer to potential CPAs should be designed to ensure mastery
of the subjects covered on the CPA examination . . .” 7 This
might remain true whether or not twenty-first century voices
in accountancy education disclaim passage of the CPA
Examination as an accountancy educational goal. 8 To the
minds of surveyed business law educators of 1993 and 2005,
UCC-topics numbered among the topmost ranks among CPA
Examination subject-matters of salience to accountancy
students contemplating a public accounting career.9
However, the 1980s was when the law component of
the CPA Examination held a sway wider than thereafter. 10
Upon CPA Examination revisions of 1994 through 2004 or still
more recently, the business law element of the test reached its
Id. at 161, 180.
Id. at 180; Christine Neylon O’Brien & John Neylon, The Role of
Business Law in the 150 Hour Educational Requirement for CPA
Certification, 18 J. OF LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 1, 19 (2000).
7 Id. at 18.
8 KOCAKULAH ET AL., supra note 4, at 156.
9 Id. at 160-161, 174-175.
10 Carol J. Miller & Susan J. Crain, Legal Environment v. Business Law
Courses: A Distinction Without a Difference? 28 J. OF LEGAL STUD.
EDUC. 149, 158 (2011).
5
6
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then-nadir.11 Examination-revision diminishing business lawand-accountancy professors’ potent rationale for business law
course-requirements, the incentives for accountancy students
to register for elective business law coursework faded
accordingly. 12 Meanwhile, between 1969 and 2009 corporate
law was removed from the majority of business schools’
curricula.13 As early as 1969 the AACSB excised language from
its standards that looked to business law as a curricular
requirement.14
For decades, new Certified Public Accountants have
deemed business law as of comparatively slight import
respecting their own professional competence. 15 And
nowadays prominent organizations of the accountancy field
treat business law acumen as of eroding import for their
calling’s college graduates. 16 The Uniform Accountancy Act
Model Rules require no business law coursework, albeit
expressly exacting income taxation-training. 17 Universities
overwhelmingly have come to require but a single businesscore law-based course for their majors in business; the decline
from a minimum of two such business law courses to this
decade’s solitary one transpired over 1960-2010.18 Proceedings
of the AACSB Golden Jubilee Meeting over April 25-29, 1966,
already evidenced the shifting tide.19
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(“AICPA”) released an Exposure Draft: Maintaining the
Relevance of the Uniform CPA Examination on September 1,
2015.20 Said “relevance” communicates to the citizenry that the
KOCAKULAH ET AL., supra note 4, at 144.
Id. at 182.
13 J.C. Spender, The Past Is Present, BizEd, 42-44 (March/April 2016).
14 KOCAKULAH ET AL., supra note 4, at 152.
15 Id. at 146.
16 Id. at 139.
17 Id. at 141, 178.
18 MILLER & CRAIN, supra note 11, at 166.
19 Id. at 166-167, 167 n.83.
20 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, EXPOSURE
DRAFT: MAINTAINING THE RELEVANCE OF THE UNIFORM CPA
EXAMINATION 3 (2015),
https://www.aicpa.org/BecomeACPA/CPAExam/nextexam/Dow
nloadableDocuments/Next-CPA-Exam-Exposure-Draft20150901.pdf.
11
12
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AICPA’s Certified Public Accountant credential maintains its
assurance of high professional capacities. Accommodating an
entrepreneurial spirit, the Exposure Draft related: “The
accounting profession is dynamic, and the required skills and
abilities of CPAs need to evolve to keep pace with the
increasing rate of change in the marketplace.”21 That Exposure
Draft delivered proposals for the impending version of the
Uniform CPA Examination.
The Exposure Draft delineated proposed revisions to
become effective upon approval by the AICPA Board of
Examiners:22 “The AICPA will consider all responses received
on or before November 30, 2015,”23 i.e., in eleven weeks from
the Exposure Draft’s release. Actual revisions were to be
announced during 2016 toward adoption for the 2017 Exam.24
The structure of the Exam was to continue as that of its current
four sections.25
Business Law was to remain as area II of the
Regulation section: “The Regulation (REG) section tests
knowledge and skills that a newly-licensed CPA must
demonstrate with respect to federal taxation, ethics and
professional responsibilities related to tax practice, and
business law.” 26 Anticipated was extension of the Exam’s
length from 14 to 16 hours. 27 But the proportion of the
upcoming version of the Exam allocated area II shriveled to 515 percent from its current 17 to 21 percent.28 Business Law’s
contemplated ceiling falls beneath its prior floor:
“Additionally, the content percentage allocated to Area II will
be reduced.”29 For example: “The group Uniform Commercial
Code will be eliminated; however, the topic Secured
Transactions, formerly in that group, will move to the group
Debtor-Creditor Relationships.”30

Id. at 23.
Id. at 2.
23 Id. at 6.
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id. at 3.
26 Id. at 21.
27 Id. at 4.
28 Id. at 21, A55.
29 Id. at 21.
30 Id. at 21 (italics in original).
21
22
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The National Association of State Boards of
Accountancy (“NASBA”) reacted to this Exposure Draft via its
October 23, 2015, joint letter from NASBA’s President-CEO,
and its Chair, to the AICPA Board of Examiners. Regarding
significant areas of content, this reply propounded, inter alia:
In REG, Area II – Business Law, Topic D.
Government Regulation of Business: The
International Qualifications Appraisal
Board (IQAB) is concerned about deleting
a significant portion of the content that
has been tested regarding the Uniform
Commercial Code, as well as other
federal laws and regulations (including
antitrust, copyright, patents, money
laundering, labor, employment and
ERISA). This is important because the
REG section of the Examination is used as
the
International
Qualifications
Examination (IQEX). It is imperative that
this section not be reduced.31
Imperative. Respecting the content ranges within
each section of the Examination, this NASBA
response offered:
a. The reduction in emphasis on REG,
Area II, Business Law is concerning. A
reduction from a minimum of a 17%
focus to only a 5% focus seems extreme,
as the basic understanding of business
law is crucial to all CPAs. We would
suggest a minimum range would be
between 10% and 15%. Further, if REG is
going to continue to serve as the IQEX
Exam, Business Law topics should be
Letter from Walter C. Davenport, Chair of the NASBA, and Ken L.
Bishop, President and CEO of the NASBA, to the Board of Examiners
of the AICPA (Oct. 23, 2015), available
athttps://media.nasba.org/files/2015/10/Response-to-CPA-ExamExp-Oct-23-2015.pdf.
31
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increased to range between 15% and 20%
of the Examination.
b. We note that throughout all four
sections of the Examination, the number
of content areas has been reduced and the
percentage
bands
within
each
reconstituted
area
have
been
expanded.Why were bands with ranges
from 4-6% previously, now all given
ranges of 10%? This has the effect of
providing less granularity and insight to
stakeholders,
including
candidates,
regarding the importance of various
topics. . .
c. This expansion of percentage bands
also seems to give much latitude in
creating panels. As an example, as
outlined in the Exposure Draft, 85% of
one REG. Examination could be devoted
solely to taxation topics, leaving only 15%
for business law, ethics, professional
responsibilities and federal tax procedure.
. ..32

Hence assume, arguendo, that within accountancy the
requisite command of business law (expressly embracing the
Uniform Commercial Code) were to shrink. There transpires
an actual, years-long annual evaporation from business
schools’ applicant-pool.33 Hence assume, arguendo, that such
yearly diminution endures. If those conditions prevailed in
2017, then how during 2018 could undergraduate commerce
colleges’ business law professors substantiate their own value
more vigorously?

III. COMMERCIALIZED EMPLOYMENT-MARET CAPABILITIES
SIGNALING

Id. at 4-5.
Alexandra Wolfe, Clayton Christensen, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1-2, 2016, at
C17.
32
33
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The undergraduate school of business law professor
constructively could reinforce 2018’s students and future
alumni and alumnae through facilitating award to them of
well-earned
professional
business
certifications.
Undergraduate business colleges’entering freshmen seek more
structured support and career guidance, even tailored career
advice, than that on-offer hitherto.34 Simultaneously, knowing
scholars of business assert: “When assessed from an
employer’s perspective, any evidence of a student’s study for
professional designations and/or passing those exams may
suggest a high level of ambition, strong work ethic and career
commitment from that student.”35
Any payoffs from students’ display to employers of
such affirmative evidence might particularly prove practical
for an identifiable population of the student-bodies found
among America’s many undergraduate commerce colleges.
For in 2016, economists Eric R. Eide, Michael J. Hilmer and
Mark H. Showalter reported their study of the earnings of
approximately
7,300
college
graduates
a
decade
postgraduation. 36 Their report controlled for variables
influencing graduates’ incomes including, e.g., age at conferral
of degree, ethnicity/race, family income, graduate degrees,
marital status, SAT scores, and sex. 37 It disclosed that the
sharpest earnings gaps develop among business majors;
products of selective institutions command 12% greater
average earnings than do midtier-colleges’ products and 18%
more in earnings than graduates of least-selective colleges.38
These economists add: “[I]t could be related to differences in
Srilata Zaheer, Business is Our Classroom, BIZED (February 23, 2016),
http://www.bizedmagazine.com/archives/2016/2/features/busine
ss-is-our-classroom.
35 Joseph W. Goetz, et al., Integration of Professional Certification
Examinations With the Financial Planning Curriculum: Increasing
Efficiency, Motivation, and Professional Success, 4 AM. J. OF BUS. EDUC.
35 (2016),
https://www.cluteinstitute.com/ojs/index.php/AJBE/article/view
/4111.
36 Eric R. Eide & Michael J. Hilmer, Is It Where You Go or What You
Study? The Relative Influence of College Selectivity and College Major on
Earnings, 34 CONTEMP. ECON. POL. 37, 39 (2016).
37 Id.
38 Id., at 41.
34
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alumni networks and other connections with potential
employers for jobs and internships due to institutional
prestige.” 39 Truly could it be connected with those
divergences, because 21 years earlier Cornell University
Professor of Economics, Ethics, and Public Policy Robert H.
Frank and Duke University Professor of Public Policy Philip
Cook discerned: “Many of the nation’s most prestigious
employers have an interest in hiring the graduates of elite
institutions quite independently of how they perform on the
job.”40
So faculty members serving less-exclusive student
bodies within less-prestigious institutions ought, for their
identifiable student-segment among America’s undergraduate
business schools, to help level an uneven jobhunting-field.
Pursuit of a business professional designation by commerce
college undergraduates exemplifies the signaling exercise:
“The use of a mechanism by which someone indicates to
someone else that they have certain characteristics, even
though those characteristics are not directly observable….
Economists have been increasingly inclined to explain
economic and non-economic phenomena as signals.” 41 Paul
Seabright, respected professor of economics at the Toulouse
School of Economics, observes how, after all, everyone serves
within networks shaping self-presentation to everybody else.42
Consider the following:
. . . students may seek qualifications
through formal examinations even
though they have no interest in a subject,
and it is well known that it will be of no
use to them in actually doing a job. This is
rational conduct if they believe that
prospective employers will regard
Id.
ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL
SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW AT THE TOP GET SO MUCH MORE THAN THE
REST OF US 148 (1995).
41 GRAHAM BANNOCK, ET AL., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 380 (1998).
42 PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE WAR OF THE SEXES: HOW CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION HAVE SHAPED MEN AND WOMEN FROM PREHISTORY TO
THE PRESENT 125 (1st ed. 2012); PAUL SEABRIGHT, THE COMPANY OF
STRANGERS: A NATURAL HISTORY OF ECONOMIC LIFE (rev. ed. 2010).
39
40
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success in examinations as signaling
ability, so that such success helps obtain a
good job.43
Reinforced employment-marketplace signaling capability is
advisable for less prestigious institutions’ graduates, even
after factoring-in their presumptive willingness to work for
less. For employers’ hiring is impeded by information costs,
even when labor’s marginal value product exceeds its
remuneration.44
Respecting
human
capital,
employer-employee
certification signals also succeed in reverse. Those burgeoning
“Best Places to Work” certifications correspond to lower rates
of turnover. There seem such turnover abatements across
multiple certifications, albeit at shrinking marginal turnoverdiminutions. With an employer’s certifications-increase comes
an elevation of applicant pool quality for smaller enterprises.45
Certified Public Accountants boast generalist
practicioners and specialists to boot, e.g., forensic accountants,
management
accountants,
and
tax
accountants. 46
Undergraduate school of commerce law professors, heedful of
professional business certifications, understand that (like
Certified Public Accountants) lawyers specialize, e.g., the
bankruptcy attorney or the estate attorney. 47 Most lawyers
prefer a practice concentrated on a single area of law.48 Highly
familiar too are medical specialists, e.g., orthopedists. 49
Observe that in these fields a mastery of the discipline,
corresponding to that of a general practicioner, must be
JOHN BLACK, ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 413-14 (3rd ed.
2009).
44A. ALLAN SCHMID, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS: A POLITICAL ECONOMY
APPROACH 115 (1st ed. 1989); A. ALLAN SCHMID, CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION: INSTITUTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 229-30
(1st ed. 2004).
45 Brian R. Dineen & David G. Allen, Third Party Employment
Branding: Human Capital Inflows and Outflows Following “Best Places to
Work” Certifications, 59(1) ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 90 (Feb. 2016).
46 Catherine Seeber, There’s a Designation for That, J. OF FIN. PLAN.
(May 2014) at 29.
47 Id., at 28.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 29.
43
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absorbed (in the customary expectation) before or at least
simultaneously with an expertise in any specialization.
Contrariwise, within the financial industry, specialized
credentials are in supply for that market’s many predatory
participants devoid of knowledge comparable to that of the
Certified Public Accountant or attorney. Thus, the temptation
for opportunists to prey upon the unsuspecting by flaunting
superficial credentials; those credentials less evidence
sophisticated professional competence than imply that they
are designed to
appeal to some assumedly-exploitable
consumer market element, like seniors:50 “There . . . has long
been a trend among financial advisers of paying to earn
various designations meant to show expertise in a particular
niche, such as serving retirees.” 51 This contrasts with using
specialization to advance (as above) the professional’s
knowledge beyond a generalist’s professional-level base.52
That point was elaborated upon, in context of the
nascent financial therapy field, in America’s business media:
Potential clients should be aware that not all
financial therapists have financial-planning
backgrounds. Some hail from mental-health
fields and often focus on solving one issue, such
as anxiety due to cash-flow problems. For
comprehensive financial plans and continuing
advice, individuals should make sure an
adviser has extensive experience and holds a
major designation, such as being a certified
financial planner.53
One witnesses specializing to advance beyond the
generalist’s disciplinary baseline, ideally anyway, in the
instances of the Certified Public Accountant, the attorney, and
the physician. The school of business administration’s law
professors do well to march ahead conscious of prospective
payoffs from the economists’ salutary signaling device.
JANE BRYANT QUINN, HOW TO MAKE YOUR MONEY LAST: THE
INDISPENSABLE RETIREMENT GUIDE 29-30 (1st ed. 2016).
51 Anne Tergesen, Help Wanted: A Therapist for Your Finances, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 1-2, 2015, at B7.
52 Seeber, supra note 47, at 29; Quinn, supra note 51, at 30.
53 Tergeson, supra note 52, at B7.
50
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However, business law professors cautiously must circumvent
the hazard of promoting certifications other than those
appropriately appreciated as substantive. Most agreeably, one
finds information at hand in reassuring measure respecting
contract management’s CCCM business credential.

IV. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT’S CCCM PROFESSIONAL
CREDENTIAL
A. CONTRACT MANAGERS INTERWEAVE THE WORLD
Tyler Cowan, the George Mason University economist,
counsels that modern America witnesses a wide array of
careers that now, highly frequently, demand a university
education short of the master’s degree-level. 54 Numbered
among these are found the roles of buyers and purchasing
agents. 55 The National Contract Management Association
discerns that contract management, and procurement, actually
mirror one another. Procurement consists of evaluation and
selection of sellers. The supplier counterpart-role is that of the
contract managers. Contract management is a niche within the
procurement profession. Contract managers aim to optimize
outcomes bilaterally.56 Indeed, the Labor Department’s Bureau
of Labor Statistics in January 2013 delivered (on behalf of the
Standard Occupational Classification Policy Committee) a
Direct Match Title File assimilating the “Contracting Manager”
and “Contract Administrator” with “Purchasing Managers.”57
In Canada, similarly, the government’s National Occupational
Classification 2011 listed “contract manager” among titles of
“Purchasing managers.”58
TYLER COWEN, AVERAGE IS OVER: POWERING AMERICA BEYOND THE
AGE OF THE GREAT STAGNATION 37 (1st ed. 2013).
55 Id.
56 CONT. MGMT. ASS’N, WHAT IS CONTRACT MANAGEMENT?, NAT’L
(April 3, 2016)
(http://www.ncmahq.org/About/content.cfm?ItemNumber=993&n
avitemNumber=9909).
57 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIRECT
MATCH TITLE FILE (2016),
http://www.bls.gov/soc/soc_2010_direct_match_title_file.pdf.
58 GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, QUICK SEARCH – RESULTS (April 3,
2016),
54
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The late Douglass C. North, in 1993 the joint recipient
of the Nobel Prize for Economics,59 explained that a division of
specializing labor engenders a worldwide populace expert in
its specialties yet consequentially more ignorant about the
globe’s other elements. 60 More than an efficient system for
pricing is demanded to integrate specialized knowledge at
low-level transaction expense. 61 For products have indirect
producers, e.g., the guarantors of property and contractual
rights, who sustain the structures wherein direct producers
prosper. 62 The expense in transacting is identifiable as the
burden of agreement-enforcement plus the measurement of
what is exchanged. 63 Both enforcement and measurement
must prove imperfect even postulating well-specified rights in
property.64 Vended services and goods (e.g., computers and
autos) must be presented for purchasers lacking expertise
(such as that of, e.g., the computer programmer or automotive
engineer): “Warranties, guarantees, trade marks are just
illustrations of the vast range of institutions and organizations
that enabled specialized individuals to have access to the other
consumer markets that they needed in order to take advantage
of the potential economies possible in…a world of
specialization.”65
Exemplifying transaction costs, broadly, are the
expenses behind, e.g., amassing information, negotiations,
monitoring, and contract enforcement; 66 whereas production
costs actually result in utility-evoking services and goods.67 In
http://www5.hrsdc.gc.ca/NOC/English/NOC/2011/QuickSearch.
aspx?val65=0113.
59 BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 42, at 301.
60 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 162 (1st ed. 2005).
61 Id. at 98, 121.
62 DAVID COLANDER & RONALD KUPERS, COMPLEXITY AND THE ART OF
PUBLIC POLICY: SOLVING SOCIETY’S PROBLEMS FROM THE BOTTOM UP 34
(1st ed. 2014).
63 North, supra note 61, at 158.
64 Id. at 123.
65 Id. at 121.
66 NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM AND BEYOND 113-114 (2nd ed.
2006).
67 RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, ECONOMICS FOR LAWYERS 123 (1st ed. 2005).
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fact, to cut transaction costs impeding the maximizing of
wealth is fixed-upon by positive law-and-economics scholars
insofar as they define prescriptive corollaries at all.68 Happily,
as North comprehends: “The movement from personal to
impersonal exchange always increases total transaction costs
but the consequence is a drastic reduction in production costs,
which more than offset the increased resources going into
transacting—and was responsible for the dramatic growth of
modern economies.”69 Impersonal exchange at a level actually
definitive of everyday life is indispensable to the economic
advance of our species.70
More specifically, investigators into law and economics
distinguish three transaction cost subvarieties. These are
contractual, information, and policing costs. Hence,
contractual costs constitute a niche within transaction costs.
Negotiation expenses (including the value of lost time), and
brokerage and legal fees exemplify the contractual costs
behind attaining agreements. 71 Consistently with these
realities, the nonprofit International Association for Contract
& Commercial Management (IACCM) was established during
1999 due to a need for contract and commercial management
skills. That need resulted from global trade’s deepening
complexity.72

B. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AS A CAREER
Truly is the system of networking, sales, purchases, etc.
(“increased resources going into transacting”), a business
endeavor? Contracts nonetheless seem within the attorney’s

JONATHAN KLICK & FRANCESCO PARISI, FUNCTIONAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS, THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 41
(1st ed. 2009).
69 North, supra note 61, at 91.
70 Peter Boettke, Institutional Transition and the Problem of Credible
Commitment, I ANN’L PROC. OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF
NATIONS 41, 46-47 (2008-2009)
(https://www.beloit.edu/upton/annual_proceedings/).
71 A. ALLAN SCHMID, PROPERTY, POWER, AND PUBLIC CHOICE: AN
INQUIRY INTO LAW AND ECONOMICS 88 (1st ed. 1978).
72 TIM CUMMINS, ET AL., CONTRACT & COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT—
THE OPERATIONAL GUIDE (JANE CHITTENDEN ed., 1st ed. 2011).
68
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compass. 73 North states: “[I]nside the firm there are ever
increasing numbers of accountants, lawyers, and others
devoted to facilitating exchange in the complex world of
impersonal exchange.”74 Supposing swelling totals of people
working
with
contracts,
the
contracts-portfolio’s
administration and the handling of the risks therein demand
attention. 75 Who in the modern day company oversees
contractual risks? While the correct reply shifts among projects
and organizations, the contract manager bears a major portion
of the load.76
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook
Handbook, 2016-2017 Edition
pronounces:
“Purchasing
managers plan, direct, and coordinate the buying of materials,
products, or services for wholesalers, retailers, or
organizations.” 77 Furthermore, “Purchasing managers,
sometimes known as contract managers, are also responsible for
developing their organization’s procurement policies and
procedures. These policies help ensure that procurement
professionals are meeting ethical standards to avoid potential
conflicts of interest or inappropriate supplier and customer
relations.”78
Understandably, “Purchasing managers usually have
at least a bachelor’s degree and some work experience in
procurement. A master’s degree may be required for
advancement to some top-level manager jobs.” 79 In Canada,
one learns of employment prerequisites for purchasing
managers: “A bachelor’s degree or college diploma in

HELENA HAAPIO & GEORGE J. SIEDEL, A SHORT GUIDE TO CONTRACT
RISK (New Ed. 2013).
74 North, supra note 61, at 91.
75 HAAPIO & SIEDEL, A Short Guide to Contract Risk, supra note 73;
HELENA HAAPIO & GEORGE J. SIEDEL, PROACTIVE LAW FOR MANAGERS:
A HIDDEN SOURCE OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 123 (1st ed. 2011).
76 HAAPIO & SIEDEL, A ShortGuide to Contract Risk, supra note 73;
HAAPIO & SIEDEL, Proactive Law for Managers, supra note 75.
77Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Occupational Outlook
Handbook, 2016-17 Edition,
http://www.bls.gov/ooh/management/purchasing-managers.htm
(last visited Jan. 13, 2016).
78 Id. (italics in original).
79 Id.
73
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business administration, commerce or economics is usually
required.”80
Consistently with the foregoing, Robert Half Legal’s
U.S. Glossary of Legal Job Descriptions offers capsuledescriptions of the educational background, jobskills and
duties of many employment slots in corporate legal
departments. The Glossary records:
Contract administration is the management of
contracts made or to be made with customers,
vendors, partners or employees. It involves
negotiating the terms and conditions in
contracts, analyzing and minimizing risk,
ensuring compliance with the terms and
conditions, documenting and agreeing on any
changes or amendments that may arise during
implementation or execution, and drafting and
executing contracts. Duties may include
implementing systems and software to ensure
accurate tracking and record-keeping in order
to fulfill contractual obligations.81
Supervising the contract administration staff is the
contract manager, who well could represent a minimum of
five years of experience.82 More suiting the business college
senior’s aspirations
seems the subordinate, contract
administrator position (drawing upon some twelve months of
experience):
The Contract Administrator is responsible for
reporting on the firm’s operations, overseeing
administrative departments, managing outside
vendors and assisting with the firm’s budget. A
bachelor’s degree and/or a certificate of
completion from a paralegal education program
are typically required. Strong computer skills in
80Government

of Canada, supra note 58.
Half Legal, U.S. Glossary of Legal Job Descriptions (2016),
http://www.roberthalf .com/legal/industry-resources/us-glossaryof-legal-job-descriptions (last visited March 16, 2016).
82 Id.
81Robert
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basic computer programs and management
software are preferred.83

The NCMA website has a Careers Library including
information on resumes, jobhunting, etc. Of course, the
internet might offer many such useful resources. Yet the
NCMA site is one—perhaps the only one—that some
undergraduate, would-be contract managers would actually
read. This website encompasses a detailed January 2014
“$alary Survey: Executive Summary” with 2013 statistics.84 A
glance at the internet can disclose reports of average contract
manager position annual salaries approximating: $79,605; 85
$68,000; 86 $91,730; 87 $95,819; 88 and $62,000; 89 with a median
nationally of $109,538.90
The NCMA’s Student Memberships cost $35.00
annually and include twelve issues of Contract Management
magazine. Prospective undergraduate business school
matriculants (or their job placement-minded parents) guided
by a college of business’s website to the NCMA website can
there find a 10-minute audiovisual presentation entitled This
Is Contract Management: Five Great Reasons to Become a

83

Id.

http://www.ncmahq.org/ (last visited March 4, 2017).
MANAGER SALARY,
http://www.payscale.com/research/US/Job=Contracts_Manager/
Salary (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
86CONTRACT MANAGER SALARY,
http://www.indeed.com/salary/Contract-Manager.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2015).
87CONTRACT MANAGER SALARIES,
https://www.glassdoor.com/Salaries/contract-manager-salarySRCH (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
88CONTRACTS MANAGER, http://salary.careerbuilder.com/Contracts-Manager- (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
89SIMPLYHIRED, www.simplyhired.com (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
90CONTRACTS ADMINISTRATION MANAGER SALARIES,
http://www1.salary.com/Contracts-Administration-ManagerSalary.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
84

NCMA,

85CONTRACT
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Contract Manager. 91 The internet meanwhile affords a 2+
pagelong Contracts Manager Resume Sample.92

C. NCMA CERTIFICATION OPPORTUNITIES
The NCMA’s CCCM
certification examination is
legally defensible and is based on psychometrically sound
objective testing of knowledge.93 This pre-credentialing test is
a four-hour, multiple-choice examination. The Certified
Commercial Contracts Manager (CCCM) examination is 150
questions long, with a passing score of 70 percent. This CCCM
credential appears to constitute a legitimate, nearterm,
contract management credentialing-opportunity for many
among a school of business’s impending-degreeholders. The
undergraduate degree is one prerequisite to award of the
CCCM. Said certification attests to such an education plus,
experience, and knowledge of the Uniform Commercial
Code.94 Prerequisite to earning CCCM status is a minimum of
one year of experience in dealing with commercial contracts
(which recalls the experience requisite to attaining that Robert
Half contract administrator status), and 80 hours of continuing
professional education.95
This CCCM seems a serious credential. The scholarly
literature of business recognizes that professional societies,
generally, aim at educating their memberships in a shared
knowledge; such knowhow can be borne by those members to
their homebase-firms as an element of their workaday
routines. 96 Hence a diffusion of best-practices: the optimal
methods whereby to execute a given process. For professional
associations endeavor to define their callings through the
91THIS

IS CONTRACT MANAGEMENT,
http://www.ncmahq.org/About/content.cfm?ItemNumber=7565&
navitem (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
92 RESUME4DUMMIES, http://www.resume4dummies.com/contractsmanager-resume-sample/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
93WELCOME TO NCMA’S PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION PROGRAM,
http://www.ncmahq.org/ProfessionalDevelopment/content.cfm?It
emNumber=6068&navit (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 STEVEN J. KAHL, ASSOCIATIONS, JURISDICTIONAL BATTLES, AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF DUAL-PURPOSE CAPABILITIES 381, 391 (1st ed. 2014).
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development of and the standardizations of skills and
capabilities. Best-practices are absorbed into enterprises less
by imitation than via such an association’s trainees’ local
application of their own training.97
Luckily: “Candidates [for the CCCM] lacking only the
experiential and continuing education requirements may
apply for the designation and take the [CCCM] examination.
Upon successful completion of the examination, the candidate
will be awarded the designation ONLY when both
experiential and continuing education requirements are
met.”98 Consequently, despite those continuing education and
on-the-job-experience demands upon prospective CCCMs,
they can take the CCCM examination shortly postCommencement—as newborn JDs then take the bar
examination. Here enter employment placement-conscious
professors teaching undergraduate business law. Their
undergrauates can be assisted toward postgraduation mastery
of this UCC “bar examination.” The CCCM examination is
provided at various times weekly through Kryterion Learning
Centers; available are more than 600 testing centers nationally
and internationally,99 i.e., wherever the newly-minted business
degreeholder nets her job.
Therefore, a professional business credential for recent
arrivals to their vocation proves earnable—examwise, at any
rate—when the business school’s undergraduate UCC-lessons
remain fresh. An Economics Department’s course in Law and
Economics might empower would-be contract managerstudents, and instill an overarching logic embedded in a clutch
of UCC and additional business administration law-topics.
Theories of contract law seem to blur into certain humanities
theories, like philosophical theories, or conceptual theories
within political science.100 Yet a law and economics descriptive
97

Id. at 391.

98CERTIFICATION,

http://www.ncmabluegrasschapter.org/Certification.html (last
visited Apr. 3, 2015).
99CCCM,
http://www.ncamahq.org/ProfessionalDevelopment/cccm.cfm?Ite
mNumber=1067&navitem (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
100BRIAN H. BIX, LAW AND ECONOMICS AND EXPLANATION IN
CONTRACT LAW, THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
203-04 (Mark A. White, ed., 1st ed. 2009).
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theory of contract law doctrine, itself, just might become
workable. 101 Carlin Romano’s booklength discussion of
philosophy in the United States 102 elicited Tom Meany’s
rejoinder: “The book…has a glaring gap in perhaps the most
important region of philosophy today—economics, or what
used to be called political economy—which, with its reigning
orthodoxies and radical challengers, could have been the
center of a book like this.”103 Supposing such an overarching
logic, the researches and the teaching of lawyers and academic
economists could dovetail synergistically104 when confronting
subject-matter like regulation, the legal machinery of market
protection, and public policy.105 How might commerce college
law professors empower business students for CCCM’s UCC
“bar examination”?

V. THE UNDERGRADUATE BUSINESS LAW DEPARTMENT AND
THE CCCM
It has been recognized that:
The National Contract Management
Association (NCMA) issues contract
management
certification.
The
organization notes that entry-level
contract professionals [e.g., bachelor’s
degree-holding
CCCM-examination
candidates] usually perform clerical tasks,
prepare
responses
for
contract
modification, assist upper-management
and analyze contract requirements and

Id. at 213.
ROMANO, AMERICA, THE PHILOSOPHICAL (1st ed. 2012).
103Thomas Meaney, Reading the National Mind, WALL ST. J., June 2-3,
2012, at C6.
104 Carol J. Miller & Susan J. Crain, Law-Based Degree Programs in
Business and Their Departments: What’s in a Name? (A Comprehensive
Study of Undergraduate Law-Based Degrees in AACSB-Accredited
Universities), 24 J. OF LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 235, 275 (2007).
105Academy of Legal Studies in Business: Task Force on General Education,
Legal Studies in General Education: Phase I Final Report, 17 J. OF LEGAL
STUD. EDUC. 161, 186 (1999).
101

102CARLIN
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terms to make sure that the contract
complies with laws and regulations.106

Thereby each rookie rather resembles the classic picture of a
lately-graduated JD toiling in a major law firm while studying
for, or recently having passed, her bar examination. 107 No
surprise is it that the NCMA answers the question “What are
the recommended study materials for the CCCM?” with
“Cornell
University
Legal
Institute
web
site
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uss/”; a followup question to
the NCMA runs: “What are the optional materials for the
CCCM[?],” this enquiry evoking: “The Contract Management
Body of Knowledge (CMBOK). 4th Edition.”108
This CMBOK is published by the NCMA itself. That 4th
edition dates from 2013. 109 The year 2014 also brought
ExamReview’s CCCM Contract Management Exam Study
Guide & Practice Questions 2015. 110 Its Amazon.com blurb,
from pages two and three of this book, proclaims of the CCCM
examination: “The focus is more on the UCC Articles 1, 2, and
2a and some general commercial contracting elements…. At
the time of this writing, CCCM is in a format of 150 questions
per exam....”111 Indeed that focus falls on the UCC.
This book is just 298 pages long.112 One learns from a
detailed Table of Contents 113 that the great bulk of the
substance of its CCCM examination material ought to be quite
familiar to innumerable undergraduate business law-course
veterans. The wide range of its detailed topics-listing signifies
that each such topic’s coverage can be but narrow therein,
106HOW

TO BECOME A CERTIFIED CONTRACT MANAGER,
http://study.com/articles/How_to_Become_a_Certified_Contract_
Manager.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
107 MARTIN MAYER, THE LAWYERS 330-31 (1967).
108CERTIFICATION FAQS,
http://www.ncmahq.org/ProfessionalDevelopment/cccm.cfm?Item
Number (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).
109MARGARET G. RUMBAUGH & JOHN WILKINSON, CONTRACT
MANAGEMENT BODY OF KNOWLEDGE (4th ed. 2013).
110CCCM CONTRACT MANAGEMENT EXAM STUDY GUIDE & PRACTICE
QUESTIONS 2014 (Large ed. 2013).
111Id. at 2-3.
112 Id.
113Id. at 3-5.
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attracting a couple of pages per subject. Article 1 is largely
commonsense, at least for a lawyer teaching business law.
Undergraduate business law courses routinely teach about
UCC Article 2 (Sales). Undergraduate professors of business
law might present sufficient CCCM material by advancing as
though with one eye on the UCC and another on that Study
Guide for 2015.
Professors Carol J. Miller and Susan J. Crain’s review
of hundreds of catalog course descriptions enabled them to
formulate this Legal Environment model-course’s composite
course description:114
This course explores legal and ethical
issues to assist business persons in
recognizing, preventing, and managing
related risks in the domestic and
international regulatory environment in
which businesses function. Students are
introduced to the U.S. court system, and
alternative means of resolving legal
disputes. Sustainability of business
practices, social responsibility, and rights
& duties are explored through discussion
of environmental law, employment
discrimination, deceptive advertising,
products liablility, torts, and agency
principles,
along
with
related
constitutional law issues. The course also
examines how contract rules and
practices impact businesses, customers
and other constituents.115
Miller and Crain contrast that with their Business Law
model- course’s composite course-description:
Business organizations are examined in terms
of
differentiating
the
structure,
legal
requirements, liability risks, and agency rights
& duties. Fiduciary duties are discussed,
114MILLER
115

& CRAIN,supra note 11, at 202.
Id. at 203.
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including their relationship with selected
security regulations. Rules related to contracts
are studied, along with Uniform Commercial
Code requirements as they apply to sale of
goods, negotiable instruments and secured
transactions. Application of these rules and
concepts
to
business
situations
is
emphasized.116

These composite course descriptions comport with CCCM
credential considerations. Contract rules impact businesses,
cutomers and other constituents. Uniform Commercial Code
requirements apply to sale of goods.

VI. CONCLUSION
Appraised herein has been a specific, Uniform
Commercial Code-focused certification option. That CCCM
credential in its serious business field appears a realistic,
postgraduation goal toward which an undergraduate business
school can train and aim undergraduates. The CCCM is onoffer through the National Contract Management Association.
By no means need “Business Law Department” professors in
business schools inaugurate inquiries into the subject of
undergraduates and professional certifications in business,
particularly regarding the law-related business field of
contract management, from Square One. Nearterm,
professional certifications in practical business sectors can add
muscle to the push of ambitious commerce school-products to
win challenging positions, and to prosper therein.
In 2015, Robyn Lawrence and Melissa Wright of the
University of Scranton assessed the contemporary role of
business law within the accountancy curriculum. 117 They
declared their topic’s
impact beyond the sectors of
accountancy’s students and their educators. 118 They
apprehended that the retreat of law-related instruction within
Id. at 206.
Lawrence & Melissa Wright, The Current Role of Business
Law in the Accounting Curriculum, 15(7) J. HIGHER EDUC. THEORY &
PRACTICE 86 (2015).
118 Id.
116

117Robyn
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the accountancy curriculum seemed to have paused through
the preceding decade. 119 Yet they also acknowledged the
thrust of the September 2015 AICPA Exposure Draft.120 In the
meantime, preparation of business school undergraduates for
the CCCM credential presents another avenue whereby
“Business Law Department” professors potentially show their
mettle afresh, even in a period of shrinking emphasis on legal
topics in the Uniform Certified Public Accountant
Examination.

119
120

Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 90.
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Zachary C. Bolitho1

I. INTRODUCTION
A hypothetical young entrepreneur named Ernest
recently read an article reporting that marijuana distribution
was a lucrative business. After extensive research and
discussions with some friends who work in the “marijuana
industry,” Ernest decided to open a retail store selling
marijuana in his hometown of Raleigh, North Carolina. He
entered a supply agreement with a local horticulturist who was
also an expert marijuana grower. Ernest named his business
“Best Buds Dispensary, Inc.,” registered it with the secretary of
1Assistant
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state’s office, rented a storefront in a strip mall, outfitted the
space with display cases and shelving, hung some signs, hired
a few employees, and opened for business on December 1, 2016.
His dispensary sold loose-leaf marijuana, marijuana joints, and
so-called “marijuana edibles.”
The business operated on a cash-only basis, and
business was booming due in part to an advertising campaign
Ernest started on social media. In the first week, Ernest sold
over 60 kilograms of marijuana and generated a profit of
$50,000. To protect himself, his product, and his profit from
would-be robbers, Ernest hired an armed security guard to
serve as a sentry at the dispensary’s entrance. Ernest opened a
business account at the local bank. The bank manager asked
some questions before eventually allowing Ernest to use the
account to deposit large amounts of cash generated from the
dispensary.
Ernest made no secret of the fact that Best Buds
Dispensary, Inc. sold marijuana. Everybody in town knew
what he was up to, and it did not take long for Ernest to appear
on the radar screen of agents with the federal Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). Within a month, DEA
agents raided his dispensary while waiving a federal search
warrant in the air. The agents not only seized the marijuana
found in the dispensary, they also went to the local bank with a
court order authorizing them to seize the contents of Best Buds
Dispensary’s bank account.
A short time later, the U.S. Attorney’s Office presented
the matter to the grand jury. The grand jury returned an
indictment charging Ernest with a slew of serious federal
charges, including distribution of marijuana, 2 renting a
property for the purpose of drug distribution, 3 advertising the
distribution of a controlled substance, 4 money laundering, 5 and
221

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). This provision of the federal code is commonly
referred to as the “crackhouse statute.” See generally Michael E.
Rayfield, Pure Consumption Cases under the Federal “Crackhouse” Statute,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (2008).
421 U.S.C. § 843(c)(2)(A) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly or intentionally use the Internet, or cause the Internet to be
used, to advertise the sale of . . . a controlled substance . . . .”).
518 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957.
321
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aiding and abetting the possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime. 6 The indictment also included an
allegation seeking forfeiture of the bank account’s contents, as
well as any other property that Ernest obtained using the
proceeds from his marijuana dispensary. 7 If convicted, Ernest
would be sent to federal prison for a significant period of time. 8
And, the charges were not limited to Ernest. The grand
jury also charged the local bank with money laundering for
allowing Ernest to conduct financial transactions using drug
money. 9 Additionally, the grand jury charged the armed
security guard who protected Ernest, his money, and his

618

U.S.C. § 2; 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
U.S.C. § 853(a) (providing for forfeiture of “any property
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained
directly, or indirectly, as the result” of violating the federal drug laws).
8Conviction on the firearm charge alone would result in a five-year
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that a defendant convicted of a § 924(c) offense
shall “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5
years”). And, that five-year term of imprisonment would be served
consecutive to the imprisonment imposed on the other charges. See
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (“no term of imprisonment imposed on a
person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment imposed on the person, including any term of
imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed”).
9The bank would most likely face money-laundering charges under 18
U.S.C. § 1956 and/or 18 U.S.C. §1957. See Julie Anderson Hill, Banks,
Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 617 (2015) (“In
sum, a financial institution that knowingly processes transactions for
marijuana-related businesses commits the crime of money
laundering.”). That is so because, generally speaking, both statutes
prohibit banks from knowingly engaging in transactions—such as
deposits, transfers, and withdrawals—that involve the proceeds of
drug trafficking. See generally Christie Smythe, HSBC Judge Approves
$1.9B
Drug-Money
Laundering
Accord,
Bloomberg,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-07-02/hsbcjudge-approves-1-9b-drug-money-laundering-accord (last visited
January 19, 2017) (discussing the $1.9 million deferred prosecution
agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and HSBC bank to
resolve money laundering charges stemming from transactions
involving the proceeds of drug trafficking).
721
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marijuana with possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime. 10
Now, imagine that Ernest operated his marijuana
dispensary in Denver, Colorado instead of Raleigh, North
Carolina. The story would be much different. The DEA agents
stationed in Colorado—agents who work for the same DEA and
are sworn to uphold the same federal laws as the DEA agents
stationed in North Carolina—would have conducted no raids,
secured no search warrants, and seized no funds. The U.S.
Attorney in Colorado—who works for the same U.S.
Department of Justice and is sworn to uphold the same federal
laws as the U.S. Attorney in North Carolina—would have
sought no grand jury indictments and instituted no forfeiture
proceedings. Instead of contemplating what life would be like
inside of a Federal Bureau of Prisons’ facility, Ernest would be
in his dispensary selling marijuana and counting his (large
amount) of cash. He would be depositing that money in his
account at the local bank, and his armed security guard would
be standing by his side. Although federal law is the same in
Colorado as it is in North Carolina, the DEA Agents and
Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Colorado would drive by Ernest’s
dispensary and do nothing about his blatant and unapologetic
violations of crystal clear federal law.
This hypothetical, unfortunately, is not some far-fetched
scenario dreamt up by an imaginative law professor. No, it is
an illustration of exactly what has been happening in the United
States. Marijuana is a controlled substance that is strictly
prohibited under federal law;11 nonetheless, seven states and
the District of Columbia have passed measures legalizing
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); see generally United States v. Archuleta, 19 F.
App’x 827, 829-30 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming § 924(c) conviction for a
defendant whose role in the conspiracy was “kind of like a guard,”
and who “possessed the given firearm for the specific purpose of
providing security”).
11See 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (explaining the criteria for listing a drug as
a schedule I controlled substance); 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule 1(c)(10)
(listing marijuana in schedule I); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (stating that it is
unlawful to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled
substance”); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (stating that it is unlawful for “any
person to knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled substance”).
1018
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marijuana for recreational use. 12 And a total of twenty-six states
have legalized marijuana for medical purposes. 13 Rather than
challenging those state laws under the Supremacy Clause, and
instead of continuing to enforce the longstanding federal law
equally across the country, the U.S. Department of Justice under
Attorney General Eric Holder announced that it would neither
seek to preempt state legalization measures 14 nor (absent
exceptional circumstances) bring federal marijuana charges
against individuals in those states. 15 Moreover, the Department
of Justice and the Department of Treasury have informed
financial institutions that, money laundering laws
notwithstanding, they may “offer[][financial] services to a
marijuana-related business.” 16 And, an entire industry has
sprung up to provide marijuana dispensaries with armed
12State

Marijuana
Laws
2016
Map
(available
at
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-mapmedical-recreational.html).
13Id.
14Aug. 29, 2013 Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to
Governors of Colorado and Washington (stating that “the
Department will not at this time seek to challenge your state’s law”).
15Aug. 29, 2013 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James
M. Cole to all United States Attorneys (announcing that, as an exercise
of prosecutorial discretion, the Department would not prosecute
marijuana cases in those states that have “legalized” marijuana, except
in extreme cases where specified criteria were satisfied); see also
October 19, 2009 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David
W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys (stating that federal
prosecutors in states that have authorized medical marijuana “should
not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state
laws providing for the medical use of marijuana”).
16February 14, 2014 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
James M. Cole to All United States Attorneys, “Guidance Regarding
Marijuana Related Financial Crimes”; Fin. Crimes Enforcement
Network, Dep’t of the Treasury, FIN-2014-G0001, BSA Expectations
Regarding Marijuana-Related Businesses (Feb. 14, 2014) (providing
guidance to banks that “should enhance the availability of financial
services for, and the financial transparency of, marijuana-related
businesses” in those states that passed “recent state initiatives to
legalize certain marijuana-related activity”); see also Hill, supra note 9,
at 604 (“The guidance explains that the agencies do not prioritize
punishment of banks servicing state-legal marijuana businesses.”).
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security guards. 17 That same Department of Justice, however,
has continued to prosecute marijuana cases in the remaining
states. 18 This is a problem. Indeed, some have called it a
“crisis,” 19 others a “quagmire.” 20 Regardless of what it is called,
one thing is for certain—it must be resolved.
It should be noted at the outset that this Article has little
do with marijuana per se. There is a legitimate debate to be had
regarding our national marijuana policy. Perhaps the time has
come to move marijuana out of Schedule I of the Controlled
Substances List, which would authorize it to be used
medicinally. Or, maybe we should consider decriminalizing
marijuana altogether. The fact of the matter, however, is that
neither of those things has happened. Instead, federal law is
clear—marijuana is illegal in all fifty states. If that is going to
change, it must be done in the way our Founding Fathers

Yakowicz, The Highly Trained Security Force Protecting Colorado’s
Weed
Stash,
Inc.
(Apr.
20,
2015)
(available
at,
http://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/inside-the-backbone-of-thecannabis-industry.html) (reporting on the activities of Blue Line
Protection Group’s business of providing armed security for
Colorado’s marijuana dispensaries and marijuana growing
operations); see also Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look
Like?, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 689, 693-94 (2015) (recognizing that
“every Colorado marijuana business owner who employs an armed
security guard could wind up serving an effective life sentence in
prison” if the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were enforced).
18See generally David Sinclar, Village Man to Forfeit $1 Million in Drug
Case,
The
Pilot
(April
28,
2016)
(available
at
http://www.thepilot.com/news/village-man-to-forfeit-million-indrug-case/article_3a35452a-0d72-11e6-9e61-571d44b5d3fb.html)
(reporting that a North Carolina businessman who was convicted on
federal marijuana and money laundering charges faced a federal
prison sentence and was required to forfeit $1,000,000 in proceeds
from the marijuana sales).
19Bradley E. Markano, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana Through
Executive Branch Nonenforcement, Note, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 293
(2015) (quoting David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana
Legalization and the Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35
CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 575 (2013)).
20Melanie Reid, The Quagmire that Nobody in the Federal Government
Wants to Talk About: Marijuana, 44 NEW MEX. L. REV. 169 (2014).
17Will
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envisioned: the passage of a bill in Congress that is signed into
law by the President.
Along with a host of other serious matters, the future of
federal marijuana enforcement will soon be landing on the desk
of Jeff Sessions, the newly appointed Attorney General. It is
clear from his confirmation hearing testimony that Sessions is
aware of the issue and recognizes that deciding how to handle
it “won’t be an easy decision.” 21 He further stated that “the
United States Congress has made the possession of marijuana
in every state and distribution of it an illegal act. . . . If that . . .
is not desired any longer, Congress should pass the law to
change the rule. It’s not so much the attorney general’s job to
decide what laws to enforce.” 22 At several other points during
the hearing, Sessions reiterated his firm commitment to
enforcing federal law and following the Constitution. 23
Unless and until Congress changes the law, fulfilling
that commitment will require the Department of Justice to alter
its approach to those states that have legalized marijuana. The
current approach is unsustainable and sets a dangerous
precedent that threatens the very existence of our federal
system. It also violates two provisions of the United States
Constitution: (1) the Supremacy Clause; and (2) the Take Care
Clause.
First, state laws authorizing the possession,
manufacture, distribution, and use of marijuana conflict with
the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). More specifically,
the state laws stand as an obstacle to the federal goal of
eliminating the manufacture, distribution, and possession of
marijuana. The state laws, therefore, are preempted by
operation of the Supremacy Clause. Second, the Department of
Wallace, Jeff Sessions Vague About Marijuana Strategy at AG
Senate Hearing, The Cannabist, (Jan. 10, 2017) (available at,
http://www.thecannabist.co/2017/01/10/jeff-sessionsconfirmation-hearing-marijuana-enforcement-first-day/71005/).
22Id.
23See Steven Dennis & Chris Strohm, Sessions Seeks to Reassure Senators
on Race, Torture, Clinton, Bloomberg Politics (Jan. 10, 2017) (available
at,
https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-0110/sessions-cites-crime-rebuts-racism-in-u-s-attorney-general-bid)
(reporting that Attorney General Sessions testified “he would enforce
the laws and Supreme Court decisions—even those he disagreed
with”).
21Alicia
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Justice’s non-enforcement policy in those states that have
legalized marijuana represents a breach of the Presidential
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 24
The Take Care Clause requires the President—and his
surrogates—to enforce the laws passed by Congress, regardless
of whether those laws align with his policy preferences.25 The
current approach is inconsistent with that requirement.
Prosecutors, of course, have broad discretion in
deciding what cases to bring. As a former federal prosecutor,
that discretion is something I know quite well. Prosecutorial
discretion, however, is not boundless. And, it does not extend
so far as to allow the Department of Justice to adopt a policy
that bases the decision to prosecute on the law of the state
where the conduct occurred. Similarly, a state should be unable
to fill its coffers with hundreds of millions of dollars in tax
revenue generated from an activity that flies in the face of
federal law while other states are deprived of such revenue by
their commendable choice to follow federal law. 26 There is
something fundamentally wrong (and, frankly, offensive)
about allowing people to be richly rewarded for their blatant
and open defiance of well-settled law. 27 That is especially true
24Art.

II, § 3, U.S. Const.
J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the Dream Act, and
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013) (stating that the
“Constitution’s Take Care Clause imposes on the President a duty to
enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and
cases”).
26See generally Carlos Illescas, Marijuana Sales Tax Revenue Huge Boon
for Colorado Cities, Denver Post (May 26, 2016) (available at,
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/26/marijuana-sales-taxrevenue-huge-boon-for-colorado-cities/) (discussing the millions in
dollars of tax revenue that have been generated by the Colorado law
permitting recreational marijuana use and reporting that city of
Denver alone “took in $29 million last year from all sales by taxes and
licensing fees”); see also Tanya Basu, Colorado Raised More Tax Revenue
From Marijuana Than From Alcohol, Time Magazine (Sep. 16, 2015)
(“Legal recreational marijuana is a boon for tax revenues in Colorado
. . . . Colorado collected almost $70 million in marijuana taxes.”).
27See
Lucy Rock, Marijuana Millionaires Cashing in on Cannabis
Legalisation, The Guardian (May 22, 2016) (available at,
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/may/22/cashing-in25Robert

50

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

when people doing the same thing in another part of the
country are being sent to federal prison and having their money
forfeited to the federal government. 28
This Article explains why the Department of Justice’s
marijuana policy over the past eight years violates the
Constitution. Part II tells the story of how we ended up where
we are today. It discusses the history of federal marijuana
regulation, including the CSA’s treatment of marijuana as a
Schedule I drug. Part III provides an overview of recent state
marijuana legalization measures. It also discusses the federal
government’s response to those measures. Part IV discusses the
Supremacy Clause, and Part V discusses the Take Care Clause.
Part VI consists of a brief conclusion.

II. THE FEDERAL PROHIBITION ON MARIJUANA
Marijuana has been regulated by federal law since 1937
when Congress passed the Marihuana Tax Act. 29 The Tax Act
“allowed marijuana to be sold and prescribed medically so long
on-cannabis-legalisation) (reporting that one marijuana business
owner in Washington made over $3 million in his first twenty months
of business); see also Vickie Bane & Trevor Dodd, Marijuana
Millionaires
(July
28,
2014)
(available,
at
http://people.com/archive/marijuana-millionaires-vol-82-no-4/)
(reporting that one owner of a marijuana dispensary in Colorado
“raked in $47,000 in 24 hours; within three months, he says, he grossed
$1.5 million”).
28See, e.g., United States v. White, Case No. 12-cr-03045-BCW, 2016 WL
4473803, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 23, 2016) (rejecting motion to dismiss
filed by defendant who was being federally prosecuted for growing
marijuana in Missouri—a state that has not legalized marijuana); see
also David Sinclar, Village Man to Forfeit $1 Million in Drug Case, The
Pilot
(April
28,
2016)
(available
at
http://www.thepilot.com/news/village-man-to-forfeit-million-indrug-case/article_3a35452a-0d72-11e6-9e61-571d44b5d3fb.html)
(reporting that a North Carolina businessman who was convicted on
federal marijuana and money laundering charges faced a federal
prison sentence and was required to forfeit $1,000,000 in proceeds
from the marijuana sales).
29Andrew Renehan, Clearing the Haze Surrounding State Medical
Marijuana Laws: A Preemption Analysis and Proposed Solutions, 14 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 299 (2014).
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as the requisite tax was paid.” 30 Fourteen years later in 1951,
Congress criminalized marijuana with the passage of the Boggs
Act. 31 The Boggs Act was a hard-hitting statute that imposed a
mandatory minimum sentence of two years’ imprisonment for
first-time marijuana offenders, five years’ imprisonment for a
second offense, and ten years’ imprisonment for any additional
offenses. 32 The Boggs Act was largely replaced in 1970 by the
CSA. 33 The CSA was a massive enactment intended to
“combat[] drug abuse and control[] the legitimate and
illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.” 34 To that end, the
CSA “create[d] a comprehensive, closed regulatory regime
criminalizing the unauthorized manufacture, distribution,
dispensing, and possession” 35 of “various plants, drugs, and
chemicals (such as narcotics, stimulants, depressants,
hallucinogens, and anabolic steroids.” 36 Although it has been
tweaked from time to time, the CSA remains the predominant
federal drug law today.
The CSA divides the regulated substances into five
different “schedules.” Drugs are “scheduled” based on their
potential for abuse, accepted use for medical treatment, and
their psychological and physical impact on the body. 37
Schedule I drugs are subject to the most stringent regulation,
while Schedule V drugs are subject to the least. 38 The
manufacture, distribution, possession, or use of Schedule I

30Id.
31Id.

32See

Alex Kreit, Controlled Substances: Crime, Regulation, and Policy
at 408 (Carolina Academic Press 2013) (discussing the evolution of
federal marijuana law).
33Id. at 409.
34Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2005).
35Id.
36Todd Garvey & Brian T. Yeh, State Legalization of Recreational
Marijuana: Selected Legal Issues, Congressional Research Service (Jan.
13, 2014).
37Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).
38Id.
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drugs is flatly prohibited regardless of whether intended for
medical or recreational use. Schedule I drugs “may not be
dispensed under a prescription, and such substances may only
be used for bona fide, federal government-approved research
studies.” 39 That is so because a drug listed in Schedule I has
been determined to have a “high potential for abuse,” “no
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States,” and “a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under medical
supervision.” 40 From the CSA’s effective date until today,
marijuana has been listed on Schedule I. 41 As a result, it cannot
be lawfully manufactured, distributed, or possessed anywhere
in the United States. 42
For years, there have been efforts to move marijuana
from Schedule I to one of the less regulated schedules. 43 The
rescheduling of marijuana could occur in two ways: (1)
legislatively by way of an amendment to the CSA, or (2)
administratively by the Attorney General, acting in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. 44 Despite years of debate, Congress has taken no
action to remove marijuana from Schedule I. 45 The most recent
supra note 36, at 6.
U.S.C. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(C).
4121 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule I (c)(10); Garvey, supra note 36, at 7 (“When
Congress enacted the CSA in 1970, marijuana was classified as a
Schedule I drug. Today, marijuana is still categorized as a Schedule I
controlled substance and is therefore subject to the most severe
restrictions contained within the CSA.”).
42Garvey, supra note 36, at 7 (“Pursuant to the CSA, the unauthorized
cultivation, distribution, or possession of marijuana is a federal
crime.”). The only exception to the flat prohibition is federally
approved research. Raich, 545 U.S. at 13 (stating that the “sole
exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug
Administration preapproved research study”).
43See Raich, 545 U.S. at 13, n.23 (describing various unsuccessful efforts
to reschedule marijuana).
4421 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b) (establishing the process that must be followed
for the Attorney General to reschedule a controlled substance).
45See Paul Lewis, A Gateway to Future Problems: Concerns About the
State-by-State Legalization of Medical Marijuana, 13 UNIV. N. H. L. REV.
39Garvey,
4021
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attempt at administrative rescheduling was denied in August
of 2016 during the tenure of Loretta Lynch, President Obama’s
second Attorney General. 46 Moving marijuana from Schedule I
to a less regulated schedule would not legalize marijuana for
recreational purposes. It would, however, allow marijuana to
be prescribed by a physician—much like opiate-based
painkillers (Schedule II) or anabolic steroids (Schedule III).
Equally unsuccessful have been attempts by marijuana
advocates to have the federal judiciary strike down the CSA’s
regulation of marijuana. Advocates have challenged the
constitutionality of applying the CSA to purely intrastate
marijuana growers and users whose actions complied with a
California law authorizing medicinal marijuana. 47 More
specifically, the proponents argued that applying the CSA to
homegrown marijuana would exceed Congress’ power under
the Commerce Clause. 48 The Supreme Court rejected that
argument in Gonzales v. Raich, holding that the “regulation [of
intrastate marijuana] is squarely within Congress’ commerce
power because production of the commodity meant for home
consumption . . . has a substantial effect on supply and demand
in the national market for that commodity.” 49 In support of its
conclusion, the Court stated that Congress had reasonably
found that allowing locally grown marijuana “would

49, 57 (2014) (recognizing that “federal lawmakers have been, and
continue to be, adamantly opposed to the legalization of marijuana”).
46Catherine Saint Louis, DEA Keeps Marijuana on List of Dangerous
Drugs, Frustrating Advocates, New York Times (Aug. 11, 2016). The
2016 refusal to reschedule marijuana was not all that surprising, given
Attorney General Lynch’s stated opposition to legalizing marijuana at
the federal level. See generally Matt Ferner, Loretta Lynch Says She
Doesn’t Support Marijuana Legalization or Obama’s Views on Pot,
Huffington
Post
(Jan.
28,
2015)
(available
at,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/28/loretta-lynchmarijuana_n_6565962.html).
47Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6 (2005).
48Id.
49Id. at 20.
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undermine the orderly enforcement of the entire regulatory
scheme.” 50
Raich was not the first time the Supreme Court
addressed the applicability of the CSA to state medical
marijuana laws. Four years earlier, the Court decided United
States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative. 51 In that case, a
cooperative was formed to distribute medical marijuana under
California law. 52 The U.S. Department of Justice sued the
cooperative, seeking to enjoin the cooperative on the basis that
its conduct violated the CSA. 53 The cooperative argued that the
CSA contained an implied exception that allowed marijuana to
be distributed and used when it was medically necessary. 54 The
Supreme Court rejected that argument because by placing
marijuana in Schedule I, “the balance already has been struck
against a medical necessity exception” by Congress. 55 And, the
judiciary lacks the authority to “override Congress’s policy
choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior should be
prohibited.” 56
The lower federal courts have also repeatedly rejected
claims that the CSA’s treatment of marijuana as a Schedule I
drug violates substantive due process or equal protection. 57 Put
simply, marijuana proponents have made very little progress at
the federal level—marijuana is as illegal under federal law
50Id.

at 28.
U.S. 483 (2001).
52Id. at 486.
53Id. at 486-87.
54Id. at 490.
55Id. at 499.
56Id. at 497.
57See e.g., Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“Raich II”) (rejecting argument that CSA’s treatment of marijuana as
a Schedule I drug violated substantive due process because “federal
law does not recognize a fundamental right to use medical
marijuana”); United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1976)
(rejecting argument that CSA’s treatment of marijuana was
“irrational”); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1973)
(stating “we cannot say that [marijuana’s] placement in Schedule I is
so arbitrary or unreasonable as to render it unconstitutional”).
51532
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today as it was on the day the CSA was enacted in 1970. But,
the story has been much different in the states. That is
especially true of the past ten years.

III. STATE EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE MARIJUANA AND THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE
For over twenty-five years after the passage of the CSA,
marijuana was prohibited under federal law and the laws of
every state. 58 That changed in 1996 when California passed the
Compassionate Use Act. 59 The Act allowed “seriously ill”
patients and their caregivers to “possess[] or cultivate[]
marijuana for the patient’s medical purposes upon the
recommendation or approval of a physician.” 60 Several years
later, Oregon and Washington passed state laws authorizing
medical marijuana. 61 By the year 2004, ten states had such
laws. 62
The initial federal response to those laws was
understandably hostile given the existence of the CSA. Federal
officials filed lawsuits, 63 obtained injunctions, 64 conducted
raids, instituted prosecutions, 65 and developed a plan for
58Raich

II, 500 F.3d at 856 (explaining that “from 1970 to 1996, the
possession or use of marijuana—medically or otherwise—was
proscribed under state and federal law”).
59Id.
60United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S.
483, 486 (2001).
61Robert A. Mikos, On Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the
States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421,
1423 n. 6 (listing states that have passed laws allowing medical
marijuana).
62Id.
63See id.
64See id.
65See Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 689, 690 (2015) (“By one estimate, the federal
government spent $483 million dollars interfering with state medical
marijuana laws between 1996 and 2012, conducting at least 528 raids
and dozens of prosecutions of people operating in compliance with
state medical marijuana laws.”); see also Lewis, supra note 45, at 59
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helping state and local police agencies fight against medical
marijuana efforts. 66 Thus, the Department of Justice “under the
Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations” aggressively
fought state medical marijuana legalization efforts. 67
The Department of Justice’s approach changed
dramatically, however, after Eric Holder, Jr. was sworn in as the
82nd Attorney General of the United States. 68 The clearest sign
that there was a new (and less stringent) sheriff in town took
the form of a “Memorandum for Selected United States
Attorneys” that was issued on October 19, 2009, by Deputy
Attorney General David Ogden. In that memorandum, Ogden
informed U.S. Attorneys that they “should not focus federal
resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana.” 69 The Ogden
Memorandum represented a major policy shift by the
Department of Justice, and marijuana reformers viewed it as a
turning point in the fight to loosen marijuana restrictions. 70
Although the Ogden Memorandum contained its fair share of
(“The battle against state medical marijuana legalization intensified
under the administration of George W. Bush, as Assistant U.S.
Attorneys prosecuted several high-profile medical marijuana
suppliers during these eight years.”).
66Florence Shu-Acquaye, The Role of States in Shaping the Legal Debate
on Medical Marijuana, 42 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 697, 738 (2016)
(explaining the historical approach of the federal government to state
medical marijuana laws).
67Id.
68See Lewis, supra, note 45, at 60 (stating that President Obama’s
administration, in which Eric Holder served as Attorney General, took
a “180-degree turn from the medical marijuana policies of its
predecessors”).
69October 19, 2009 Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
David W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys.
70Lewis, supra note 45, at 60 (stating that “[i]n 2009, the Obama
administration declared that it would take a political 180-degree turn
from the medical marijuana policies of its predecessors”); see also ShuAcquaye, supra note 66, at 740 (explaining that the Ogden
Memorandum was viewed initially as “a groundbreaking shift in
federal drug policy”).
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double-talk and caveats, 71 it was widely viewed as a clear signal
that “the Department of Justice (DOJ) would stop enforcing the
federal marijuana ban against persons who comply with state
medical marijuana laws.” 72 There can be no denying that it
provided a huge boost to the efforts of state marijuana
legalization proponents. Additional states moved almost
immediately to legalize medical marijuana, and “the
nationwide medical marijuana industry . . . [has grown] at a rate
of 13.8 percent since 2009.” 73
In a move that surprised many observers, the
Department appeared to take a step back on June 29, 2011 with
the release of a Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
James Cole. That memorandum was entitled “Guidance
Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to
Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use,” and it reaffirmed the
Department of Justice’s commitment “to the enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act in all States.” 74 And, it further stated
that the Ogden Memorandum was “never intended to shield”
large commercial, industrial marijuana growing operations
from “federal enforcement action and prosecution, even where
those activities purport to comply with state law.” 75 Despite the
2011 Cole Memorandum, state marijuana legalization measures
did not stop.
In fact, they intensified—branching out from medical
marijuana to legalization of marijuana for recreational
purposes. 76 Both Colorado and Washington passed measures

71For

example, the Memorandum stated that it was merely “guidance”
and that “no State can authorize violations of federal law.”
72Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New
Approach to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 633 (2011).
73Lewis, supra note 45, at 62 (quoting statistics compiled by IBSWorld,
a marijuana industry reporting company).
74June 29, 2011 Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United States
Attorneys.
75Id.
76COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16.
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in November of 2012 that legalized recreational marijuana. 77 A
short time later, the Department of Justice issued yet another
Memorandum relating to state marijuana legalization efforts.
In that Memorandum issued on August 29, 2013, Deputy
Attorney General James Cole told federal prosecutors in those
states that have legalized marijuana to leave even the largescale industrial marijuana growers alone, so long as they were
operating in compliance with eight principles: (1) not selling to
minors; (2) preventing money from going to criminal gangs and
cartels; (3) preventing diversion to those states that have not
legalized marijuana; (4) not using the distribution of marijuana
as a cover for trafficking in other drugs; (5) avoiding violence
and the use of firearms; (6) preventing impaired driving and
other public health issues associated with marijuana use; (7) not
growing marijuana on public lands; and (8) not possessing or
using marijuana on federal property. 78
Also on August 29, 2013, Attorney General Holder sent
a letter to the governors of Colorado and Washington. In that
letter, Attorney General Holder informed the governors that the
Department of Justice would “not at this time seek to challenge
your state’s law.” 79 Put another way, Attorney General Holder
assured the governors that the Department of Justice would not
seek to preempt the Colorado and Washington laws under the
Supremacy Clause. That letter, combined with the Cole
Memorandum issued the same day, was tantamount to the
Department of Justice waving the white flag of surrender. It
was surrender, however, to a battle that the Department had
stopped trying to win four years earlier. And, the marijuana
industry responded by aggressively expanding the list of states
Smith, Marijuana Legalization Passes in Colorado, Washington,
CNNMoney
(Nov.
8,
2012)
(available
at,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/07/news/economy/marijuanalegalization-washington-colorado/).
78Aug. 29, 2013, Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United
States Attorneys at, 1-2.
79Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to Governors of Colorado
& Washington (Aug. 29, 2013).
77Aaron
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that allow marijuana to be used in one form or another.
California, Oregon, Nevada, Alaska, Massachusetts, Maine,
and the District of Columbia have all recently joined Colorado
and Washington by legalizing recreational marijuana. 80 The
number of states authorizing medical marijuana is now at
twenty-six, plus the District of Columbia. 81 Thus, over half of
the states now expressly permit what federal law expressly
prohibits. The Department of Justice has allowed blatant
violations of the CSA’s marijuana prohibition in those states,
but at the same time it has continued to enforce those same
marijuana prohibitions in other states. That is the status quo,
and it raises serious constitutional problems. Those problems
are discussed below.

IV. PREEMPTION
As things stand today, on one side there is a federal law
that prohibits manufacturing, distributing, and possessing
marijuana. On the other side, there are state laws that authorize
manufacturing, distributing, and possessing marijuana. Under
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution when federal
and state law clash, federal law prevails, and the state law is
preempted. 82 That is what should happen here—the state laws
legalizing marijuana must give way to the federal CSA.

80State

Marijuana
Laws
in
2016
Map
(available
at,
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-mapmedical-recreational.html.)
81Id.
82U.S. CONST. art. VI, (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”); see Mikos, supra note
61, at 1422 (explaining that “if Congress possesses the authority to
regulate an activity, its laws reign supreme and trump conflicting
state regulations on the same subject”).
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Although some legal commentators have said as much, 83 the
issue has not been addressed by the federal courts because the
Department of Justice refused to file a lawsuit against the
offending states. 84 There is, however, a new captain steering
the ship at the Department of Justice. With the swearing in of
Jeff Sessions as Attorney General comes the possibility of a
lawsuit seeking to preempt state laws that conflict with the
CSA. If Attorney General Sessions chooses to go down that
road, he will have a strong legal argument.
Preemption is a “doctrine of American constitutional
law under which states and local governments are deprived of
their power to act in a given area” due to the existence of a
federal law that operates in that same area. 85 The Supreme
Court has recognized two broad categories of preemption: (1)
express preemption, and (2) implied preemption. 86 Express
preemption occurs when Congress passes a statute that
explicitly withdraws certain powers from the states. 87 In
circumstances where Congress has failed to make an explicit
83See,

e.g., Brandon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal
Federalism, and Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 567, 579 (2015) (explaining that “[i]t seems
axiomatic that the Supremacy Clause and preemption doctrine
prohibit states” such as Colorado and Washington from allowing
marijuana when federal law prohibits it); Garvey, supra note 36, at 7
(“The Colorado and Washington laws, which legalize, regulate, and
tax an activity the federal government expressly prohibits, appear to
be logically inconsistent with established federal policy and are
therefore likely subject to a legal challenge under the constitutional
doctrine of preemption.”); but see Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of
Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to
Legalize a Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009) (opining
that preemption of state marijuana laws would run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle).
84Aug. 29, 2013 Letter from Attorney General Eric Holder to
Governors of Washington & Colorado
85James T. O’Reilly, Federal Preemption of State and Local Law:
Legislation, Regulation and Litigation at 1 (ABA Publishing 2006).
86See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000)
(providing overview of preemption law).
87Id.
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statement, state law may still be displaced under the doctrine of
implied preemption. 88 Implied preemption “occurs where
Congress, through the structure or objectives of a federal
statute, has impliedly precluded state regulation of that area.” 89
Regardless of whether a case involves express or implied
preemption, the judiciary’s task is the same: “to determine
whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and
purpose of the [federal] statute as a whole.” 90 Or stated another
way, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in
every pre-emption case.” 91
Over the years, the Supreme Court has come to
recognize two types of implied preemption: (1) field
preemption, and (2) conflict preemption. 92 Field preemption
occurs when federal law has been so dominant in a particular
area that “Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.” 93 Conflict preemption can take two forms. The first is called
physical impossibility preemption, and it occurs when
“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
The second is called obstacle
physical impossibility.” 94
preemption, and it occurs when “state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” 95
With respect to the battle between state marijuana laws
and the CSA, express preemption is inapplicable because the
CSA does not explicitly remove the possibility of state
regulation of drugs. The CSA does, however, contain a

88O’Reilly,
89Id.

supra note 85, at 65.

supra note 83, at 572 (internal quotations omitted).
v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (internal quotations

90Denning,
91Wyeth

omitted).
92Id. at 572.
93Nelson, supra note 86, at 227 (internal quotations omitted).
94Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
95Id. (internal quotations omitted)
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preemption provision in 21 U.S.C. § 903. Section 903 provides
as follows:
No provision of this subchapter shall be
construed as indicating an intent on the part of
the Congress to occupy the field in which that
provision operates, including criminal penalties,
to the exclusion of any State law on the same
subject matter which would otherwise be within
the authority of the State, unless there is a
positive conflict between that provision of this
subchapter and that State law so that the two
cannot consistently stand together. 96
Section § 903 clearly takes field preemption off the
Equally clear from § 903 is Congress’s intent to ensure
that conflict preemption remains on the table. Looking to the
two subsets of conflict preemption, it has traditionally been
very difficult to succeed on a physical impossibility preemption
theory. 98 To do so, it must be proven that “state law requires
what federal law prohibits, or state law prohibits what federal law
requires.” 99 That is not present here because a person in, say,
Colorado could comply with both federal and state law by

table. 97

9621

U.S.C. § 903.
supra note 36, at 9 (stating that § 903 “clarifies that Congress
did not intend to entirely occupy the regulatory field concerning
controlled substances or wholly supplant traditional state authority in
the area”).
98Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009) (“Impossibility preemption is a demanding defense.”); see also Garvey, supra note 36, at
10 (“Courts have only rarely invalidated a state law as preempted
under the impossibility prong of the positive conflict test.”).
99Garvey, supra note 36, at 10 (emphasis in original); see also Erwin
Chemerinksy, Constitutional Law: Principles & Policies at 391 (2d ed.
2002) (“If federal law and state law are mutually exclusive, so that a
person could not simultaneously comply with both, the state law is
deemed preempted.”).
97Garvey,
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refraining from the manufacture, distribution, and possession
of marijuana. 100
But, there is an argument to be made that this is not the
correct way to view physical impossibility preemption.
According to Professor Brandon Denning, viewing physical
impossibility preemption in that way renders the doctrine
meaningless because “a finding of impossibility could always
be avoided simply by refraining from engaging in the activity
that is the object of the conflicting regulatory regimes.” 101 As
Professor Denning has explained, physical impossibility
preemption only serves a purpose if it is “viewed from the
perspective of one who is engaging in the very conduct
regulated by both state and federal governments.” 102 Under
that conception of physical impossibility preemption, state laws
legalizing marijuana would be preempted because it would be
physically impossible for a person in Colorado to open a
marijuana dispensary under state law without simultaneously
violating federal law. 103 Although it is certainly an appealing
argument, Professor Denning’s approach is somewhat difficult
to reconcile with language found in the Supreme Court’s
decision in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson. 104
In Barnett Bank, the Court was considering whether a
federal law that authorized national banks to sell insurance in
small towns preempted a state law that prohibited national

supra note 86, at 228 n.15 (nothing that the Supreme Court
has held that “if one sovereign’s law purports to give people a right
to engage in conduct that the other sovereign’s law purports to
prohibit, the ‘physical impossibility’ test is not satisfied; a person
could comply with both state and federal law simply by refraining
from the conduct. Thus, even when state and federal law contradict
each other, it is physically possible to comply with both unless federal
law requires what state law prohibits (or vice versa)”).
101Denning, supra note 83, at 578.
102Id.
103Id. at 578-79.
104517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
100Nelson,

64

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

banks from doing precisely that. 105 Although the Court found
the state law to be preempted under the doctrine of obstacle
preemption, it rejected the physical impossibility preemption
argument. In doing so, the Court explained that this was not a
situation where “the federal law said, ‘you must sell insurance,’
while the state law said, ‘you may not.’” 106 Because a national
bank could comply with both state and federal law by refusing
to sell insurance, there was no physical impossibility
preemption. 107 Thus, the argument goes, physical impossibility
preemption is inapplicable to the marijuana conundrum
because there is an easy way to comply with both laws—do not
grow, distribute, or possess marijuana. Given the language of
Barnett Bank and the Court’s treatment of physical impossibility
preemption as a “very narrow” doctrine, 108 it is unlikely that
state marijuana legalization measures would be preempted
under that doctrine.
It seems more likely that state marijuana legalization
measures would be preempted under the second subset of
Obstacle
conflict preemption—obstacle preemption. 109
preemption is appropriate when the state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

105Id.

at 27 (“The question in this case is whether a federal statute that
permits national banks to sell insurance in small towns pre-empts a
state statute that forbids them to do so.”).
106Id. at 31.
107See Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 230
P.3d 518, 528 (Or. 2010) (en banc) (explaining that in Barnett Bank it
was not physically impossible to comply with both state and federal
law because “[a] national bank could simply refrain from selling
insurance”); see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 590 (2009) (Thomas,
J., concurring in judgment) (questioning the physical impossibility
preemption doctrine in part because federal and state law may give
conflicting commands even though “an individual could comply with
both by electing to refrain from the covered behavior”).
108Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 589 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
109Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 10-11 (focusing analysis more on
obstacle preemption than physical impossibility preemption because
the state laws “would likely survive the impossibility prong”).
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purposes and objectives of Congress.” 110 To determine whether
a state law serves as an obstacle, the courts must “examin[e] the
federal statute as a whole and identify[] its purpose and
intended effects.” 111
Determining the purpose of the CSA is an easy task. It
was drafted with one goal in mind—eliminating the abuse,
production, and illicit trafficking of certain psychotropic
To achieve that goal, Congress created a
drugs. 112
comprehensive regulatory regime prohibiting the possession,
distribution, or manufacture of certain drugs (i.e., Schedule I)
and regulated the possession, distribution, or manufacture of
other drugs (i.e., Schedules II-V). 113 In doing so, Congress made
clear that the CSA applies to drugs that are manufactured,
distributed, and possessed purely intrastate. 114 Congress found
that such “[f]ederal control of the intrastate incidents of the
traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective
control of the interstate incidents” of drug trafficking. 115
Congress believed that its ultimate objective could not be
reached if there were an exemption that allowed the
manufacture, distribution, or possession of locally grown
marijuana.
The application of the CSA to purely intrastate activity
was attacked in Gonzalez v. Raich as an unconstitutional exercise
of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. In Raich,
the Supreme Court upheld the CSA and declared that Congress
110Pacific

Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983).
111Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (internal
quotations omitted).
112See 21 U.S.C. § 801a(1) (setting forth Congress’s findings regarding
the need for the CSA); see also Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 13, 20 (2005)
(“The main objectives of the CSA were to conquer drug abuse and to
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled
substances.”).
113Raich, 545 U.S. at 13-14.
11421 U.S.C. § 801(3)-(6).
11521 U.S.C. § 801(6).
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had the authority to regulate even locally grown marijuana that
never crossed a state line. 116 According to the Court, exempting
marijuana that was “locally cultivated for personal use . . . may
have a substantial impact on the interstate market for this
And, the Court
extraordinarily popular substance.” 117
recognized that a state law authorizing the use of medical
marijuana (even if locally grown) would “have a significant
impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market for
marijuana.” 118 Perhaps most importantly for purposes of the
current debate, the Raich Court spoke approvingly of
Congress’s determination that allowing intrastate marijuana to
escape the CSA’s reach “would undermine the orderly
enforcement of the entire regulatory scheme.” 119
Such undermining, however, has been occurring since
the Ogden Memorandum was released in 2009. Because of state
legalization efforts and Department of Justice acquiescence, the
CSA’s regulatory scheme has been significantly undermined.
The goal of the CSA was to eliminate the market for marijuana,
and “[l]iberal regimes like Colorado’s and Washington’s are
diametrically opposed to th[at] goal.”120 It does not take a law
degree to see that a state law authorizing the production,
distribution, and use of marijuana makes it difficult for the
federal government to achieve its goal of eradicating marijuana.
It is made even more difficult when the state actually benefits
from increased use of the substance that federal law is trying to
decrease.
545 U.S. at 19. For those unfamiliar with the case, Raich
involved several individuals who sought to use and grow marijuana
for medicinal purposes under California’s Compassionate Use Act. Id.
at 5-7. The individuals sued the Attorney General of the United States,
seeking a declaration that the CSA’s prohibition on the manufacture,
distribution, and possession of marijuana was unconstitutional as
applied to locally grown marijuana that did not travel in interstate
commerce. Id. at 7.
117Id. at 28.
118Id. at 30.
119Id. at 28.
120Denning, supra note 83, at 579.
116Raich,
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Take Colorado, for example. It legalized marijuana for
recreational use in 2012, and in 2015 Colorado collected
approximately $135 million in tax revenue from the marijuana
industry. 121 That money has been used to fund a variety of state
programs and projects ranging from school construction and
street paving to bullying prevention. 122 If people stop selling,
smoking, and growing marijuana in Colorado, then the state
and local governments will lose money. If the government loses
money, it will cut programs and services. No government
desires to do either of those things. So, what does Colorado
want? More marijuana sales! When do they want them? Now!
The good news for Colorado is that it is getting what it
wants. The data shows that when a state legalizes marijuana,
use of the drug increases in that state. 123 That should come as
121National Public Radio, All Things Considered, Where Does
Colorado's Marijuana Money Go? (Oct. 1, 2016) (transcript available at,
http://www.npr.org/2016/10/01/496226348/where-doescolorados-marijuana-money-go).
122Id. (reporting that money from marijuana tax revenues was used to
build schools, provide for the homeless, and create college
scholarships); see also Carlos Illescas, Marijuana Sales Tax Huge Boon for
Colorado Cities, Denver Post (May 26, 2016) (available at,
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/05/26/marijuana-sales-taxrevenue-huge-boon-for-colorado-cities/) (quoting an official of a
small Colorado town as saying: “We have such as small tax base . . .
.Medical and retail marijuana have definitely helped the town’s
bottom line. I’d be lying if I said it didn’t.”); Mahita Gajanan, Colorado
Will Use Extra Marijuana Revenue to Prevent Bullying in Schools, Time
Magazine
(Sep.
28,
2016)
(available,
at
http://time.com/4511895/colorado-surplus-marijuana-tax-revenuebully-prevention/) (reporting that $2.9 million in marijuana tax
revenues was used to create a bullying prevention program at 50
schools).
123Beau Kilmer, If California legalizes marijuana, consumption will likely
increase. But is that a bad thing?, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 16, 2016)
(reporting that after legalization, marijuana use increased in Colorado
and Washington); see also Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area, The Legalization of Marijuana in Colorado: The Impact
(Jan.
2016)
(available
at,
http://www.rmhidta.org/html/FINAL%20NSDUH%20Results-
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no surprise. After all, allowing “profit-maximizing firms to
produce, sell, and advertise” 124 an item that was previously
only available on the black-market will result in an increase in
that item’s use. So, state legalization efforts have led to an
increase in the very activity that the CSA prohibits and seeks to
eliminate altogether.
That type of conflict between the effect of a state law and
the objective of a federal law is what obstacle preemption is
designed to address. When previously confronted with an
analogous situation, the Supreme Court struck down the
offending state law in Michigan Canners & Freezers v.
Agricultural Board. 125 The Michigan Canners Court held that the
federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act preempted the Michigan
Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act because the
Michigan law stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 126
The federal law was designed to improve the bargaining
power of farmers when they brought their food to market. 127
One provision of the federal law prevented an association of
food producers from interfering with an individual producer’s
decision about whether to bring food to the market individually
or to sell it through a producers’ association. 128 The Michigan
law, on the other hand, stated that a producers’ association was
the exclusive bargaining agent for all producers of a particular

%20Jan%202016%20Release.pdf) (stating that “in the two year
average (2013/2014) since Colorado legalized recreational marijuana,
youth past month marijuana use increased 20 percent compared to the
two year average prior to legalization (2011/2012)” while at the same
time “nationally youth past month marijuana use declined 4
percent”); Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances
Act, 16 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5, 17 (2013) (“There is little doubt,
then, that marijuana use will increase following state legalization.”).
124Kilmer, supra note 123.
125467 U.S. 461 (1984).
126Id. at 478 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
127Id. at 463-64.
128Id. at 464.
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food item. 129 Individual producers were required to pay a fee
to the association and abide by the terms of the association’s
contracts. 130 In other words, the Michigan law “empower[ed]
producers’ associations to do precisely what the federal Act
forbids them to do.” 131 The Michigan law, therefore, was struck
down by the Supreme Court under the obstacle preemption
doctrine. 132
Just like the Michigan law authorized producers’
associations to engage in conduct that federal law prohibited,
those states that have legalized marijuana have “empower[ed]
[marijuana growers, distributors, and users] to do precisely
what the federal Act forbids them to do.” 133 It is difficult to
escape that reality. 134 So, why has no federal court ruled that
the CSA preempts state marijuana legalization laws? Because
the Department of Justice—through its “policy of benign
neglect” 135—has refused to bring a lawsuit challenging state
marijuana legalization laws as preempted under the obstacle
preemption doctrine. 136
In response to the Department of Justice’s decision not
to file a preemption lawsuit, Oklahoma and Nebraska made a
valiant effort to have the Supreme Court rule on the issue. They
129Id.

at 466.

130Michigan

Canners & Freezers Ass’n, 467 U.S. at 467-68.
at 477-78.
132Id. at 478 (holding that the Michigan law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress” and “therefore, the Michigan Act is pre-empted”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
133Id. at 477-78.
134See generally Denning, supra note 83, at 580 (“At the risk of seeming
obtuse, I find it self-evident that state legalization regimes permitting
marijuana use for medical or recreational purposes present a
substantial obstacle to the implementation of a federal law that (1)
recognizes no medical use for marijuana and (2) seeks to eliminate the
national market in marijuana by banning all production, possession,
and transfer.”)
135Denning, supra note 83, at 583.
136Id. at 581 (stating that “[o]nly the DOJ’s announced policy of
forbearance keeps this conflict from coming to a head”).
131Id.
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brought a lawsuit against Colorado directly in the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution
and 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a), both of which vest the Supreme Court
with “original jurisdiction” over a lawsuit between two
states. 137 In that lawsuit, Oklahoma and Nebraska argued that
Colorado’s marijuana legalization law “conflicts with and
otherwise stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.” 138 For reasons unknown and unstated,
the Supreme Court refused to exercise its jurisdiction to hear
the case. 139
Although no federal court has ruled on the preemption
issue, a handful of state courts have addressed it. 140 Of that
handful of courts, the most notable opinion is the Supreme
Court of Oregon’s in Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of

137Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Nebraska & Oklahoma v.
Colorado, Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 18, 2014)
(available
at,
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/Neb.-Okla.-original-suit-vs.-Colorado-1218-14.pdf).
138Id. at 23.
139Nebraska, et al. v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1034 (2016) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of motion for leave to file complaint)
(arguing that the Court should have exercised its original jurisdiction
to hear the case instead of “denying, without explanation, Nebraska
and Oklahoma’s motion for leave to file a complaint”). In the wake of
the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the case, Nebraska and Colorado
sought permission to intervene in a lawsuit brought by some private
parties against Colorado. That lawsuit had been previously dismissed
by a U.S. District Court judge on the basis that private parties could
not seek preemption under the Supremacy Clause. Safe Streets
Alliance, et al. v. John Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado, et al., No. 1:15CV-00349, 2016 WL 223815, at *3, *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 19, 2016). The
plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
Nebraska and Oklahoma sought permission to intervene in that
appeal. The Tenth Circuit allowed the intervention, and the parties
are awaiting a decision on the merits. Safe Streets Alliance, et al. v. John
Hickenlooper, Governor of Colorado, Order Granting Motion to
Intervene, Appeal No. 16-1048 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2016).
140See Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 14-15 (summarizing several state
court rulings).
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Labor and Industries. 141 The Emerald Steel court concluded that
the CSA preempted Oregon’s Medical Marijuana Act, which
provided that people who had been issued a medical marijuana
card could manufacture, distribute, and possess marijuana. 142
According to the court, the Oregon law stood “as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes of the federal law.”143
The court further explained that when Congress passed the
CSA, it “did not intend to enact a limited prohibition on the use
of marijuana—i.e., to prohibit the use of marijuana unless a
state chose to authorize its use.” 144 Instead, Congress meant for
the CSA to “impose[] a blanket prohibition on the use of
marijuana without regard to state permission to use.” 145 And,
there is no U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that “states
can authorize their citizens to engage in conduct that Congress
explicitly has forbidden.” 146 Some scholars 147 and a few

141348

Or. 159 (2010) (en banc).
at 161; but see County of San Diego v. San Diego NORML, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 461, 482 (Cal. App. Ct. 2008) (holding that the CSA does not
preempt California’s medical marijuana identification card law
because “the purpose of the CSA is to combat recreational drug use,
not to regulate a state’s medical practices”).
143Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc., 348 Or. at 186.
144Id. at 177-78.
145Id. at 178.
146Id. at 183.
147See Sam Kamin, Pot Prohibition is Almost Over; Oklahoma, Nebraska’s
Suit is Doomed, THE CANNABIST (Jun. 29, 2015) (available at,
http://www.thecannabist.co/2015/06/29/pot-marijuanaoklahoma-nebraska-lawsuit-colorado/37014/#disqus_thread) (law
professor opining that Colorado’s marijuana legalization measure is
not preempted by the CSA because “the federal government cannot
force state officials (cannot commandeer them, to use the
constitutional term) to enforce” federal law); see also Robert A. Mikos,
On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked
Power to Legalize a Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1423-24 (2009)
(arguing that “to say that Congress may thereby preempt state
inaction (which is what legalization amounts to, after all) would, in
effect, permit Congress to command the states to take some action—
namely, to proscribe medical marijuana.
The Court’s anti142Id.
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judges 148 have argued that a finding that the CSA preempts
state marijuana legalization laws would run afoul of the anticommandeering principle embodied in the Tenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. That argument is creative and
thought-provoking. But, it is wide of the mark—at least as it
relates to what has actually happened in those states that have
legalized marijuana.
The Tenth Amendment provides as follows: “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” 149 The Supreme Court has read
that language to prevent the federal government from
“commandeering” state governments by requiring them to
enforce federal law. 150 Perhaps the most significant anticommandeering case is Printz v. United States. 151 At issue in
Printz was the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which
contained a provision requiring state and local police officers to
conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. 152 The
Court struck down that provision under the Tenth Amendment
because the federal government “may not compel the State to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” 153
Undoubtedly, the anti-commandeering doctrine
applied in Printz would prevent the federal government from
forcing state and local police officers to enforce the CSA’s
marijuana prohibition. It is also beyond debate that the federal
commandeering rule, however, clearly prohibits Congress from doing
this.”).
148See, e.g., Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus.,
348 Or. 159, 191 (2010) (en banc) (Walters, J., dissenting) (citing the
anti-commandeering doctrine as one of the reasons why the CSA does
not preempt Oregon’s medical marijuana law).
149U.S. CONST. amend. X,
150New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that
“[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program”).
151521 U.S. 898 (1997).
152Id. at 903.
153Id. at 933 (internal quotations omitted).
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government could not mandate that all states criminalize
marijuana. Neither of those things, however, would result from
a court holding that the CSA preempts state marijuana
legalization laws. A finding that the CSA preempts a state
marijuana legalization law would result in the state having no
law—authorizing or forbidding—marijuana. And, that is
entirely constitutional because states are free by virtue of the
anti-commandeering doctrine to decriminalize marijuana
through the repeal of their laws that prohibit the manufacture,
distribution, and possession of marijuana. 154
There is, however, a critical difference between
decriminalizing marijuana by repealing existing law and
authorizing marijuana, regulating it, and making a tremendous
amount of money by taxing it. Recognizing as much, the law of
preemption distinguishes between failing to criminalize an
activity and making the activity lawful. 155 As a panel of the
California Court of Appeals explained, “[w]hen an act is
prohibited by federal law, but neither prohibited nor
authorized by state law, there is no obstacle preemption.” 156
But, when a state moves beyond decriminalization and passes
a law that affirmatively authorizes and regulates what federal
law prohibits, the state’s law is preempted, and the anticommandeering doctrine is not implicated. 157
154See Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 13-14 (explaining that under the
“Tenth Amendment and preemption precedent” a state could exempt
marijuana-related activities from criminal penalties under state law).
155See Pack v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d 633, 651
(Cal. App. Ct. 2012). In Pack, the court held that the CSA preempted
a city ordinance requiring an expensive permit to grow or distribute
medical marijuana. Id. at 638. The court’s decision was accepted for
review by the Supreme Court of California, but the appeal was
dismissed by request of the parties. Pack v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles, Case No. B228781, Order of Aug. 22, 2012) (available at,
http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?di
st=2&doc_id=1961761&doc_no=B228781).
156Pack, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 651.
157Id. at 652 (“The City’s ordinance, however, goes beyond
decriminalization into authorization . . . . A law which authorizes
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Looking again to Colorado as an example, the state’s
2012 marijuana legalization measure did more than simply
repeal the state’s statute that criminalized marijuana—it
created a regulatory scheme that authorizes, permits, and
collects large fees 158 from marijuana-related activities that are
prohibited by federal law.
More specifically, Colorado
developed “procedures for the issuance, renewal, suspension,
and revocation of licenses; provide[d] a schedule of licensing
and renewal fees; and specif[ied] requirements for licensees to
follow regarding physical security, video surveillance, labeling,
health and safety precautions, and product advertising.” 159
There is now an entire state bureaucracy focused on nothing
more than administering the marijuana industry. 160 Because
the state law expressly authorizes what federal law prohibits, it
is preempted because it serves as an obstacle to the fulfillment
of Congress’ goal to eliminate the manufacturing, distribution,
possession, and use of marijuana.
Of course, it is unlikely that a federal court will have the
opportunity to reach that conclusion unless the Department of
Justice changes its approach and files a lawsuit against the
individuals to engage in conduct that the federal Act forbids stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress and is therefore preempted.”) (internal
quotations and alterations omitted); see also Emerald Steel Fabricators,
Inc. v. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 348 Or. 159, 177-78 (2010) (en banc)
(explaining that Oregon’s law was preempted because it went beyond
exempting marijuana offenses from state prosecutions by
“affirmatively authoriz[ing]” marijuana manufacturing, distribution,
and possession); Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 14 (stating that the
“affirmative act of regulating and licensing marijuana cultivation and
distribution may not invoke the same Tenth Amendment protections
enjoyed by the states’ initial decision to simply remove marijuanarelated penalties under state law”).
158Garvey & Yeh, supra note 36, at 5 (reporting that Colorado imposes
a 25% tax on retail marijuana sales).
159Id.
160See https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/enforcement/marijuanaenforcement
(website of the Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Colorado
Department of Revenue).
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offending states. Although the filing of such a lawsuit after
years of sitting on the sidelines while state marijuana
legalization measures spread like wildfire will ruffle feathers
and disrupt what has become a billion-dollar industry, it is the
approach dictated by the law (as opposed to personal
preference or political expediency). Aside from the preemption
issues discussed above, the Department of Justice’s current
approach violates the Take Care Clause.

V. TAKE CARE CLAUSE
The Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution is, in
comparison to other constitutional provisions, largely
unknown and infrequently litigated. 161 It provides in simple
and direct language that the President “shall take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.” 162 Despite its brevity and relative
obscurity, the Take Care Clause packs a mighty punch. It
ensures that the power of our federal government is dispersed
among the different branches, 163 and it prevents executive
“lawlessness in the form of overreach or inaction.” 164
The Take Care Clause was designed to prevent
Presidents (and their surrogates, such as the Attorney General)
from doing exactly what the Department of Justice has done by
refusing to enforce the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana in those
states that have passed legalization measures. It has been
argued that the Department’s current approach is an
unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion rather than a

161See

Ted Cruz, The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness,
38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 70 (2015) (stating that “[o]nly a few
Supreme Court cases have interpreted the Take Care Clause”).
162U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
163See Todd Garvey, The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the
Enforcement of the Law, Congressional Research Service (Sept. 4, 2014)
(explaining that the “Take Care Clause makes a significant
contribution to the separation of powers”).
164Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and
Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 183, 196 (2016).
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breach of the Take Care Clause. 165 That argument lacks merit
because there is a difference between prosecutorial discretion in
individual cases (constitutional and necessary) and a blanket
policy of non-enforcement (unconstitutional and dangerous).
As explained below, the Department’s approach falls on the
unconstitutional and dangerous side of the line.
To understand the Take Care Clause and its purpose, a
brief historical review is necessary. Prior to the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, the English crown possessed suspension
and dispensation powers. 166 Generally speaking, those powers
allowed the king to nullify or simply disregard statutes passed
by Parliament. 167 Because Parliament rarely met and the king
was viewed as the “source of all law,” the suspension and
dispensation powers were viewed for many years as “useful
and broadly accepted lubricants” that allowed the king to
adjust the law as the circumstances required. 168 Things changed
when King James II came to power. 169 He drew the ire of
Parliament and the people when he began using his suspension
and dispensation to “systematically dispense with a vast array
of religious legislation and rules governing the universities.” 170
His actions contributed to the Glorious Revolution, which
resulted in the ascension of William III to the crown and the
elimination of the suspension and dispensation powers. 171 The
elimination of those powers was a “central achievement of the
English Revolution . . . . [and] formed an important backdrop to
the American constitutional enterprise.” 172
165Id. at 200 (“In the context of federal marijuana law enforcement, it
seems clear that the Obama administration’s guidance to prosecutors
regarding the allocation of scarce resources is nothing more than an
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”).
166Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67
VAND. L. REV. 671, 690-91 (2014).
167Cruz, supra note 161, at 66.
168Price, supra note 166, at 691.
169Id.
170Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 805 (internal quotations
omitted).
171See Price, supra note 166 at 691 (explaining that “William III and
Mary II replaced King James on the throne. As part of the new
constitutional settlement, the monarch was henceforth denied
suspending and dispensing powers.”).
172Id. at 692.
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Given the experience of their English ancestors, our
Founding Fathers took pains to ensure that the President lacked
the authority to “make, or alter, or dispense with the laws.” 173
Thus, they drafted the Take Care Clause and included it in
Article II, § 3. The Clause places upon the President “an
obligation and affirmative duty” to enforce the laws passed by
Congress. 174 It is worth emphasizing “how strong the language
of the Take Care Clause is. It is pitched at the highest register
of constitutional obligation. The President shall—not may.” 175
In fact, it has been argued that the Take Care Clause is one of
only two duties expressly imposed on the President by the
Constitution—“he must take the Oath of Office . . . and he shall
take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 176 The
obligation is not simply the President’s; rather, it is one that is
borne by all Executive Branch officials. 177
Although the President has a role in the legislative
process (most notably, the veto power), when a bill becomes a
law the President’s “legislative role comes to an end and is
supplanted by his express constitutional obligation under” the
Take Care Clause. 178 Noticeably absent from the Take Care
Clause is a footnote clarifying that the President only has to
faithfully execute the laws that he personally agrees with or
those that are popular with his political base. 179 Permitting the
supra note 163, at 5 (internal quotations omitted).
supra note 161, at 69.
175Brief for the Cato Institute, Professors Randy E. Barnett & Jeremy
Rabkin as Amici Curiae, United States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case
No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1377723, at *10 (Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the
history and purpose of the Take Care Clause).
176Id. (internal citations omitted).
177See generally Kamin, supra note 164 at 196 (stating that under the
Take Care Clause “the federal executive is charged with taking care
that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed”); see also
Garvey, supra note 163, at 5 (explaining that the “President and
executive branch officers must ‘faithfully’ implement and execute the
law[s]”).
178Garvey, supra note 136, at 5..
179See Cruz, supra note 171, at 73 (stating that “the President’s
obligation to enforce the laws does not include the power to disregard
duly enacted laws when they become politically inconvenient”); see
also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 794 (explaining that the
Constitution “imposes on the President a duty to enforce existing
173Garvey,
174Cruz,
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President to ignore or modify congressional enactments would
violate the separation of powers doctrine by “cloth[ing] the
executive branch with the power of lawmaking.” 180 If the
Framers wanted the President to have that type of power, they
would have given him suspension and dispensation powers
instead of saddling him with an affirmative duty to faithfully
execute the laws passed by Congress. As Professors Delahunty
and Yoo have explained, a “deliberate decision to leave a
substantial area of statutory law unenforced or underenforced
is a serious breach of Presidential duty.” 181
If you want to see an example of such a breach of
Presidential duty, look no further than the Department of
Justice’s approach to state marijuana legalization efforts. The
CSA is a longstanding federal law that makes it clear as day that
marijuana is prohibited nationwide for both medicinal and
recreational use. Nonetheless, the Department announced that
it would not prosecute marijuana offenders in those states that
passed legalization measures. Similarly, the Department
refused to institute preemption proceedings against the
offending states. To the contrary, when two states (Oklahoma
and Nebraska) tried to do the Department’s job for it by suing
Colorado over its marijuana legalization law, the Department
actually filed a brief supporting Colorado. 182 Yes, you read that
correctly—the U.S. Department of Justice came to the aid of the
state that was violating federal law instead of those that were
seeking to enforce it.

statutes, regardless of any policy differences with the Congresses that
enacted them or the presidents who signed them”). The president
may, however, refuse to enforce a law if he believes the law violates
the Constitution. See Cruz, supra note 36, at 73-74 (“[I]f a President
faces a decision between enforcing a law that Congress has passed and
enforcing the Constitution, many scholars have argued that he is
obligated to enforce the Constitution.”). But, there have been very few
circumstances where a president’s nonenforcement decision was
based on a constitutional concern. Id. at 74.
180Garvey, supra note 163, at 5.
181Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 25, at 785.
182Lyle Denniston, U.S. Opposes Marijuana Challenge by Colorado’s
Neighbors,
SCOTUSBlog
(Dec.
17,
2015)
(available
at,
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/u-s-opposes-marijuanachallenge-by-colorados-neighbors/).
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For the approximately thirty-nine-year period between
the passage of the CSA in 1970 and 2009, the Department of
Justice (in both Democratic and Republican administrations)
took care to see that the CSA’s marijuana prohibition was
faithfully executed. That all changed approximately one year
into President Obama’s term when his Deputy Attorney
General announced that the Department would no longer seek
to prosecute “individuals whose actions [we]re in clear and
unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing
for the medical use of marijuana.” 183 A later announcement
extended that policy of non-enforcement to those living in
states that authorized recreational marijuana. 184 Further, those
states have become marijuana meccas where people grow, sell,
and smoke marijuana openly. But, the words written into law
by Congress remain unchanged—marijuana is a Schedule I
controlled substance that is strictly prohibited, and its
manufacture, distribution, and possession are punishable by
imprisonment. What had changed, however, is that the words
written into law by Congress did not align with the policy
preferences of those heading up the Executive Branch. 185
So, the Department of Justice simply decided to suspend
the CSA in certain states and to grant dispensations to people
183October

19, 2009, Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General
David W. Ogden to Selected United States Attorneys.
184Aug. 29, 2013, Memorandum from James M. Cole to All United
States Attorneys.
185Both President Obama and Attorney General Holder have made
public statements regarding their dissatisfaction with the CSA’s
treatment of marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance. See, e.g.
Jann S. Wenner, The Day After: Obama on His Legacy, Trump's Win and
the Path Forward, ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE (Nov. 29, 2016) (available
at, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/features/obama-on-hislegacy-trumps-win-and-the-path-forward-w452527)
(quoting
President Obama as saying that he believes marijuana should be
treated the “same way we do with cigarettes or alcohol”); see also Nick
Wing, Eric Holder Says It’s Ridiculous To Treat Weed Like Heroin, But He
Can’t Do Anything About It Now, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2016)
(quoting Eric Holder as saying “we treat marijuana in the same way
that we treat heroin now, and that clearly is not appropriate”).
Ironically, as the Attorney General, Holder could have addressed the
issue lawfully by exercising his authority under 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b)
to remove marijuana from Schedule I of the CSA. He failed to do so.
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who grow, sell, and possess marijuana in those states. There is
one slight problem. The American President and his surrogates
in the Department of Justice are not 17th-century English
monarchs who possess suspension and dispensation powers. 186
That was the whole point of the Take Care Clause. 187 If the
President and the attorney general wanted marijuana to be
treated differently by federal law, they should have lobbied
Congress or followed the administrative rescheduling process
that Congress set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 811.
Some have defended the Department’s nonenforcement policy as a permissible exercise of prosecutorial
discretion, rather than an abdication of the “take care” duty. 188
That argument has some surface appeal. But, it crumbles upon
closer inspection because there is a difference between
prosecutorial discretion and a policy of non-enforcement. 189
The former is entirely permissible and virtually
unchallengeable, the latter is a violation of the Take Care
Clause. 190 To understand why, it is necessary to look at what
prosecutorial discretion is and the purpose that it serves.
The concept of prosecutorial discretion reflects an
understanding that the executive branch’s duty to enforce the
186See

4A U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55 (1980) (opinion by Office
Legal Counsel explaining that “[t]he President has no ‘dispensing
power[,]’ meaning that the President and his subordinates may not
lawfully defy an Act of Congress if the Act is constitutional”).
187See Cruz, supra note 161, at 114 (“The Take Care Clause was
explicitly included in the Constitution to prevent the President from
wielding the suspension and dispensation powers that had been
abused by English kings.”).
188See Kamin, supra note 164, at 200 (opining that “the Obama
administration’s guidance to prosecutors regarding the allocation of
scarce resources is nothing more than an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion”).
189See Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, United
States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1319656, at
*3 (Apr. 4, 2016) (explaining that “the Executive’s authority to exercise
discretion in the enforcement of the laws does not encompass the far
broader power to authorize . . . class-wide relief”).
190See Cruz, supra note 161, at 77 (“[I]t would violate the Take Care
Clause for a President to invoke prosecutorial discretion as a means
of failing to enforce those laws of which the President disapproves.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
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laws does not have to be “performed robotically.” 191 Rather,
federal prosecutors (as the President’s surrogates) have the
power to decide whether to bring charges in a particular case.
Generally speaking, a prosecutor’s refusal to bring charges is
not subject to judicial review. As the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit has explained: “It follows, as an incident of the
constitutional separation of powers, that the courts are not to
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of
the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal
prosecutions.” 192
Generally speaking, the decision of whether to institute
a prosecution is made by a prosecutor after considering the facts
and circumstances of a particular situation. It is a case-specific
judgment call that is based on such things as the strength of the
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the constitutionality of
police conduct, the preferences of a victim, the potential
defendant’s criminal history, and resource constraints. A
federal prosecutor’s exercise of discretion is to be guided by the
parameters set forth in a chapter of the U.S. Attorney’s Manual
entitled “Principles of Federal Prosecution.” 193 That chapter
begins with the general rule that an “attorney for the
government should commence or recommend federal
prosecution if he/she believes that the person’s conduct
constitutes a federal offense, that the admissible evidence will
probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, and
that a substantial federal interest would be served by the
prosecution.” 194 A case that meets those requirements should
be prosecuted, 195 unless “(1) The person is subject to effective

191See

Price, supra note 166, at 696.
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
193U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220
(available
at,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200).
194Id.
195See Michael Edmund O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in
Federal Prosecutorial Discretion, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, 237 (2003)
(discussing the Principles of Federal Prosecution and stating that “the
expectation is that where legal evidence of an offense exists, a
prosecutor is expected to initiate criminal proceedings”).
192United
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prosecution in another jurisdiction; or (2) There exists an
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution.” 196
As a trio of former U.S. Attorneys General 197 have
explained, “[e]ach of these situations is intensely case—and
person—specific. . . .the core of the discretionary authority
exclusively reserved to the Executive is the authority to make a
decision in particular cases regarding particular individuals.” 198
Put another way, “executive officials hold discretion only to
make case-specific exceptions to enforcement.” 199 Thus, the
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion does not provide the
Attorney General with the authority to decline prosecutions
“on a categorical or prospective basis.” 200 Nor can the Attorney
General rely on the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion to
justify the creation of a policy against enforcing a particular
provision of federal law. 201 Prosecutorial discretion is not
unfettered—the “mere invocation of prosecutorial or
enforcement discretion is not to be treated as a magical
incantation” 202 that allows the executive to disregard
congressional enactments.
Although the judiciary generally refuses to review
exercises of prosecutorial discretion, the courts have recognized
that there is a difference between the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in an individual case and an agency non-enforcement
policy. 203 As the Department of Justice itself previously
196U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-27.220
(available
at,
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200).
197The trio consisted of Edwin Meese III, Richard Thornburg, and John
Ashcroft. Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae,
United States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL
1319656, at *1 (Apr. 4, 2016).
198Id. at *11, *13.
199Price, supra note 166, at 677.
200Cruz, supra note 161, at 76-77 (internal quotations omitted).
201See Brief of former U.S. Attorneys General as Amici Curiae, United
States v. Texas, Supreme Court Case No. 15-674, 2016 WL 1319656, at
*13 (Apr. 4, 2016) (discussing the difference between individualized
prosecutorial discretion and a blanket policy of nonenforcement).
202Garvey, supra note 163, at 25 (internal quotations omitted).
203See id. at 25-26 (discussing the judiciary’s attempts to distinguish
between traditional prosecutorial discretion and an agency
nonenforcement policy).
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admitted, “the individual prosecutorial decision is
distinguishable from instances in which courts have reviewed
the legality of general Executive Branch policies.” 204 While the
courts will not “assume the essentially Executive function of
deciding whether a particular alleged violator should be
prosecuted,” they will make the “conventionally judicial
determination of whether certain fixed policies allegedly
followed by the Justice Department and the United States
Attorney’s office lie outside the constitutional and statutory
limits of ‘prosecutorial discretion.’” 205 And, the question of
whether a Department of Justice policy of not enforcing a
particular law violates the Take Care Clause is one that can be
reviewed by the judicial branch. 206
It is a good thing that such review is available. Consider
the consequences of allowing the Executive Branch to refuse the
enforcement of duly-enacted laws under the guise of
prosecutorial discretion. An Executive Branch that believed
there was too much environmental regulation could refuse to
prosecute people who dumped pollutants into the waterways.
An Executive Branch that disagreed with federal firearm laws
could refuse to prosecute people who sold guns to convicted
2048

Op. O.L.C. 101, 126 (1984).
v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
206Id. at 679, n.19 (quoting the Take Care Clause and noting that the
“law has long recognized the distinction between judicial usurpation
of discretionary authority and judicial review of the statutory and
constitutional limits to that authority. Judicial review of the latter sort
is normally available unless Congress has expressly withdrawn it.”)
(internal citations omitted). Interestingly, the Supreme Court of the
United States last term asked the parties in the case of United States v.
Texas to address whether the Obama administration’s policy of not
enforcing certain immigration laws constituted a violation of the Take
Care Clause. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Supreme Court Adds ‘Take
Care Clause’ to the DAPA Debate, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIETY
BLOG
(Jan.
19,
2016)
(available
at,
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-supreme-court-adds%E2%80%98take-care-clause%E2%80%99-to-the-dapa-debate). The
issue was briefed and argued, but the Court did not issue a decision
in the case because Justice Scalia died during the pendency of the case
and the remaining justices deadlocked 4-4. See United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (“The judgment is affirmed by an
equally divided court.”).
205Nader
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felons. An Executive Branch that disliked the tax system could
refrain from prosecuting tax fraud cases. And, an Executive
Branch that favored drug legalization could stop prosecuting
drug dealers. If that is what prosecutorial discretion allows,
then it “threatens to undermine the constitutional lawmaking
process.” 207 And, we should stop referring to the bills passed
by Congress and signed by the President as “laws.” A more apt
description would be “suggestions for the Executive Branch.”
The Take Care Clause was designed to prevent that very thing
from happening.
At bottom, the Department of Justice’s refusal to enforce
the CSA’s marijuana prohibition in those states that have
legalized marijuana is not an exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. The decision of whether to prosecute is not being
made on an individualized basis—a federal prosecutor is not
considering the evidence, looking at the circumstances,
applying the factors set forth in the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, and
deciding whether a prosecution is warranted against a
particular suspect. Rather, there is an articulated nonenforcement policy that effectively exempts the residents of
twenty-six states from federal marijuana law. As the U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary
reported, “the breadth of the Justice Department’s position on
marijuana non-enforcement goes well beyond the limits of
prosecutorial discretion . . . the guidance to U.S. Attorneys
establishes a formal, department-wide policy of selective nonenforcement of an Act of Congress.”208 In his famous speech
entitled “The Federal Prosecutor,” then-Attorney General (later
Justice) Robert H. Jackson warned against such behavior,
stating: “The federal government could not enforce one kind of
law in one place and another kind elsewhere . . . the only longterm policy that will save federal justice from being discredited
by entanglements with local politics is that it confine itself to
strict and impartial enforcement of federal law, letting the chips

supra note 161, at 78.
No. 113-377 of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House
of Representatives, regarding Executive Needs to Faithfully Observe
and Respect Congressional Enactments of Law (ENFORCE) Act of
2014 (Mar. 7, 2014).
207Cruz,

208Report
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fall in the community where they may.” 209 The Department of
Justice has disregarded Justice Jackson’s admonition, choosing
instead to adopt a policy that violates the President’s duty to
“take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 210

VI. CONCLUSION
The approach that the Department of Justice has taken
to state laws legalizing marijuana over the past eight years must
not continue. At the end of the day, federal law is federal law—
meaning that it applies equally in all fifty states regardless of
what laws a state may pass. It is not only terrible policy for the
federal government to allow states to make a mockery of federal
law, but it is also unconstitutional. The notion that people in
one part of the country can violate federal law with impunity
while people in another part of the country go to federal prison
for engaging in the same conduct is un-American. If the time
has come to change the way federal law treats marijuana, then
that change needs to occur in a lawful manner—either by
passing a bill that is signed into law by the President or by
following the administrative rescheduling procedure set forth
in 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)-(b). Until that occurs, the Department of
Justice should return to doing its job by enforcing federal
marijuana law uniformly throughout the United States.

209Robert

H. Jackson, Attorney General of the United States, Speech at
the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys: The
Federal Prosecutor at 6 (Apr. 1, 1940).
210U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3.
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AGREE TO DISAGREE: MOVING TENNESSEE
TOWARD PURE NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Evan Wright a1
I. INTRODUCTION
“The ancient origins of marriage confirm its centrality,
but it has not stood in isolation from developments in law and
society.” 1
As Justice Kennedy aptly pointed out, the institution of
marriage has developed from roots that run deep into human
evolution. Divorce emerged as a means for parties to dissolve a
legal relationship. For much of our history, domestic relations
law reflected religious values that looked unfavorably on

J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Lincoln Memorial University. The
author would like to thank Professor April James for inspiring this
Note. This was just one of the many spirited domestic relations
debates that we had over the last two years. Also, Duncan School of
Law Dean of Academics Matthew Lyon contributed a great deal of
time critiquing this Note. Dean Lyon has, without question, raised
the level of my writing over the past three years. Thank you to both
of these professors for your time and insight.
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
a1
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divorce. 2 Remedies required proof that at least one party failed
to conform to society’s expectations—a fault-based divorce.
Time brings change. Divorce law’s grip on the reigns of
marriage loosened during the twentieth century. 3
Modern divorce laws have no-fault options firmly
entrenched in all fifty states. 4 As discussed in more detail
below, the manner and process by which parties use no-fault
divorce differs significantly across the country. Some states,
including Tennessee, ask litigants to overcome significant
hurdles to use no-fault grounds. 5 Other states have diverged
from these restrictive requirements, allowing litigants to plead
no-fault grounds that allow a court to decide any disputed
ancillary issues. 6 Some states moved even further, removing
fault grounds completely. 7 Despite some ominous forecast, 8
pure no-fault divorce has proved sufficient to dissolve legal
relationships without damaging society as a whole.
No-fault opponents have relied on varying economic
and moral arguments to further a religion-based agenda that
does not reflect current societal realities. 9 Aggrieved parties
already have access to more efficient criminal and tort law
remedies. These systems, by design, correct and expel
unwanted conduct more efficiently than do equity-focused
domestic relations laws. Moreover, significant declines in
religious affiliation demonstrate a marked change in societal
values. 10 Divorce law should reflect this evolution and provide
efficient, equitable dissolution to marital relationships.
Tennessee should progress toward a pure no-fault
system. The law currently places an unnecessary burden on no-

See Deborah H. Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the Century, 71 MISS.
L.J. 781, 782-85 (2002).
3 Id.
4 See David P. Horowitz, Breaking Up Is [Easier] To Do, 82 N.Y. ST. B.J.
18 (2010).
5 See e.g., infra note 11.
6 See infra note 56.
7 See infra note 58.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 See id.; see also infra Part V.
10 See infra Part V.
2
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fault divorce that requires both parties to agree on all issues. 11
This requirement escalates contentiousness, increases costs, and
unnecessarily complicates future disputes over children and
alimony. A pure no-fault system, or a move in that direction
that removes the agreement requirement, would increase access
to the courts for those who need it most. The steadily decreasing
number of people that affiliate with marriage’s founding father,
religion, 12 should cause lawmakers to reevaluate the current
statutory requirements and reconsider Tennessee’s restricted
access.
This Note will discuss various reasons for Tennessee to
move toward a pure no-fault divorce system. Part II will discuss
the historical developments leading to the current system; part
III categorizes the three types of no-fault divorce used across
the fifty states; part IV will address several common themes
among fault proponents; part V focuses on the significance of
religion in divorce laws; and part VI discusses several reasons
for changing Tennessee’s no-fault divorce statute.

II. DIVORCE LAW’S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Divorce laws have changed over time to coincide with
the evolution of marriage. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
in Obergefell recognized that marriage was not an unchanging
institution but a reflection of societal values effectuated in the
law. 13 Divorce laws have followed along this same path.

A. DEVELOPMENT OF FAULT-BASED GROUNDS FOR
DIVORCE
Divorce in the newly formed United States looked to
English ecclesiastical courts for guiding precedent. 14 Similar to
corporations, many pre-twentieth century divorces came
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
12 See infra note 103.
13 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
14 Adiaen M. Morse Jr., Comment, Fault: A Viable Means of ReInjecting Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 607
(1996).
11
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through legislative acts. 15 This cumbersome system gave way
to a statutorily created fault-based divorce. Courts relied on the
concept of full-fault divorce to dissolve a marriage. 16 Full-fault’s
narrow proposition required an innocent spouse’s proof that
the other committed some marital misconduct to grant the
divorce. 17 This process proved insufficient as time progressed,
eventually giving rise to the concept of no-fault divorce.
The progression of fault-based divorce law exhibited a
delayed reflection of societal view of morality. Initially, states
recognized adultery as the only ground for absolute divorce. 18
States expanded fault-based grounds during the twentieth
century to include variations of cruelty and abandonment. 19
Interestingly, New York held on to a narrow, antiquated,
adultery-only definition of fault until 1966, causing director
Woody Allen to quip, “while the Ten Commandments forbid
adultery, New York demands it if you want a divorce.” 20 Faultbased grounds for divorce sufficed throughout most of the
twentieth century, but America’s liberalization in the 1960s
proved too much for these aging laws. California become the
first state to implement a pure no-fault system. 21
During the 1960s, the California legislature recognized
that the fault-based paradigm failed to address the obvious—
most divorces were actually uncontested dissolutions. 22 The
pre-1970 system was fraught with divorces based on false
claims of cruelty used to comply with the fault requirement. 23
California’s current no-fault statute only permits divorce for
Id.
Ira M. Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic
Violence, and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L.
REV. 719, 722-24 (1997).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 See Bell, supra note 2, at 783-84.
20 See Gabriella L. Zborovsky, Note, Baby Steps to “Grown-Up”
Divorce: The Introduction of the Collaborative Family Law Center and the
Continued Need for True No-Fault Divorce in New York, 10 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 305, 305 (2008).
21 Family Law Act of 1969, ch. 1608, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3314-51; see
Bell, supra note 2, at 784.
22 Herma Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75
CAL. L. REV. 291, 297-98 (1987).
23 Id. at 297.
15
16
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irreconcilable differences, 24 and developed on the theory that
fault-based divorce no longer served the public interest. 25

B. NO-FAULT DIVORCE GAINS TRACTION ACROSS THE
UNITED STATES
No-fault divorce allowed parties to avoid many
undesirable and all-too-common occurrences in full-fault
divorce proceedings. Across the country, fault-based grounds
caused collusion and deception between parties to provide
courts with sufficient proof to meet statutory requirements. 26
Currently, all fifty states have adopted some form of no-fault
divorce that avoids this charade. 27
States have used no-fault divorce to provide a level of
homeostasis between societal values and the law. Because
values differ from state to state, divorce laws reflect the
principle that states can and should differ. Despite some subtle
differences, the basic reasoning behind no-fault divorce
revolves around the following principles:
[T]o strengthen and preserve the integrity of
marriage and safeguard family relationships; to
promote the amicable settlement of disputes that
have arisen between parties to a marriage; to
mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and
their children caused by the process of legal
dissolution of marriage; to make reasonable
provision for the spouse and minor children
during and after litigation; and to make the law
of legal dissolution of marriage effective for
dealing with the realities of matrimonial
experience by making irretrievable breakdown

CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext current with urgency
legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016
2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot).
25 Kay, supra note 22, at 299.
26 Bell, supra note 2, at 784.
27 See infra Part III.
24
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of the marriage relationship the sole basis for its
dissolution. 28
Keeping with these principles, Tennessee, for example, now
allows parties to plead irreconcilable differences or to claim to
have lived apart continuously for a period of two years. 29 States
can be placed into three distinct categories based on how the
state allows parties to access no-fault grounds.

III. NO-FAULT DIVORCE STATUTES AND THE CONSEQUENCES
States can experiment with new laws that reflect societal
values and address specific needs. As a result, no-fault statutes
took on different forms throughout the United States.
Predictably, different beliefs emerged within the language of
these laws. The following three categories demonstrate how
states have diverged from the traditional fault-based paradigm.

A. NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVE IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
Rather than allow unfettered access to no-fault divorce,
some states placed significant limitations on those grounds. 30
These limitations come in several different forms. 31 Some states
24 GEORGE BLUM ET AL., AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE § 2 No-fault
divorce (2d ed. 2016).
29 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-4-101(14)-(15) (West, WestlawNext current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
30 See. e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West, WestlawNext current with
legislation passed during the 2016 Session of the Georgia General
Assembly). Georgia law withholds any divorce on this ground be
granted until at least 30 days after serving the respondent. See also
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 580-42 (West, WestlawNext current through
Act 1 (End) of the 2016 Second Special Session, pending revision by
the revisor of statutes).
31 Compare N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current
through 2016 released chapters 1-396), with GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation passed during the 2016
Session of the Georgia General Assembly). Some no-fault statutes
require complete agreement between the litigants on all ancillary
issues, while other no-fault agreement requirements leverage
litigants to avoid unnecessary appearances or time.
28
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require significant waiting periods before entering a no-fault
divorce decree. 32 In Arkansas, a couple must live apart for
eighteen months to obtain a no-fault divorce. 33 Other states vary
the waiting period depending on the no-fault ground. 34 New
Jersey allows an agreed divorce based on irreconcilable
differences after a six-month wait, while a less agreeable couple
must live apart for eighteen months before divorce is granted. 35
A number of states still require complete agreement as
a prerequisite to no-fault grounds. 36 To avoid proving fault in
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(c) (West, WestlawNext current
through the end of the 2016 Second Extraordinary, 2016 Fiscal, and
2016 Third Extraordinary Sessions of the 90th Arkansas General
Assembly, and include changes made by the Arkansas Code
Revision Commission received through May 1, 2016).
33 Id.
34 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301 (West, WestlawNext current
through the end of the 2016 Second Extraordinary, 2016 Fiscal, and
2016 Third Extraordinary Sessions of the 90th Arkansas General
Assembly, and include changes made by the Arkansas Code
Revision Commission received through May 1, 2016); LA. CODE ANN.
ART. 103.1 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 First
Extraordinary, Regular, and Second Extraordinary Sessions, for all
laws effective through December 31, 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2
(West, WestlawNext current with laws effective through L.2016, c. 55
and J.R. No. 6); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-6 (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapters 93, 95 to 101 of the 2016 Regular Session of the
General Assembly, pending changes received from the Revisor of
Statutes); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (West, WestlawNext current
through the 2016 session, subject to technical revisions by the Code
Commissioner as authorized by law before official publication); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551 (West, WestlawNext current through the
laws of the Adjourned and Special Sessions of the 2015-2016
Vermont General Assembly (2016)); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (West,
WestlawNext Current through End of the 2016 Reg. Sess.). Virginia
appears under both the waiting period group and the complete
agreement group because the Old Dominion shortens the waiting
period for those more agreeable litigants.
35 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-2 (West, WestlawNext current with laws
effective through L.2016, c. 55 and J.R. No. 6). While New Jersey only
requires the parties agree on the grounds to avoid the long wait, this
could allow one party to leverage the other into a long wait, leaving
child or spousal support issues unaddressed.
36 See ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (West, WestlawNext current through the
end of the 2016 Regular Session and through Act 2016–485 of the
32
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these states, parties must resolve all ancillary issues in
advance. 37 Whether the couple has children, numerous
property or business interests, or one party requires the support
of the other, everyone must agree to a resolution to avoid
having to prove fault. In most cases, including Tennessee, the
divorcing couple submits the agreement with the petition for
divorce. 38 Some states also subject the agreement to the court’s
scrutiny. 39
These statutes limit access to no-fault grounds,
increasing the likelihood that a divorce assumes an adversarial
posture that will resurrect the historically defective “kangaroo”
court procedures just to access the legal system and settle an
ancillary issue. Before adopting pure no-fault divorce, it was
estimated that at least ninety-five percent of California divorces
were uncontested dissolutions where fault was usually
unnecessary. 40 Funneling more litigants toward fault preserves
many of the issues surrounding the traditional fault-based
system.

2016 First Special Session); ALASKA STAT. § 25-24-200 (West,
WestlawNext current with Chapters 2-17, 19-24, 27, 33, 42-43, 52-53
and 55 from the 2016 2nd Reg. Sess. of the 29th Legislature); GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West, WestlawNext current with legislation
passed during the 2016 Session of the Georgia General Assembly)
(requiring complete agreement to avoid an appearance); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 580-42 (West, WestlawNext current through Act 1
(End) of the 2016 Second Special Session, pending revision by the
revisor of statutes) (using agreements similarly to Georgia); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 7-103 (West, WestlawNext Current through
all legislation from the 2016 Regular Session of the General
Assembly); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current
through 2016 released chapters 1-396); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91 (West,
WestlawNext Current through End of the 2016 Reg. Sess.).
37 See e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-102 (West, Westlaw current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25-24-200 (West, WestlawNext current
with Chapters 2-17, 19-24, 27, 33, 42-43, 52-53 and 55 from the 2016
2nd Reg. Sess. of the 29th Legislature). Alaska requires not only
complete agreement but also that the agreement be “fair” as
determined by the court.
40 Kay, supra note 22, at 298.
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First, the complete agreement requirement needlessly
increases the costs involved in situations where the parties are
already dividing assets. 41 Moving toward no-fault divorce has
decreased costs associated with divorce. 42 The emotional toll
affects everyone involved. Why should divorce statutes
increase legal fees and other associated costs by requiring fault?
These savings could be used to support children or provide
mental health counseling, healthcare, and education. Lowering
costs and providing more resources at the marriage’s end may
also avoid other costs associated with future litigation over
changes in child or spousal support.
A state-by-state examination of divorce costs indicates
that no-fault divorce could decrease divorce costs, even though
the no-fault pioneer, California, maintains the highest divorce
costs in the nation. 43 States atop the list had much higher hourly
attorney fee rates and court filing fees. 44 While the state with the
cheapest divorce costs, Wyoming, had the lowest filing fee and
the second-lowest average for an attorney’s hourly rate. 45
Increased costs were found in states with higher costs of living,
such as California, Alaska, and New York. 46 Certainly, a wide
range of factors can cause divorce costs to increase, including
fault. States that take fault out of the divorce proceeding at least
streamline the process, which helps both states with higher and
lower hourly rates.

Erik V. Wicks, Comment, Fault-Based Divorce “Reforms,” Archaic
Survivals, and Ancient Lessons, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1565, 1582 (2000)
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 146 (4th ed.
1992)).
42 Cf. Twila L. Perry, No-Fault Divorce and Liability Without Fault: Can
Family Law Learn from Torts?, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 69-70 (1991). This
author posits that no-fault divorce has lowered some litigation costs.
43 Elyssa Kirkham, The Best and Worst States to Get a Low-Cost
Divorce, Go Banking Rates (Feb. 3, 2016),
https://www.gobankingrates.com/personal-finance/best-worststates-low-cost-divorce/.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id; see also America’s Top States for Business 2016, CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/12/
americas-top-states-for-business-2016-the-list-and-ranking.html (last
visited Dec. 8, 2016) (cost of living ranking).
41
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Second, requiring complete agreement pressures an
aggrieved party to compromise legal or economic outcomes to
avoid the harsh realities of fault-based divorce. In short, these
requirements provide leverage over weaker parties and could
force a less desirable outcome. 47 As former President Bill
Clinton taught us, human beings will go to great lengths to
avoid the embarrassment of publicly airing sordid details of
marital impropriety. 48
Last, burdening the marital dissolution process with
these agreements introduces the same danger that no-fault
divorce was designed to cure. These onerous requirements
force litigants, at least in some cases, to put on a fault-based
farce to settle ancillary issues in court. 49 Placing unnecessary
hurdles in the divorce gauntlet urges parties to lie and
denigrate the entire legal system.
New York provides an excellent example of just how
heinous fault-based divorce can become. The Empire State held
on to tradition, retaining adultery as the only grounds for
divorce until 1966. 50 Because widespread shenanigans were
occurring during divorce proceedings, as early as 1945 the
Committee on Law Reform of the City of New York advocated
for reform in the legislature. 51 The legislature finally conceded
in the 1960s and expanded the grounds for fault. 52 However,
no-fault grounds were not allowed in New York until 2010. 53
See Allen M. Parkman, Why are Married Women Working So Hard?,
18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 41 (1998). This article discusses how no-fault
divorce has affected settlement negotiations by pushing parties
toward equitable outcomes that place too little importance on
domestic contribution.
48 See Peter Baker & John F. Harris, Clinton Admits to Lewinsky
Relationship, Challenges Starr to End Personal ‘Prying’, WASHINGTON
POST (August 18, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/special/clinton/stories/clinton081898.htm.
49 See Kay, supra note 22, at 298; see also Sanford Katz, Historical
Perspective and Current Trends in the Legal Process of Divorce, 4 FUTURE
OF CHILDREN 1 (1994).
50 Zborovsky, supra note 20, at 309.
51 Katz, supra note 49, at 3.
52 Zborovsky, supra note 20, at 309.
53 Sophia Hollander, Divorces Drag on Even After Reform, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL (May 6, 2012), available at
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023048113045773681
10112622548.
47
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Even then, New Yorkers were limited by an agreement
requirement. 54 Some states have addressed the realities of faultbased divorce by loosening these restrictions.

B. UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO NO-FAULT ALTERNATIVES
Not all divorces revolve around the elusive concept of
identifiable marital misconduct. Even with all fifty states
enacting no-fault divorce, some states place significant
limitations on the use of those grounds. 55 Although reasonable
minds can differ as to what qualifies as a significant limitation,
nineteen states have both fault and no-fault grounds for divorce
that allow litigants to use no-fault grounds without requiring
complete agreement as to ancillary issues. 56 Dissolving a
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current through
2016 released chapters 1-396).
55 See e.g., LA. CODE ANN. ART. 103.1 (West, WestlawNext current
through the 2016 First Extraordinary, Regular, and Second
Extraordinary Sessions, for all laws effective through December 31,
2016). The Pelican State requires a waiting period of 180 days
without minor children or 365 days with.
56 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (West, WestlawNext Current
through the Second Regular Session of the Fifty-Second Legislature
(2016)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-40 (West, WestlawNext current with
enactments of the 2016 February Regular Session, the 2016 May
Special Session, and the 2016 September Special Session.); IDAHO
CODE § 32-603 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 Second
Regular Session of the 63rd Idaho Legislature); IND. CODE § 31-15-2-3
(West, WestlawNext current with all legislation of the 2016 Second
Regular Session of the 119th General Assembly); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
23-2701 (West, WestlawNext current through laws enacted during
the 2016 Regular and Special Sessions of the Kansas Legislature); ME.
STAT. TIT. 19-a, § 902 (West, WestlawNext Current with legislation
through the 2015 Second Regular Session of the 127th Legislature.
The Second Regular Session convened January 6, 2016 and
adjourned sine die April 29th, 2016. The general effective date is July
29, 2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 208, § 1 (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapter 298 of the 2016 2nd Annual Session); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 93-5-2 (West, WestlawNext current through the End of the
2016 First and Second Extraordinary Sessions and the 2016 Regular
Session); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:7-a (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapter 330 (End) of the 2016 Reg. Sess., not including
changes and corrections made by the State of New Hampshire,
54
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marriage in these states requires pleading only the no-fault
grounds, complying with statutory requirements, and then, if
needed, asking the court to decide unsettled issues inhibiting
the final dissolution of the marriage.
States with mixed divorce grounds still retain
traditional ideas of divorce, while also recognizing that no-fault
grounds produce many advantages. These state statutes
represent an intermediate step between the traditional full-fault
systems and no-fault systems implemented in states taking a
different approach to family law. Introducing no-fault divorce
would allow parties to proceed without an understanding that
some perjury will take place, permit the court to grant a divorce
without contorting the law outside of legislative intent, and
avoid committing the legal system to a charade that disrespects
the entire litigation process. 57

C. PURE NO-FAULT DIVORCE
Unsatisfied with how a fault-based system addressed
family law concerns, seventeen states have adopted a pure no-

Office of Legislative Services); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-1 (West,
WestlawNext current through the end of the Second Regular and
Special Sessions of the 52nd Legislature (2016)); N.D. CENT. CODE §
14-04-03 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016 Special
Session of the 64th Legislative Assembly and measures passed in the
June 14, 2016 election); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (West,
WestlawNext current through File 124 of the 131st General Assembly
(2015-2016)); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 43, § 101 (West, WestlawNext current
through Chapter 395 (End) of the Second Session of the 55th
Legislature (2016)); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301 (West, WestlawNext
current through 2016 Regular Session Acts 1 to 109); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 25-4-2 (West, WestlawNext current through 2016 Session
Laws and Supreme Court Rule 16-67); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.001
(West, WestlawNext current through the end of the 2015 Regular
Session of the 84th Legislature); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-3 (West,
WestlawNext current through 2016 Third Special Session); W. VA.
CODE § 48-5-201 (West, WestlawNext current with legislation of the
2016 Regular Session, the 2016 First Extraordinary Session, and the
2016 Second Extraordinary Session).
57 See Sanford N. Katz, Historical Perspective and Current Trends in the
Legal Process of Divorce, 4 CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 1 (1994).
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fault system. 58 The language may vary, but the statutes contain
a consistent theme—divorce does not require proof of fault. As
states have progressed toward this model, naysayers have
forecast numerous scenarios that will upend society as we
know it. 59 But pure no-fault models simply remove an
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext current with
urgency legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016 Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of
2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on 2016 ballot); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-106 (West, WestlawNext current through the
Second Regular Session of the 70th General Assembly (2016)); DEL.
CODE ANN. TIT. 13, § 1505 (West, WestlawNext current through 80
Laws 2016, ch. 430); FLA. STAT. § 61.052 (West, WestlawNext current
through the 2016 Second Regular Session of the Twenty-Fourth
Legislature); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/401 (West, WestlawNext current
through P.A. 99-904 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 598.17
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation from the 2016
Reg.Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (West, WestlawNext
current through the end of the 2016 regular session); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 552.6 (West, WestlawNext current through P.A.2016, No. 314
of the 2016 Regular Session, 98th Legislature); MINN. STAT. § 518.06
(West, WestlawNext current with legislation through the end of the
2016 Regular Session.); MO. REV. STAT. § 452.305 (West, WestlawNext
current through the end of the 2016 Regular Session and Veto
Session of the 98th General Assembly, pending changes received
from the Revisor of Statutes. Constitution is current through the
November 4, 2014 General Election.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-104
(West, WestlawNext current through the 2015 session); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-353 (West, WestlawNext current through the end of the
104th 2nd Regular Session (2016)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.010 (West,
WestlawNext current through the end of the 78th Regular Session
(2015) and 29th Special Session (2015) of the Nevada Legislature and
all technical corrections received by the Legislative Counsel Bureau);
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (West, WestlawNext current with 2016 Reg.
Sess. legislation eff. through 7/1/16 and ballot measures on the
11/8/16 ballot, pending classification of undesignated material and
text revision by the Oregon Reviser); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030
(West, WestlawNext current with all laws from the 2016 Regular and
First Special Sessions of the Washington legislature that take effect
on or before July 1, 2016); WIS. STAT. § 767.315 (West, WestlawNext
current through 2015 Act 392, published 4/27/2016); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 20-2-104 (West, WestlawNext current through the 2016
Budget Session).
59 See e.g., Peter Nash Swisher, Marriage and Some Troubling Issues with
No-Fault Divorce, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 243 (2004-2005). This article
58
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unnecessarily contentious aspect of divorce law. Most of these
states use the terms “irretrievably broken” or “irreconcilable
differences” for the legal ground. Parties may then settle a case
by agreement or move forward with litigation or mediation to
decide ancillary issues.
Pure no-fault does not leave parties without sufficient
remedies, even when fault is the predominant factor in the
divorce. For example, assume that a couple in a pure no-fault
state marries, maintaining that relationship for ten years and
has two children. Husband develops a prescription drug habit
that eventually leads to the demise of this marriage. Wife
decides the children should stay away from husband’s drug
habit and files for divorce. No-fault grounds would not cloak
the undesirable behavior of the husband. Rather, the court, or a
mediator in some cases, would take his behavior into account
when addressing child custody, property division, and
alimony. A court could then adjudicate ancillary issues using
the same equitable principles that the fault-based systems are
supposed to be based on. 60
Many litigants may avoid proof of fault altogether.
Determining an equitable distribution is not an exact science.
Parties may differ on the accounting methods used to
determine business values, 61 or haggle over the type of alimony
to be awarded. 62 Why should domestic relations laws force
parties to show fault for the court to decide these issues? This
appears a puzzling, unnecessary, and counterproductive
requirement. Fault advocates have argued that no-fault allows
litigants to skirt responsibility. 63 Other fault-based arguments
focus on outlier cases with controversial outcomes to disparage
the entire system. 64 These arguments against no-fault are
attributes increased divorce rates to the adoption of no-fault divorce
statutes.
60 See Bell, supra note 2, at 793-94.
61 See e.g., Powell v. Powell, 124 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
62 See e.g., Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99 (Tenn. 2011).
63 Ellman, supra note 16, at 733. The author describes no-fault divorce
as reflecting “amoral thinking.”
64 See Swisher, supra note 59, at 254. The author uses In re Koch, 648
P.2d 406 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), as an example of no-fault removing
needed remedies for injured parties. In Koch, the court held that a
wife could not use her injuries from a physical altercation for the
basis of a spousal support claim. The wife’s tort case against the
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treated with more depth below. This back-and-forth does
emphasize that in each system individual judges and attorneys
will determine how efficiently and effectively the system
works. No perfect system exists, but no-fault systems reflect
reality and provide access to the judicial system that the faultbased system does not.

IV. NO-FAULT OPPONENTS BLAME THE SYSTEM FOR
UNRELATED SOCIETAL TRENDS
The beauty and utility of American democracy lies in
the struggle between liberal and conservative ideologies.
Middle ground has moved this country forward at a pace that
both respects our history and recognizes societal changes.
Certainly this system has its faults, 65 and divorce laws are not
immune to this struggle. The categories above demonstrate
how states have implemented divorce laws that reflect
divergent views of marriage. Since no-fault’s inception in 1970,
time has provided ammunition for both sides to take aim at the
other. No-fault opponents rely on a narrow, dystopian view of
the results in no-fault states to argue fault back into domestic
relations law.

A. NO-FAULT DIVORCE AND THE INCREASE IN DIVORCE
RATES
Ostensibly, divorce rates provide an elementary
indicator of no-fault’s allegedly adverse effect on society. While
relevant, divorce numbers only provide a small piece of the
entire puzzle. No-fault opponents argue that increased divorce
rates are directly related to no-fault divorce statutes. 66

husband for the same injury was pending at the time of the divorce
decree.
65 See, e.g., Eric Warner, Gridlock in Congress may Presage More of the
Same to Come, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/congress-clearsstopgap-spending-bill-11b-to-fight-zika/2016/09/28/d233ab9885e8-11e6-b57d-dd49277af02f_story.html.
66 Michael McManus, Confronting the More Entrenched Foe: The
Disaster of No-Fault Divorce and Its Legacy of Cohabitation, THE FAMILY
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Overwhelmingly, the increase in the 1970s provides the basis
for this assertion. 67 This ignores a much longer trend—divorce
rates in America have been steadily rising since the 1860s. 68 One
might quickly correlate these increases to expansions in fault
and the development of no-fault divorce. But no-fault divorce
has only become more prolific since the 1970s. 69 In Tennessee
for example, divorce rates have leveled off and even declined
during that period. 70
Arguments based on divorce rates ignore numerous
other aspects that affect those numbers. If reducing divorce
numbers were as simple as making divorce more difficult, as
fault-based divorce certainly does, then barring divorce
altogether presumably would lower the rate to zero. As recently
as 1997, Ireland amended its constitution to permit divorce for
the first time in over 50 years. 71 The same arguments no-fault
detractors use were made in opposition to the constitutional
amendment permitting the Irish to obtain a divorce. 72 As the
IN AMERICA

(Spring 2011),
http://familyinamerica.org/files/9913/8757/6279/
FIA.Spring11.McManus.pdf.
67 See Swisher, supra note 59, at 243-44.
68 See 100 YEARS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1973,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/
sr_21/sr21_024.pdf.
69 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (Consol., LexisNexis current through
2016 released chapters 1-396). Even the most stringent holdouts
adopted no-fault grounds, providing some no-fault access in all 50
states.
70 Compare TENN. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND
DIVORCES WITH RATES PER 1,000 POPULATION BY COUNTY, TENNESSEE
RECORDED DATA, 2009, https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/
attachments/TN_Marriages_Divorces_-_2009.pdf, with TENN. DEP’T.
OF HEALTH, NUMBER OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES WITH RATES PER
1,000 POPULATION BY COUNTY, TENNESSEE RECORDED DATA, 2014,
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/health/attachments/TN_Marr
iages_Divorces_-_2014.pdf; see also note 81, infra.
71 James F. Clarity, Before Date of New Law, Ireland Grants First Divorce,
N. Y. TIMES (Jan. 18 1997),
http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/18/world/before-date-of-newlaw-ireland-grants-first-divorce.html.
72 Kate Holmquist, Divorce, Irish Style, THE IRISH TIMES (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/divorce-irish-style1.2068656.
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Irish realized, addressing family law issues requires more
nuance than a simple prohibition. 73
Wealth and education affect divorce numbers across the
country more than fault-based divorce statutes. Divorce rates
are obviously tied to marriage rates. Socioeconomic status and
education affect both marriage and divorce far more than nofault opponents give credence. 74 A Pew Research study in 2009
found that education levels correlated with both marriage
rates 75 and the average age at which people marry. 76 Although
the Pew study found no direct correlation between
socioeconomic status and divorce, socioeconomic status and
education affected the average marriage age, and age did show
a correlation to divorce rates. 77 This demonstrates only one
factor affecting divorce rates, while many other factors,
including religious affiliation, 78 foreign military engagements, 79
and economic recessions also affect divorce. 80 Presuming that
people will suddenly abandon a personal relationship or,
conversely, stay in a relationship based on a state’s legal
requirements ignores too many realities.

Id.
See Social and Demographic Trends, The States of Marriage and
Divorce, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 15, 2009)
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2009/10/15the-states-ofmarriage-and-divorce/.
75 Id.
76 UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE: PATTERNS BY GENDER, RACE, AND EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT (2013),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/marriage-anddivorce-patterns-by-gender-race-and-educational-attainment-1.htm.
77 See Social and Demographic Trends, supra note 74.
78 See infra Part V.
79 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 100 YEARS OF
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES, 1867 – 1967,
supra note 68. Divorce rates rose around the time of the Second
World War.
80 D’Vera Cohn, Divorce and the Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (May 2, 2012),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/05/02/divorce-and-thegreat-recession/. This study found a correlation between foreclosure
and divorce rates but not between unemployment increase and
divorce rates.
73
74
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Over the past twenty-five years, divorce rates have
decreased in both no-fault and fault-based states. 81 The chart
below shows these trends using states that are close
geographically and have no-fault divorce statutes from each
category. Despite the three different approaches, divorce rates
have followed the same trend—a decline. 82 Kentucky’s pure nofault approach has at most a negligible impact on divorce rates.
These numbers do not corroborate the argument that no-fault
divorce equals increased divorce.

Divorce Rates per 1,000 People by State:
1990-2014
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B. NO-FAULT DIVORCE FAILS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
REMEDIES
Another argument against no-fault divorce is that
eliminating fault causes outcomes that fail to provide for
aggrieved parties. 83 No-fault opponents have argued that
victims of poor marital behavior lack any real recourse when
fault does not play a significant role in divorce. 84 Even then,

See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVORCE
RATES BY STATE: 1990, 1995, AND 1999-2014,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/state_divorce_rates_90_95_a
nd_99-14.pdf (last visited Dec. 8, 2016).
82 Id.
83 Swisher, supra note 59, at 254.
84 Id.
81
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fault advocates have still suggested tort and criminal law may
provide sufficient remedies. 85
No-fault divorce does not leave victims out in the cold,
and these other areas of law are better suited to remedy
particular types of marital misconduct. Criminal law reflects
society’s social norms for expected human behavior. 86 This
essential area of the law provides an efficient platform for
society to set moral expectations that place limitations in
various arenas when undesirable conduct occurs. 87 Physical
spousal abuse, behavior unquestionably in violation of society’s
social norms, could and should be addressed for the most part
in the criminal context. Moreover, defendants in criminal
procedures receive greater protections, including proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, the right to counsel, right to confront
witnesses, and the right to a jury.
In the civil context, tort law provides compensatory
remedies outside of marriage dissolution. The evolution of
interspousal immunity allowed aggrieved parties access to
these tort remedies in a variety of situations. 88 Tort law
provides time-proven methods to calculate damages, while
retaining limits on claims too stale for remedy. 89 The principles
underpinning support and alimony laws were designed based
on an entirely different idea—equity. 90 Alimony in Tennessee,
for instance, focuses on the ability of the spouse seeking the
award to live post-divorce, the other spouse’s ability to pay the
award, and several other equitable factors. 91 In contrast, tort
remedies focus simply on the wrongful conduct and the

See id.
Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in
Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2016).
87 See id.
88 See e.g., Davis v. Davis, 657 S.W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983) (holding
interspousal tort immunity is totally abolished in Tennessee); see also
Michelle L. Evans, Wrongs Committed During a Marriage: The Child
that No Area of the Law Wants to Adopt, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 466
(2009).
89 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 1-2 (AM. LAW INST. 2016).
90 Id.
91 See, e.g., Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1995).
85
86
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damage flowing from that conduct. 92 While similar policy
considerations may play a part in torts and domestic relations
law, the two are fundamentally different.
Divorce should focus on what it was designed to do—
dissolve a legal relationship. If the relationship is no longer
viable, i.e. irretrievably broken, then the court should only
require proof that the relationship is in fact broken and leave
the “why” for a possible factor for determining equitable
allocation of property, ordering support, or determining child
custody. The particulars as to the extent of damage caused or
the need for punishment to deter future incidences are better
left to criminal or tort law. Introducing these ideas into
marriage dissolution bogs down the process and confuses law
and equity. This could possibly cause important aspects of
marriage dissolution to be resolved inefficiently or in a manner
which cannot adequately address or deter undesirable conduct.
Simply put: A fault-based divorce is counterproductive.

C. NO-FAULT AVOIDS RESPONSIBILITY
Marriage symbolizes a certain amount of commitment
within a relationship. With commitment comes responsibility.
Some no-fault critics have contended the absence of fault not
only allows parties to avoid moral responsibilities, but also
allows certain behavior outside the contractual bonds of
marriage to go unpunished. 93 Conservative scholars have
argued that catastrophic consequences will result from the
ubiquity of divorce, even causing a decline in birth rates. 94 To

See, e.g., Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn.
2012).
93 Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 871 (June 1994). The authors argue that
changes in divorce law have rendered the marriage contract illusory.
94 See id. Brinig and Crafton discuss the decreasing birth rate when
marriage morphs into a long date. See Scott Drewianka, Divorce Law
and Family Formation, 21 J. POPULATION ECON. 484 (2006). Dr.
Drewianka’s article examines several studies that contend no-fault
divorce significantly contributed to the decline, and posits that nofault divorce had minimal effect on family structure.
92
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steal a line from the rock band R.E.M., under no fault- divorce
“it’s the end of the world as we know it.” 95
Chaining responsibility to fault is counterintuitive.
Child support is an established responsibility in which fault
need not play a role. Courts impose obligations that encourage
responsibility outside of marital relationships in every
jurisdiction. The traditionalist view of divorce holds fast to the
fault system to preserve the moral leverage interjected by fault
into divorce proceedings. Traditionalists use complete
agreements to impose that same leverage to a lesser degree.
Some have argued that alimony without fault has no teeth. 96
Yet, alimony statutes, such as Tennessee’s, consider a totality of
circumstances in each divorce with or without unscrupulous
behavior. 97 Removing fault does not render the marital contract
illusory, nor does it allow irresponsible behavior to proliferate.
Removing the impediments to no-fault grounds in
mixed states would allow parties to access an equitable system
for settling disputes. Unnecessary requirements force parties
into a fault-based paradigm that expands costs and increases
public humiliation. Forcing fault, by requiring complete
agreement or imposing long waits, possibly allows
irresponsible behavior to go unaddressed. At minimum,
litigants should have the no-fault option without coming to an
agreement. Imposing substantial conditions on no-fault
grounds is a thinly-veiled attempt to keep old fault-based
notions of divorce, rather than preventing some injustice.

V. DECLINING RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AFFECTS SOCIETAL
VIEWS ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
Marriage certainly has roots that run deep into human
history. 98 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[m]arriage

R.E.M., It’s the End of the World as We Know It (And I Feel Fine), on
DOCUMENT (I.R.S. 1987).
96 See Brinig, supra note 93, at 877-78.
97 See, e.g., Gonsewki, supra note 62.
98 See Robert S. Walker, ET AL., Evolutionary History of Hunter-Gatherer
Marriage Practices, PLOS ONE (April 25, 2011),
https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/sdrewian/www/DivorceLawAndFa
milyFormation.pdf.
95
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is sacred to those who live by their religions.” 99 For much of
America’s history, an overwhelming majority of the population
identified with one faith or another. 100 Although our First
Amendment authors recognized the need for separation
between government and religion, 101 moral values based on
religious beliefs have been manifest through our governing
laws. 102 Laws governing marriage and marriage dissolution
should continue that process and reflect current societal change.
A declining emphasis on religious affiliation could signal the
next step for domestic relations law.

A. STUDIES SHOW A DECLINE IN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
Religious belief and practice appears to be in decline
across the board, and in steep decline among younger
generations. A recent study from the Pew Research Center
reveals a decline in religious affiliation across the United
States. 103 A survey of more than 35,000 adults found that those
who say they believe in God has declined in recent years. 104 This
decline did not come from older adults, but overwhelmingly
from millennials. 105 Many of those millennials simply chose not
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015).
See e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Religion and the Founding of the
American Republic (last visited Sept. 5, 2016),
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/index.html; see also PEW
RESEARCH CENTER, Regional Distribution of Christians (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.pewforum.org/2011/12/19/global-christianityregions/.
101 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
102 See e.g., TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 2. Article IX, section 2 declares that
“no person who denies the being of God, or a future state of rewards
and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this
State.” See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a
Texas law banning homosexual intimate contact was
unconstitutional).
103 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, U.S. Public Becoming Less Religious: Modest
Drop in Overall Rates of Belief and Practice, but Religious Affiliated
Americans Are as Observant as Before (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/11/03/u-s-public-becoming-lessreligious/.
104 Id.
105 Id.
99

100
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to identify with religion at all. 106 The percentage of adults who
were religiously unaffiliated rose sharply, with many
respondents claiming to have no belief in God whatsoever
(referred to in the study as “nones”). 107 Specifically, seven in ten
millennials say that religion has little to no importance in their
life. 108
Tennessee adults who identified as a “none” made up
fourteen percent of the total number. 109 This study noted a
significant decline in religious affiliation between 2007 and
2014. 110 Interestingly, Pew’s research found that adults in the
Volunteer State feel substantially more at peace than in the 2007
study. 111 These trends mirror those in Kentucky, where no-fault
divorce has persisted for decades. 112 In fact, downward trends
in religious affiliation were found across the southeastern
United States. 113
Recent Gallup numbers show that religious affiliation
has been on a steady decline for several decades. 114 The number
of people that have no religious affiliation has grown nearly
Id.
Id.
108 Id.
109 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adults in Tennessee (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/tennessee/.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Kentucky (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/kentucky/.
113 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Alabama (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/alabama/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in
Arkansas (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/state/arkansas/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
Adult in Mississippi (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/mississippi/; see also PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in
Georgia (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/religiouslandscape-study/state/gerogia/.
114 GALLUP, Religion: What is your religious preference – protestant,
Roman Catholic, another religion, or no religion?. (last visited Sept. 5,
2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx. This poll
shows the rise of the “nones” over several decades.
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tenfold over the six decades covered in this survey. 115 These
numbers show that Americans are placing less and less
emphasis on religious beliefs. As younger generations of
Americans replace baby boomer populations, the percentage of
Americans who see the law through the lens of religious
teachings may fall substantially from where it is now. Looking
forward, a move toward less religion-based morality in
domestic relations law may align the law with the values of the
most affected population. Domestic relations law has followed
religious affiliation in the past. Why not now?

B. MARRIAGE IS INEXTRICABLY LINKED WITH RELIGION
American marriage finds its historical underpinnings
intertwined with religion. In religious context, the reverence
given the marital bond dates back to the book of Genesis, where
the Bible says “shall a man leave his father and his mother, and
shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall become one flesh.” 116
Islam also reveres the bond of marriage, encouraging followers
to marry in order to garner the favor of Allah. 117 Judaism
defines how a woman is “acquired” as either with money,
contract, or sexual intercourse. 118 All of the above, despite
subtle differences, refer to a relational bond between persons.
The law gives legal recognition to that relationship.
The progression of domestic relations law has tracked
America’s religious beliefs. Courts could not break the bond of
marriage in nineteenth century England. 119 Divorce law has
progressed and established divorce, expanded fault grounds,
and then developed no-fault grounds. 120 The decrease in
religious affiliation seems to accompany, at least in some
degree, that trend. That is not to say that the decline in religious
affiliation tells the whole story of increased divorce rates. It
does not. 121 But the correlation between marriage and religion

Id.
Genesis 2:22-24 (King James).
117 Surah 24:32.
118 Mishnah Kiddushin 1:1.
119 Bell, supra note 2, at 782.
120 See supra Part II.
121 See supra Part IV.
115
116
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is undeniable, and, as some conservatives might argue,
necessary to preserve the institution.
Divorce laws reflect the link between society’s concept
of marriage and religion. A quick survey comparing states
populating the Bible belt with more liberal states on the West
Coast reveals the philosophical dichotomy of marriage. 122
States in the Bible belt have higher religious affiliation than
states that began the no-fault divorce trend on the west coast. 123
This also explains why New York, with its large Catholic
population, has resisted the development of no-fault divorce. 124
With religious affiliation on the decline, even in the Bible belt,
fault-based divorce should follow suit.

Compare ALA. CODE § 30-2-1 (West, WestlawNext Current through
the end of the 2016 Regular Session and through Act 2016–485 of the
2016 First Special Session), and GA. CODE ANN. § 19-5-3 (West,
WestlawNext current with legislation passed during the 2016 Session
of the Georgia General Assembly), and TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-102
(West, WestlawNext Current through end of the 2016 Second
Regular and Second Extraordinary Sessions of the 109th Tennessee
General Assembly), with CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West, WestlawNext
current with urgency legislation through Chapter 893 of 2016
Reg.Sess., Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex.Sess., and all propositions on
2016 ballot), and COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-106 (West, WestlawNext
current through the Second Regular Session of the 70th General
Assembly (2016)), and OR. REV. STAT. § 107.025 (West, WestlawNext
current with 2016 Reg. Sess. legislation eff. through 7/1/16 and
ballot measures on the 11/8/16 ballot, pending classification of
undesignated material and text revision by the Oregon Reviser).
Bible belt states hold fast to fault-based divorce by restricting access
to no-fault grounds in attempt to limit the divorce numbers.
California, Colorado and Oregon have discarded fault altogether,
focusing resources on other family law related issues.
123 Compare PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Adult in Oregon (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/
religious-landscape-study/state/oregon/; with PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, Adult in Tennessee (Nov. 3, 2015),
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscapestudy/state/tennessee/. Thirty-one percent of the Beaver state’s
adults do not affiliate with any religion. Compare that with eighteen
percent in Tennessee.
124 See Zborovsky, supra note 20.
122
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C. SOCIETAL CHANGES URGE DIVORCE LAW REFORM
Legal divorce, expanded fault grounds, and no-fault
divorce have all correlated with changes in society. 125 Divorce
laws should undergo legislative scrutiny as these changes
occur. A liberal movement preceded no-fault laws in states like
California, Oregon, and Colorado without catastrophic
consequences. 126 Kentucky, a state not necessarily known for its
progressive values, adopted a pure no-fault model in 1972. 127
The no-fault model in Kentucky has not significantly increased
the divorce rate. 128 Other changes were afoot across the United
States that affected those rising numbers.
The late 1960s and 1970s brought about a political
revolution that was reflected first in divorce statistics and then
the law. 129 A shift toward personal autonomy contributed to
legislatures reforming divorce laws. 130 The civil rights
movement, women’s liberation campaign, and the beginning of
the LGBT movement all represented a shift in American
politics. 131 Combined with an emotional antiwar movement, the
1960s pushed some American laws to the left, discarding
several traditionalist values entrenched for over 100 years. 132
See supra Part IV.
See, e.g., Kay, supra note 22.
127 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.140 (West, WestlawNext current
through the end of the 2016 regular session).
128 See KENTUCKY MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, Marriage & Divorce Rates by
County (last visited Jul. 20, 2016),
http://www.kentuckymarriage.org/marriage-inkentucky/marriage-divorce-rates-by-county/; see CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, DIVORCE RATES BY STATE: 1990,
1995, AND 1999-2014, supra note 77.
129 See Perry, supra note 42, at 62.
130 Id.
131 See e.g. STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, PORT HURON
STATEMENT (1962), reprinted in Radical Reader 468 (Timothy
McCarthy & John McMillan eds. 2003). The Port Huron Statement
embodied the discontent of a younger generation with oppressive
civil rights. See e.g., BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963)
reprinted in Radical Reader 468 (Timothy McCarthy & John McMillan
eds. 2003). Friedan discusses the importance of femininity, and
points out the oppressive mores in American society.
132 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241; see
also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; see also
125
126
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Political changes sculpted a new social landscape across
America, including no-fault divorce. More recently, millennials
have signaled conservative values that rose to prominence over
the past few decades are held in low regard now. 133
Lawmakers should heed this current evolution, and
reflect modern societal realities in divorce laws. As was the case
in the 1960s, younger generations come of age with different
values than their predecessors. Laws written generations ago
are ill-fitted to serve the population now living under them. 134
States could avoid this unnecessary friction by reevaluating
laws that no longer represent the governed, and that do not
address some societal ill. Declining religious affiliation,
particularly among millennials, tasks lawmakers with taking a
second look at restrictive divorce laws that have roots in
religious beliefs. Liberal movements of the 1960s and 70s
spurred no-fault statutes around the country, and the time is
ripe for conservative states to discard the leftovers of
yesteryear. Lawmakers should reevaluate divorce laws to
determine the necessity of complete agreement requirements
and extended waiting periods. In the spirit of providing access
to the courts to amicably resolve disputes, states should just
move to a pure no-fault divorce altogether.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Both legislative enactments and the
Roe opinion provide prominent examples of society departing from
what were once thought unshakeable traditional values.
133 PEW RESEARCH CENTER, The GOP’s Millennial Problem Runs Deep
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/09/25/the-gops-millennialproblem-runs-deep/. This study shows just how socially liberal
millennials are, while baby boomers are progressively more
conservative as age increases.
134 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015). The
legalization of gay marriage represents one example of societal
values changing the law. See also Colo. Const. art. 18, § 16.
Coloradans amended their state constitution in 2012 to allow the
legal possession and marketing of marijuana, joining Washington in
decriminalizing and regulating a substance society, especially the
younger demographic, saw as an acceptable personal choice.
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VI. TENNESSEE SHOULD MOVE TOWARD PURE NO-FAULT
DIVORCE
Henry Drummond, depicting the part of attorney
Clarence Darrow in Inherit the Wind, a movie based on Dayton,
Tennessee’s Scopes Monkey Trial, declared to the court that “a
wicked law, like cholera, destroys everyone it touches. Its
upholders as well as its defiers.” 135 Granted, Tennessee’s
restrictive no-fault statute does not qualify as a wicked law. But
even laws noble at inception can produce perverse
consequences. The adverse effect of this law harms the very
people whom proponents of religious-based restrictions sought
to protect.

A. TENNESSEE KEEPS COSTS UP AND ACCESS DOWN
Lessening the no-fault burden would improve access to
Tennessee courts. The Volunteer State can ill-afford to force its
citizens to waste economic resources. Tennessee ranks in the
bottom quintile of states with the most people living in
poverty. 136 With contested divorce costs running in the
thousands of dollars, 137 those below the poverty line, along with
most middle class families, can easily be financially wiped out
after a contentious divorce proceeding. Tennessee already
holds the distinction for the highest bankruptcy rate. 138 Like any
INHERIT THE WIND (United Artists 1960).
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, PERCENT OF TOTAL
POPULATION IN POVERTY, 2014 (2016),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-level-datasets/poverty.aspx#P345c97c54e8c48339ab8327ebfca5161_2_233iT3.
This government survey found over 18% of Tennessee’s population
live below the poverty line and over 25% of Tennessee children ages
0-17 live below the poverty line.
137 This estimate was based on a $250.00 hourly rate, which is
considered the national average for a divorce attorney. See Kathleen
Michon, How Much Will My Divorce Cost and How Long Will it Take?,
NOLO (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/ctp/cost-of-divorce.html.
138 Dave Flessner, Tennessee Still Leads Nation in Bankruptcies,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS (Jan. 10, 2016),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/sto
ry/2016/jan/10/tennesssee-still-leads-nation135
136
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state, Tennessee’s poor have fewer property assets. But the poor
typically have more of one common point of emphasis in
divorce proceedings—children. 139 Tennessee’s family law
should focus on providing for these children or, at least, avoid
harming them by squandering precious economic resources on
fault-based divorce. Onerous agreement requirements may
force lower income litigants into inequitable agreements that
fail to address the best interest of affected parties, namely
children. 140 Equity and best interest aside, directing more
people toward fault-based divorce via agreement requirements
may cause other poor results.
Moving toward pure no-fault divorce would shift some
undesirable behavioral issues into criminal and tort forums
better suited to provide sufficient outcomes. Tennesseans
injured by conduct actionable in tort who are forced to litigate
under a fault-based family law proceeding may preclude future
litigation of the same conduct in a forum better situated to
provide a remedy. 141 Facts used in divorce proceedings to show
fault may not address all the damage that occurred due to the
equitable nature of divorce. With particularly egregious
behavior, criminal or not, res judicata may prevent an injured
plaintiff from seeking compensation for non-pecuniary harms
or forgo a punitive damages award. 142
These regrettable outcomes may arise more often in
communities with stronger ties to religious ideologies that are
resistant to no-fault divorce. Ironically, a recent study in the
bankruptcies/343890/. In 2015, Tennessee ranked number one in
bankruptcy filings for the 6th consecutive year.
139 Yang Jiang, ET AL., Basic Facts About Low Income Children,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, (Feb. 2016)
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_1145.pdf. Children
comprise twenty-three percent of the total population but thirty-two
percent of all people in poverty, signaling a higher ratio of children
among those in poverty.
140 Cf. Parkman, supra note 43, at 42. This author discusses the
changing landscape of divorce negotiation after no-fault divorce.
141 See Kemp v. Kemp, 723 S.W.2d 138 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). In Kemp,
the court held that the doctrine of res judicata prevented her suit
against her husband for assault and battery because her divorce
award was based on the same facts.
142 See id.; see also Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in NoFault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 305 (1997).
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American Journal of Sociology found the best indicator for
increased divorce by county was the concentration of
evangelicals or conservatives in that county. 143 To wit,
restrictions based on conservative religious beliefs
disproportionately affect the people who support no-fault
divorce opponents. This same study identified that low income
and lower educational attainment were directly related to
higher incidences of divorce—both were common
characteristics found in southern, conservative communities. 144
Moreover, communities that increasingly encouraged
abstinence until marriage sustained higher incidences of
divorce. 145 Rural communities – typically poorer and steadfast
in their faith – deserve better.

B. TENNESSEE COURTS CONFUSE THE ISSUE
The complete agreement requirement has such little
relevance to actually dissolving the marriage that Tennessee
courts have confused the issue. 146 In 1995, the Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed a decision that held that a wife had
substantially contributed to property owned by her husband
before the marriage. 147 The Harrison court held that the real
property in dispute was not marital property and that the wife
was not entitled to share in the value. 148 The majority opinion
glossed over the ground for this divorce—irreconcilable
differences. 149 Tennessee’s complete agreement requirements
predates the decision in Harrison, 150 and shows just how much
sense this requirement actually makes. Appellate court
Press Release, Jennifer Glass, Red States, Blue states, and Divorce:
Understanding the Impact of Conservative Protestantism on
Regional Variation in Divorce Rates, Counsel on Contemporary
Families (Jan. 16, 2014), https://contemporaryfamilies.org/impactof-conservative-protestantism-on-regional-divorce-rates/.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 See Harrison v. Harrison, 912 S.W.2d 124 (Tenn. 1995).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 124.
150 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-103(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through end of the 2016 Second Regular and Second Extraordinary
Sessions of the 109th Tennessee General Assembly).
143
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decisions after Harrison have amended or remanded trial court
judgments that granted divorce based on irreconcilable
differences for failing to comply with the statute. 151
A simplification of the divorce statute would make the
judicial task easier and more efficient. If parties could petition
for divorce on only one ground, confusion would be unlikely.
Discarding the agreement requirement would limit the cases
where a divorce is bounced back-and-forth between appellate
and trial courts to comply with a misunderstood statutory
requirement. These cases show the room for improvement.
Tennessee lawmakers have made clear the conservative
agenda that takes priority in the Tennessee legislature. 152
Traditional conservatives should operate with an eye toward a
restrained form of government that believes less is more, rather
than moral populism operating under the guise of
conservatism. Conservatives love to quote Ronald Reagan who
said, “[g]overnment is not the solution to the problem;
government is the problem.” 153 The underpinnings of faultbased divorce fit well under President Reagan’s statement.
Tennessee’s no-fault statute burdens domestic relations law
with enforcing archaic values on a generation that increasingly
does not share those same values. Continuing to restrict nofault divorce ignores current economic and cultural realties. In
short, the situation has changed and so should the law.
Conservative states like Tennessee should recalibrate divorce
laws to reflect true conservative principles.

VII. CONCLUSION
Tennessee domestic relations law should follow the
current societal trends and loosen the restrictions on no-fault
divorce. Keeping with traditional mores, the legislature persists
See Cook v. Cook, No. E2016–00042–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL
3679415 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2016); Norris v. Norris, No. E2014–
02353–COA–R3–CV, 2015 WL 9946262 (Aug. 24, 2015).
152 See Joel Ebert, Tennessee’s 2016 Legislative Session: Key Moments, Key
People, THE TENNESSEAN (Apr. 23, 2016),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2016/04/23/ten
nessees-2016-legislative-session-key-moments-keypeople/83400506/.
153 Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Inaugural Address
(Jan. 20, 1981).
151
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in requiring a complete agreement to avoid the expense and
contentiousness of fault. To what end? Forcing parties to prove
fault increases costs, decreases access and complicates matters
even further.
Tennessee’s statute runs the risk of unnecessarily
compromising desirable outcomes that could preclude further
litigation needed to address more severe misconduct. Pure nofault has not allowed people to avoid responsibility,
significantly increased divorce rates, or adversely affected
aggrieved parties. Besides the societal ills of fault-based
divorce, the current statute has confused parties, attorneys, and
courts. This increases costs and burdens the court system. Other
remedies, when combined with pure no-fault divorce, more
effectively address Tennessee’s domestic issues.
Declining religious affiliation in younger generations
and the undesirable consequences of fault-based divorce
should compel Tennessee lawmakers to take a second look at
the state’s current no-fault statute. Even if a pure no-fault model
remains infeasible, Tennessee should remove the complete
agreement requirement to plead irreconcilable differences,
allowing litigants to access the court system without proof of
fault. In other words, Tennessee should allow divorcing
couples to just agree to disagree.

LINCOLN MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW
__________________________________
VOLUME 4

SPRING 2017

ISSUE 2

_____________________________________
BEYOND THE MONEY: EXPECTED
(AND UNEXPECTED)

CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON DRUGS
Cynthia A. Brown
I. INTRODUCTION
A cacophony of cries for criminal justice reform reverberates
from a growing chorus of discouraged, disillusioned and divergent
concerns across America. Though any number of factors supplies
ample cause for unease with the current state of our criminal justice
system, extraordinarily high rates of incarceration certainly contribute
mightily to the turmoil. Hyper-criminalization challenges abound
questioning the necessity of the volumes of crime statutes demanding
enforcement. Unacceptable rates of recidivism and questionable
policing are included in the catalog of troubling dynamics, but top
billing on the list may rightfully belong to the country’s costly policies
and practices adopted to reduce the demand and eradicate the supply
of illicit drugs. Few would argue the merit of removing substances
responsible for the degree of destruction attributable to many of the
psychoactive drugs receiving attention, but the exorbitant costs of
America’s punitive plan have failed to deliver results that justify the
expense.
An examination of the merits of the efforts expended fighting
illicit drugs requires a better appreciation of the objectives and the
allocation of resources to achieve those objectives. Reaching a sound
understanding requires realistic and rational analysis of the costs –
fiscal costs, certainly, but also sacrifices exacted from the constitution,
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demands placed on public and private institutions, and the prices
associated with less quantifiable measures. An accurate accounting of
the costs of the “war on drugs” must then necessarily include all of the
collateral damage, arguably as the most costly, the caustic erosion of
the cornerstones of U.S. democracy. The court cases resulting from this
engagement have significantly diminished our civil liberties by
shrinking the Bill of Rights, methodically abridging many freedoms we
have previously fought so fervently to preserve – freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures,
and property rights. Perhaps, the only fact more staggering than the
total overhead demanded by the fight against drugs is the balance
sheet’s telling of our nation’s epic failure.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a high-level survey of
our nation’s prohibition policies within the context of the costs of the
law enforcement efforts upholding those policies. The discussion will
offer a cursory review of the economic expense of the war on drugs
with tangential coverage of the constitutional, institutional and
intangible expenses that are inseparable from an assessment of the
costs of America’s drug control efforts. Part I provides a historical
review of illicit drug use in the United States, while Part II supplies the
evolution of the country’s efforts to codify its drug control policies.
Finally, Part III contains a survey of the costs of the current war on
drugs.

II. BACKGROUND
Archaeological evidence collected all over the world chronicles
human’s proclivities for the use of psychoactive substances known to
engender altered states of consciousness. 1 It is believed that over
12,000 years ago homo sapiens from the Stone Age ingested
hallucinogenic mushrooms. 2 Lake-dwellers in Switzerland more than
4,500 years ago provide the first evidence of the domestication and

Daniel Kunitz, On Drugs: Gateways to Gnosis, or Bags of Glue? HARPER’S
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2001, at 92. “All the vegetables sedatives and narcotics, all
the euphorics that grow on trees, the hallucinogens that ripen in berries or
can be squeezed from roots – all, without exception, have been know and
systematically used by human beings from time immemorial.” Id.
2 TERENCE MCKENNA, FOOD OF THE GODS: THE SEARCH FOR THE ORIGINAL TREE
OF KNOWLEDGE 47 (1992).
1
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consumption of poppy seeds. 3 During this same time period in China
and Neolithic Europe, there are indications of the cultivation of
cannabis or hemp. 4
Before the lake-dwellers or the Chinese and the Neolithic
Europeans, lore from India in the Brahmin tradition recognized the
intoxicating properties of cannabis and heralded the plant for granting
long life and sexual prowess. 5 Similarly, use of coca and other
stimulants by the inhabitants on the continent of South America has
been traced to primordial times. 6 The Bronze Age witnessed the
expansive use of opium as a painkiller, particularly by women to ease
the pains of childbirth and by others to relieve the discomforts of
sickness and disease. 7 In 300 B.C., Theophrastus, a Greek naturalist and
philosopher who was also a student of Aristotle and a successor to
Plato, authored the earliest undisputed reference to the use of poppy
juice. 8
Our ancient predecessors partook of psychoactive plants and
plant by-products to alter consciousness, certainly, but also for treating
pain, for communing with the gods, and for survival. 9 These plants,
often rich in alkaloids, served additionally as a source of nutrition and
RICHARD RUDGLEY, ESSENTIAL SUBSTANCES: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
INTOXICANTS IN SOCIETY 24-26 (1993); Ashley Montagu, The Long Search for
Euphoria, 1 REFLECTIONS 1, 62-69 (1966).
4 Id. at 29.
5 ANTONIO ESCOHOTADO, A BRIEF HISTORY OF DRUGS: FROM THE STONE AGE TO
THE STONED AGE 9 (1996).
6 RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION: A GLOBAL HISTORY
OF NARCOTICS 26 (2002).
7 (2300 B.C. - 500 B.C.). See, e.g., R. GORDON WASSON, THE WONDROUS
MUSHROOM: MYCOLATRY IN MESOAMERICA (1980); R. GORDON WASSON,
ALBERT HOFFMANN AND CARL A. P. RUCK, THE ROAD TO ELEUSIS (1978); PETER
T. FURST, ED., FLESH OF THE GODS: THE RITUAL USE OF HALLUCINOGENS (1976).
8 Svend Norn, Poul R. Kruse & Edith Kruse, History of Opium Poppy and
Morphine, 33 DANSK MEDICINHISTORISK ARBOG 171, 174 (2004). In the 2nd
Century, Theophrastus includes in his Historia Plantarum descriptions of
different poppy varieties and methods for extracting “latex.” F.J. CarodArtal, Psychoactive Plants in Ancient Greece, 1 NEUROSCIENCES AND HIST. 28, 31
(2013). Theophrastus’s use of latex from the poppy refers to opium, using the
term mekonio to specifically designate the juice. Id. His descriptions include
opium’s medicinal uses. Id. See also, Halil Tekiner & Muberra Kosar, The
Opum Poppy as a Symbol of Sleep in Bertel Thorvaldsen’s Relief of 1815, 19 SLEEP
MEDICINE 123, 123-25 (2016), and John Scarborough, Theophrastus on Herbals
and Herbal Remedies, 11 J. OF THE HIST. OF BIOLOGY 353, 353-385 (1978).
9 Abbie Thomas, Survivial of the Druggies, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 30, 2002, at 11.
3
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energy. 10 It is, however, the ancient attraction to intoxicating fruits,
berries, roots and other plants that is cited as support for the
proposition that intoxication may be a universal human need, the
“fourth drive.” 11
Akin to the consumption of psychoactive substances across the
globe, drugs have been part of America’s story even before it was a
country. Native Americans introduced early settlers to tobacco, a crop
that eventually financed America’s development as a nation. 12
European and Asian settlers brought other products—coffee, tea,
alcohol, hemp and the opiates—to America. 13 Until the late 19th
century, Americans were largely indifferent to the consumption of
these drugs, which were then used legally and with very little
government interference. 14
The turn of the 20th century would witness growing concerns
about drug use in America.
Interestingly, concerns were
compartmentalized to some degree and divided by a drug’s specific
association with a vulnerable subgroup of American society. For
instance, opium use was associated with the Chinese and a rising
Chinese immigrant population on the West Coast. Concerns about
cocaine grew from the drug’s association with the “Negro” population,
particularly in the South. Alcohol use was associated with urban
Catholic immigrants, while the abuses of heroin were attributed to the

Id.
RONALD K. SEIGEL, INTOXICATION: LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE
10 (1989); see generally, ANDREW WEIL, THE NATURAL MIND: A NEW WAY OF
LOOKING AT DRUGS AND THE HIGHER CONSCIOUSNESS (1972); and HELEN
PHILLIPS & GRAHAM LAWTON, THE INTOXICATION INSTINCT (2004).
12 See, e.g., IAIN GATELY, TOBACCO: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF HOW AN EXOTIC
PLANT SEDUCED CIVILIZATION (2001).
13 KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, DRUGS AND THE DRUG LAWS: HISTORICAL
AND CULTURAL CONTEXTS 6 (2005).
14 The National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse reported to
Congress in 1973, "[d]rug policy as we know it today is a creature of the 20th
Century. Until the last third of the 19th Century, America's total legal policy
regarding drugs was limited to regulation of alcohol distribution, localized
restrictions on tobacco smoking, and the laws of the various states regulating
pharmacies and restricting the distribution of ‘poisons.’” KING COUNTY BAR
ASSOCIATION, DRUGS AND THE DRUG LAWS: HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL
CONTEXTS 6 (2005) (quoting DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE,
SECOND REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE 14 (1973)).
10
11
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urban immigrants. Concerns of marijuana use and the spread of its
popularity were associated with Mexican immigrants.

CHINESE OPIUM AND THE “YELLOW PERIL”
The Civil War was a marker for great change in the United
States, including what some consider the beginning of the march
toward the country’s criminalization of drugs. 15 It was the use of
morphine, an opium derivative, during the war that solidified the
support of the medical community for the drug. 16 American’s use of
opiates expanded with the spread of patent medicines containing
opium, the invention of the hypodermic syringe, and the broad
acceptance of opium derivatives, such as morphine and heroin. 17
Doctors frequently recommended opium, legal and widely available,
as a treatment for any number of ailments, and in particular, physicians
favored opium as a remedy for “female troubles” related to menstrual
and menopausal conditions. 18
By the Civil War, morphine had received broad acceptance in medical
practice. See, EDWARD M. BRECHER & THE EDITORS OF CONSUMER REPORTS
MAGAZINE, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS. THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON
NARCOTICS, STIMULANTS, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS, HALLUCINOGENS, AND
MARIJUANA – INCLUDING CAFFEINE, NICOTINE, AND ALCOHOL 3 (1972).
Morphine derives from opium and was first discovered in 1804 by German
chemist Friedrich Wilhelm Adam Serturner, responsible for isolating
morphine. THOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY 189 (1974). By 1826, the
Merck Company was producing substantial quantities of the drug. Id.
16 Id.
17 Heroin is a byproduct of morphine after it is subjected to chemical
processing, first discovered in 1874. David T. Courtwright, The Roads to H:
The Emergence of the American Heroin Complex, 1889-1956, ONE HUNDRED
YEARS OF HEROIN 3 (David F. Musto, ed., 2002). Bayer Pharmaceuticals
secured heroin’s popularity when it introduced it in 1898 as “The Sedative
for Coughs.” Id. Heroin was also used as a cure for morphine dependency
and to relieve symptoms of morphine withdrawal. Id. Its greatest medical
demand, however, was in the treatment of patients suffering from
tuberculosis, pneumonia and other common respiratory conditions and was
widely prescribed by physicians into the 1920s. Id.
18 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14, at 1. Many cure-alls and elixirs legally
contained opium, frequently in the form of morphine, an opium derivative,
though the pharmacological mixes were not required to disclose their
15
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Large numbers of Chinese also began immigrating to America
and accepting low paying jobs, primarily in mines and building
railroads, in search of better lives not only for themselves but also for
their families. With large populations of Chinese settling on America’s
west coast, businesses and the business class exploited the Chinese as
a moral scapegoat to deflect attention away from the actual causes of
California’s economic depression in the 1870s. 19 The search for places
to lay blame for the poor economic conditions found traction in the
assessment of the “moral” aspects of the Chinese inhabitants, with
special attention paid to the vices of the Asian communities, not the
least of which was their proclivities for opium. 20 The result was
duplicitous in that it was, in actuality, part of a thinly veiled
discrimination program against Chinese. Anti-Chinese sentiment
intensified, Chinese exclusionary laws became commonplace and antiChinese hostility toward Chinese workers escalated. 21 By 1890, racism
toward the Chinese was rampant, driving the proliferation of negative
public sentiment concerning opium.
The Chinese brought with them to America the practice of
smoking opium. 22 Although opium was commonly used in the United

ingredients. Id. The popular patent medicines rarely contained labels
identifying their contents. Id. As a result, an unsuspecting population
became accidental addicts, finding themselves addicted to the opium in the
cure-alls and elixirs. Id. The addict population consisted largely of middle
and upper class white middle-aged women. Id.
19 Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law: Economic Crisis and Social
Control, 8 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 56, n.1 (1978). President Rutherford B. Hayes
signed the Chinese Exclusion Treaty in 1880, effectively reversing what had
been an open-door policy set in 1868. The new law placed strict limits on the
number of Chinese immigrants allowed into the U.S. and the number of
Chinese allowed to become naturalized citizens. Two years later, Congress
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, barring immigration from China
and prohibiting the naturalization of Chinese immigrants already in the
United States for a period of 10 years. The exclusionary treaty and act
represent the federal government’s reaction to the public’s belief that lowpaid Chinese workers were taking needed jobs away from whites,
particularly during a period of economic downturn, to the public outrage of
influence the Chinese smoking parlors had over the white population, and to
an increase in anti-Chinese violence. Id. 56-58.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 The British actually introduced opium to the Chinese. After the Chinese
outlawed opium in the late 1700s, the British maintained their lucrative
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States and was popular among all classes and races, ingestion of the
drug by smoking was a distinctly Chinese practice. 23 As long as the
attraction was limited to adventurous young men, the American public
voiced little objection, but when white women fell to the temptations
of the Chinese opium smoking parlors, Chinese opium sparked public
ire. Thus, the smoking of opium quickly became one of the most
identifiable Chinese vices and is the reported trigger for the rise of the
“yellow menace.” 24 Opium and the Chinese smoking dens were
synonymous with the corruption of American values and female
chastity. 25 They also provided a tantalizing explanation for the social
problems of the day, emerging as a target for public antipathy and
legislative attention. 26
Early laws addressing opium addiction varied in their effects,
but were consistent in their origins – products of local legislation – and
smuggling trade and began what became known as the Opium Wars.
Eventually, China fell to the pressure to re-legalize the opium trade.
23 See, RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION: A GLOBAL
HISTORY OF NARCOTICS 46 (2002). The Chinese habit of smoking opium grew
from the marketing efforts of British smugglers who maintained a lucrative
trade bringing opium to China from England after China outlawed the
substance in the late 1700’s. Id. The Chinese ban punished keepers of opium
shops with strangulation but was designed to influence a great deal more. Id.
China hoped to discourage its citizens from comingling with the “barbaric”
Europeans, responsible for supplying the drug, and to protect the Chinese
economy be curtailing the exporting of China’s silver, which was being
traded for opium. Id.
24 Patricia A. Morgan, The Legislation of Drug Law: Economic Crisis and Social
Control, 8 J. OF DRUG ISSUES 58 (1978). William Randolph Hearst, the
infamous newspaper publisher, began publishing a series of articles detailing
how Chinese men seduced white women with the drug opium, leading them
“to ‘contaminate’ themselves by frequenting the dens in Chinatown.” Id.; see
also, Stanford M. Lyman, The “Yellow Peril” Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes
of a Racist Discourse, 13 INT’L J. OF POL., CULTURE AND SOC’Y 683 (2000).
25 The San Francisco Police Department reported that while officers were
visiting these opium dens they “found white women and Chinamen side by
side under the effects of this drug – a humiliating site to anyone who has
anything left of manhood.” S. COMM., Chinese Immigration, It’s Social, Moral
and Political Effects (testimony of the San Francisco Police Department) (Ca.
1878). During the same period, the San Francisco Post published articles
opposing the Chinese for having “impoverished our country, degraded our
free labor and hoodlumized our children. [The Chinaman] is now
destroying our young men with opium.” Id.
26 Morgan, supra note 23, at 56.
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in their purpose – eradication of the socializing of whites, specifically
white women, with the Chinese. 27 In some instances, city ordinances
prohibited Chinese from using opium but permitted use by white
people. 28 In other instances, local legislation allowed the continued use
of the drug by Chinese, but outlawed its use by whites. 29

“NEGRO” COCAINE AND THE “SOUTHERN MENACE”
As the opium epidemic engulfed America’s west, cocaine
amassed its attack on the South. Not unlike the Chinese immigrant
laborers on the West Coast, in the late 1800’s, southern black laborers
found cocaine to be of assistance for increasing endurance and
withstanding strenuous working conditions. By the turn of the 20th
century, poor black laborers were developing habits for the drug and
found sniffing or snorting cocaine to be the quickest and cheapest way
to reap what was believed to be the drug’s benefits. 30 Similar to the
Chinese immigrants’ association to opium, the poor black laborers of
the South became firmly linked to cocaine in the minds of the American
public, but contrary to public perception, the predominant users of
cocaine in the early 1900’s were not the black laborers in the South. 31
The drug was far more popular, in fact, with whites and especially with
the white criminal element consisting of prostitutes, pimps, gamblers
and other “urban hoodlums.” 32
Notwithstanding the drug’s popularity with the whites, the
media provided significant aid in anchoring the public’s association of
blacks and cocaine and in stoking the racial tensions that already
existed between the blacks and the whites. Another parallel between
opium and cocaine at the turn of the last century was the media’s
Id. at 56-58; Joseph D. McNamara, The Hidden Costs of America’s War on
Drugs, 26 J. OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 97, 98-99 (2011).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 CHARLES E. DE M. SAJOUS, ANALYTICAL CYCLOPAEDIA OF PRACTICAL
MEDICINE, III 506 (1902). Cocaine’s popularity was certainly not limited to
southern black laborers. Id. The act of snorting cocaine distinguished the
use by common people from the use by the upper and professional class
users who preferred injecting it with a syringe. Id. Cocaine’s “assistance”
was so apparent that some employers, including plantation owners,
provided the drug to their black workers to improve productivity and
control the laborers. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 200.
31 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 200.
32 Id.
27
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sensationalizing the drug’s use and its abuses, which the newspapers
promptly connected to a marginalized subset of American society. The
press fed the whites’ fears by publishing shocking fabrications of
“cocaine crazed Negro[es]” leaving their farms and job sites on sexual
rampages attacking and having their way with white women,
reminiscent of the goings on in the Chinese smoking parlors. 33

MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE MARIJUANA MENACE

As the 20th century progressed, a new drug threatened the
country. Immigrants moving north from Mexico, in search of the
American Dream, brought with them cannabis, which they called
marijuana. 34 Although hemp and cannabis were not new to the United
States, it was the combined effect of prohibition and the expansive
prevalence of the recreational use of marijuana by Mexican immigrants
and Mexican-Americans that brought cannabis to the forefront in the
1920s. 35
By the 1930s, marijuana’s popularity had spread throughout the
country from schoolyards to neighborhood bridge parties. 36 In fact,
33 “Most of the attacks upon white women of the South are the direct result
of the cocaine crazed Negro brain . . . Negro cocaine fiends are now a known
Southern menace.” Dr. Edward H. Williams, Negro Cocaine “Fiends” Are A
New Southern Menace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1914, at IV-12. Superhuman
strength provided another legend attributable to the blacks’ use of cocaine
and led southern law enforcement to transition from .32 to .38 caliber
revolvers because cocaine-frenzied blacks were impervious to the smaller
rounds. See, MUSTO, supra note 16, at 7 (1999). Harry Anslinger, the head of
the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Agency, advocated for harsher
penalties related to cocaine use and possession by recounting stories of
racially mixed groups dancing together at nightclubs while under the
influence of cocaine. See, HARRY SHAPIRO, WAITING FOR THE MAN: THE STORY
OF DRUGS AND POPULAR MUSIC (1999).
34 RONALD K. SEIGEL, INTOXICATION: LIFE IN PURSUIT OF ARTIFICIAL PARADISE
273 (1989). America’s prohibition of alcohol in the 1920’s kindled an
increased use of marijuana. Id.
35 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14.
36 WILLIAM O. WALKER, III, DRUG CONTROL IN THE AMERICAS 102 (1981).
In New Orleans, the reporters in 1926 laid particular stress on
the smoking of marijuana by children. "It was definitely
ascertained that school children of 44 schools (only a few of
these were high schools) were smoking 'mootas.'
Verifications came in by the hundreds from harassed parents,
teachers, neighborhood pastors, priests, welfare workers and
club women . . . The Waif's Home, at this time, was reputedly
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marijuana “tea pads,” first surfacing in New Orleans and other
southern port cities, had infiltrated most major cities in the United
States by 1930. 37 The marijuana pads “resembled opium dens or
speakeasies except that prices were very low; a man could get high for
a quarter on marijuana smoked in the pad, or for even less if he bought
the marijuana at the door and took it away to smoke.” 38
Not unlike the associations ascribed to opium and to cocaine
before it, it was marijuana’s association with Hispanics that attracted
negative public attention and opposition. 39 The white majority’s bias
against anyone not its own now also enveloped Mexicans. The white’s
intolerance intensified as competition for jobs grew fiercer while the
“roaring twenties” fell to the Great Depression. Again, paralleling the
Chinese earlier in the century, the Mexican immigrants became an
intentional scapegoat for rising unemployment rates in the 1930s and
for other social ailments as the country’s economic depression
continued to bear down on its inhabitants. 40
The public’s indifference and the government’s abeyance
concerning psychoactive drugs would not continue. Fear, economic
pressures, sensational media reports and an epidemic of addiction
joined to create a force demanding a response.

full of children, both white and colored, who had been
brought in under the influence of the drug. Marijuana
cigarettes could be bought almost as readily as sandwiches.
Their cost was two for a quarter. The children solved the
problem of cost by pooling pennies among the members of a
group and then passing the cigarettes from one to another, all
the puffs being carefully counted."
BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14.
37 SEIGEL, supra note 33, at 273. By 1930, New York City served as host to at
least 500 marijuana tea pads. See, Mayor's Committee on Marijuana, The
Marijuana Problem in the City of New York, THE MARIJUANA PAPERS 246 (David
Solomon, ed., 1944).
38 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14.
39 MUSTO, supra note 16, at 219-20. The Federal Bureau of Narcotics
furthered public fears of marijuana by publicizing official statements about
police estimates that “fifty percent of the violent crimes committed in
districts occupied by Mexicans, Spaniards, Latin Americans, Greeks or
Negroes may be traced to this evil” of marijuana. RICHARD J. BONNIE &
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIJUANA CONVICTION 100 (1974).
40 C.M. Goethe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1935, IV-9. “[M]arijuana, perhaps now
the most insidious of our narcotics, is a direct by-product of unrestricted
Mexican immigration . . . our nation has more than enough laborers.” Id.
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III. AMERICA’S CRIMINALIZATION OF DRUGS
The “war on drugs,” at least as we know it, recently marked its
forty-fifth anniversary, but America’s criminalization of drugs and the
escalation of drug enforcement began just over a century ago. Until the
turn of the last century, the federal government generally abstained
from becoming involved in drug control efforts. Prior to that, the 19th
century witnessed state and local governments promulgating the
earliest laws addressing drugs; there were no national drug control
policies. The laws the states and local governments enacted were quite
mild in their restrictions, and most placed the onus of policing drugs’
distribution on the health professions. 41 Blanket prohibitions on any
drug were rare.
Early national legislative attention centered primarily on
opium. Congress increased the import tariff on smoking opium in 1883,
but left unaffected opium imported for other purposes. 42 In 1887,
Congress barred the importation of opium by any subject of China, but
it did not prohibit importing opium by non-Chinese concerns, nor did
it restrict importation of opium from Canada. 43 Then, in 1890,
Congress passed legislation that limited the manufacture of smoking
opium to American citizens. 44

THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT
In 1906, however, the federal government responded to the
growing opium and cocaine epidemics with a new approach. By
enacting the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 45 Congress stepped into the
realm of public health and safety, an area formerly exclusively held by
state governments. The legislation did not prohibit the use of opium,
cocaine or any other substance but rather, required all physicians to
accurately label medicines to ensure the doctors disclosed the identities
and quantities of the medicines’ contents and ingredients to all

Second Report of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse,
Drug Use in America: Problem in Perspective 14 (1973).
42 CHARLES E. TERRY & MILDRED PELLENS, THE OPIUM PROBLEM 747 (1928).
43 ALEXANDER T. SHULGIN, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES: A CHEMICAL AND
LEGAL GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL DRUG LAWS 244 (1988).
44 BRECHER ET. AL, supra note 14, at 44.
45 Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768. It was also known as the
Wiley Act.
41
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potential users. 46 Additionally, Congress required appropriate notices
be included if the medicines contained any dangerous or habit-forming
ingredients. 47
Despite the success of the Pure Food and Drug Act in reducing
opiate addiction, Congress passed the Opium Exclusion Act48 in 1909,
the nation’s first federal drug prohibition law. The legislation affected
a national ban on imported, non-medicinal smoking opium, and
marked the success of the concerted efforts of the U.S. Secretary of State
Elihu Root, Dr. Hamilton Wright and others to enact national opium
prohibitions in advance of President Roosevelt’s Conference of the
International Opium Commission in Shanghai in 1909. 49
Dr. Wright was intent, however, on even greater, more widely
sweeping legislation. Upon his return from the Shanghai conference,
he drafted legislation entitled the Foster Antinarcotics Bill. 50 The
legislation was founded on Congress’ constitutionally granted taxing
power and provided for a federal tax on all drug transactions. 51 It also
required everyone who sold drugs to register with the government and
record all drug sales. 52 Unfortunately for Dr. Wright and others who
backed the legislation, the popular support did not outweigh the
nation’s drug manufacturers and retailers who opposed the bill, and
the legislation failed, never coming to a vote. 53
Id. It did not take long for the new act to debunk the belief that the vast
majority of addicts consisted of accidental addicts. It was soon discovered
that many opium addicts genuinely sought out the drug solely for its
psychoactive effects.
47 Id.
48 Smoking Opium Exclusion Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 614.
49 Id. It was a proposal drafted by Dr. Hamilton Wright, the U.S. State
Department’s appointee to the American delegation to the Conference of the
International Opium Commission. Dr. Wright advocated strongly that the
U.S. serve as a model for other nations by enacting its own exemplary opium
laws. MUSTO, supra note 16, at 33. [1999] At the time, America had no legal
ban limiting the use, sale, or manufacture of products containing opium or
coca. Id.
50 H.R. 25241, 61st Cong. (1910); see also, Hamilton Wright, Report on the
International Opium Commission and on the Opium Problem as Seen within the
United States and Its Possessions, OPIUM PROBLEM: MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 377 at 45 (1910).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 The Foster Antinarcotics Bill included cumbersome record-keeping and
reporting requirements opposed by business and industry. MUSTO, supra
note 16, at 47-48. [1999]
46
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THE HARRISON NARCOTICS TAX ACT: “ . . . A ROUTINE SLAP AT
MORAL EVIL” 54
Dr. Wright was undaunted in his efforts to acquire
prohibitionist legislation despite the earlier failure of the Foster
Antinarcotics Bill. During the next session of Congress, he, the other
physicians who participated in the drafting of the legislation and other
supporters succeeded in having the domestic drug prohibition
legislation introduced into the House of Representatives. 55 Opposition
from business and industry, including the American Medical
Association (AMA), remained ardent, but grudging compromises
resulted in the Harrison Act being signed into law on December 17,
1914. 56
The new law required drug manufacturers and sellers to
register their activity with the federal government, to keep records of
their sales, and to pay taxes on each transaction. 57 For the medical
community, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act provided a legal
mechanism to ensure that those responsible for selling and dispensing
addictive drugs, drugs such as opium and its derivatives – morphine
and heroin, cocaine and others, did so in an orderly fashion, whether
the amount distributed was smaller in quantities sold over the counter
or was larger and required a physician’s prescription. 58 Physicians and
pharmacists had participated in drafting the statute, and they felt
protected by its language, particularly the language shielding them
from government interference in their practices. 59
MUSTO, supra note 16, at 65. [1999]
MUSTO, infra note 66. [1972]
56 36 Stat. 785-90 (1914). The official title of the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act
was the following: “An Act to provide for the registration of, with collectors
of internal revenue and to impose a special tax upon all persons who
produce, import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute,
or give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives or preparations,
and for other purposes.” Id.
57 Id.; see also, EVA BERTRAM, MORRIS BLACHMAN, KENNETH SHARPE, & PETER
ANDREAS, DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 68 (1996).
58 BRECHER, ET. AL, supra note 14, at 48.
59 The Harrison Act included, “Nothing contained in this section shall apply
to the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by
a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the
course of his professional practice only.” Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, Pub.
L. No. 223, 36 Stat. 785, 789.
54
55
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Little did they know that in only a few short years, the Harrison
Narcotic Act would transform from a relatively innocuous revenue
measure into a powerful tool for federal authorities to regulate, and
ultimately prohibit, a wide range of narcotics-related activities.
Further, instead of enjoying protection of the language of the Harrison
Act, physicians and pharmacists would soon learn that the language
they believed provided them security would be language used against
them. Ultimately the language in question, the wording that shielded
them from government interference “in their practices,” was deemed
to be language subject to multiple interpretations.
Some
interpretations supplied undercover Treasury agents the authority to
arrest thousands of doctors and pharmacists for prescribing and
administering drugs to narcotics addicts. 60 In the 1920s, the Treasury
Department charged and prosecuted more than 25,000 doctors for
alleged Harrison Act violations, and over 3,000 of those charged served
sentences in the penitentiary. 61 Although contentious legal issues
arose, the Court rejected the Treasury Department’s attempts to use the
Harrison Act as a prohibition against physicians and their patients. 62
60 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at 230. The U.S. Treasury Department
took advantage of the ambiguous language “in pursuit of their professional
practice” and instigated initiatives to adopt regulations forbidding
physicians from providing drugs for addiction maintenance in cases where
addiction was unrelated to medical issues. “The manifest lack of federal
power to regulate medical practice as well as the need to unify professional
support of the Harrison Act may have required these vague phrases.”
MUSTO, supra note 16, at 125 (1999).
61 LAWRENCE KOLB, DRUG ADDITION: A MEDICAL PROBLEM 145-46 (1962).
62 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394 (1916), provided the first major
legal challenge to the constitutionality of the Harrison Narcotic Act. Id. In
its decision the Supreme Court limited the scope of the statute denying the
U.S. Treasury Department’s attempt to prosecute a doctor for prescribing
drugs to an addict and the Treasury Department’s efforts to criminalize the
addict’s possession of an illicit drug prescribed by his doctor. Id. at 401. The
Court recognized that an act of Congress is only valid if carried out pursuant
to an expressly granted constitutional power and, in so doing, held that the
Harrison Act was not required under international treaty as had been
promoted. Id. at 401. Therefore, where the Act was passed under Congress’
taxing power, it could only be valid for raising revenue. Id. The Court then
found that both preventing a doctor from exercising professional judgment
to prescribe drugs and prohibiting mere possession of drugs were actions
unrelated to revenue collection, and the federal government could not use
the Harrison Act to prosecute doctors who prescribed drugs or to prosecute
the individuals who possess the drugs. Id.

131

132

4 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2017)

The victory enjoyed by doctors and pharmacists would prove to be
short-lived. 63
Notwithstanding the decision in Jin Fuey Moy, the Treasury Department
refused to abandon its attempts to regulate the prescription practices of
physicians and pharmacists. Rather, it continued its efforts under the pretext
of conducting “tax” law enforcement in a fashion it argued was consistent
with the language of the Harrison Act and the Court’s interpretation in Jin
Fuey Moy. In United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), and Webb v. United
States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919), two companion cases whose decisions the Supreme
Court delivered on the same day, the Court explicitly upheld the statute as a
legitimate revenue measure in Doremus, writing,
[i]f the legislation enacted has some reasonable relation to the
exercise of the taxing authority conferred by the Constitution,
if cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives
which induced it....The act may not be declared
unconstitutional because its effect may be to accomplish
another purpose as well as the raising of revenue.

63

249 U.S. at 93-94. In the Webb decision, the Court went further
holding that the legitimate practice of medicine could not include
prescribing drugs to patients simply to maintain their addiction with
no intent to cure them. 249 U.S. at 97-98. The Treasury Department
seized on this language to justify their continued pursuit of doctors
and pharmacists.
Three years later, the Treasury Department obtained an
undeniable triumph that would consign significant and lasting
effects on America’s drug enforcement policy. In United States v.
Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), the Supreme Court upheld the Treasury
Department’s criminalization of physicians’ prescribing drugs to
narcotics addicts whose only medical ailment was the addiction,
affirming the federal government’s position that providing a
narcotics prescription to an addict was a de facto criminal act,
regardless of the physician’s intent or “good faith.” Id. at 289. The
effects of the Behrman decision would not be undone by the Court’s
subsequent decision in Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925). In
Linder, the Court reversed course recognizing constitutional issues
with the Harrison Act if in expanding the statute’s meaning beyond
its taxing authority the Court’s interpretation was correct. Id. at 2123. The Court’s decision recognized that there could be medically
appropriate justifications for prescribing narcotics to an addict “to
relieve conditions incident to addition.” Id. at 22. By 1925, however,
the government’s punitive enforcement practices were so firmly
entrenched that “few were willing to challenge Treasury’s actions
politically or in court, and the ruling had little real impact.”
BERTRAM, ET. AL, supra note 56, at 75.
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THE MARIJUANA TAX ACT OF 1937
The next major piece of legislation in the criminalization of
drugs in America was legislation proposed by Narcotics Commissioner
Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 64 Proponents
sought to bring marijuana under federal control, but they needed a way
to do so without running afoul of the Constitution. Relying, again, on
Congress’ authority to tax presented the solution.
To garner popular support, Anslinger looked to the power of
the press. Working through the media, Anslinger perpetuated the
public’s fear of drugs by arguing that the use of marijuana caused
insanity and led to violent crime.65 The Senate followed Anslinger’s
lead and issued a report to accompany the bill, describing marijuana’s
threats in the following way:
[u]nder the influence of this drug marijuana the will is
destroyed and all power of directing and controlling
thought is lost. Inhibitions are released. As a result of
these effects, many violent crimes have been committed
under the influence of this drug…. [M]arijuana is being
placed in the hands of high school children…. by
unscrupulous peddlers. Its continued use results many
times in impotency and insanity. 66
Though there was opposition, particularly from the American
Medical Association, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the
Congress established the Federal Bureau of Narcotics as a division of the
U.S. Treasury Department in 1930, and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon
appointed his nephew-in-law Harry J. Anslinger as the bureau’s first
commissioner. SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 245. Anslinger would become one
of the most influential and prominent figures in the history of America’s
criminalization of drugs. Id. He would become one of the most influential
individuals in America’s criminalization of drugs and would later earn
notoriety as the “father of the drug war.” See, John C. McWilliams, Unsung
Partner Against Crime: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
1930-1962, 113 PENN. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 207, 207-236 (1989).
65 “How many murders, suicides, robberies, criminal assaults, hold-ups,
burglaries, and deeds of maniacal insanity it [marijuana] causes each year,
especially among the young, can only be conjectured.” JOHN KAPLAN,
MARIJUANA, THE NEW PROHIBITION 92 (1971) (quoting Commissioner Harry J.
Anslinger); see also, NORMAN E. ZINBERG & JOHN A. ROBERTSON, DRUGS AND
THE PUBLIC 178 (1969).
66 Id. at 178-79 (quoting the U.S. Senate report accompanying the proposed
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937).
64
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Marijuana Tax Act into law on October 1, 1937. 67 The statute imposed
a tax on all marijuana imported, sold, or otherwise handled by placing
a transfer tax on each transaction involving the substance. 68
Additionally, though the new legislation did not actually prohibit the
sale or possession of marijuana, it did require anyone handling
cannabis to register with the federal government. 69 If one failed to
register, to pay the required taxes and to acquire the mandated transfer
stamp, he was subject to fines commanding substantial payments and
incarceration carrying sentences up to twenty years. 70

THE BOGGS ACT OF 1951
The Boggs Act of 1951 71 established the country’s first
mandatory minimum sentences for drug-related offenses. 72 The
legislation was in response to the concerns of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics over the rise in illicit drug use following World War II. 73
During wartime, the United States experienced a decline in drug use, a
decline attributable to a variety of factors. 74 One factor, a shortage of
supply through medical channels, fostered the need for alternative
sources for the drugs’ supply and unwittingly cultivated a black
market demand. 75 As the drug supply steadily diminished, the street
price of the drugs continued to rise, attracting even greater numbers of
criminal enterprises. 76 In addition to creating mandatory minimum
sentences for drug violations, and in part, to address the increased
67 Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 551; see also, David F. Musto, The
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, 26 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 101, 101-08
(1972).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 255, 65 Stat. 767.
72 WALKER, supra note 35, at 170-71.
73 Harry J. Anslinger, The Federal Narcotic Laws, 6 FOOD, DRUG, AND COSM. L. J.
743, 743-48 (1951).
74 WALKER, supra note 35, at 170-71.
75 DANIEL GLASER, Interlocking Dualities in Drug Use, Drug Control and Crime,
DRUGS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 46 (James A. Inciardi & Carl D.
Chambers, eds. 1974).
76 Id.
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numbers of black market drug dealers, the Boggs Act modified the
prior penalties associated with Harrison Act violations increasing them
fourfold. 77

THE NARCOTIC CONTROL ACT OF 1956
The American Medical Association and the American Bar
Association (ABA), troubled by the federal government’s punitive
drug policies, joined forces to persuade a congressional subcommittee
to reexamine the country’s drug dilemma, the degree to which narcotic
drugs were an issue, and the efficacy of the drug laws in place. 78 The
double-team effort succeeded in persuading Senator Price Daniel of
Texas to hold hearings across the country to study America’s approach
to the drug problem. 79
Daniel’s committee concluded in 1956 and reported finding a
severe drug problem requiring drastic punitive measures. 80 The
committee “accused the Supreme Court of permitting major dope
traffickers to escape trial by its too-liberal interpretation of
constitutional safeguards; it found the Narcotics Bureau could not fight
the traffic effectively without being freed to tap telephones; the
allowance of bail in narcotics cases was intensifying the flow of drugs
into the country; and Bureau agents ought to have statutory authority
to carry weapons.” 81 Further, Daniel’s committee condemned the
concept of drug treatment clinics and demanded increased penalties
for drug offenses, including the addition of the death penalty for
smuggling and for heroin sales. 82
Regrettably, it was not what the AMA and the ABA intended
when they lobbied for reexamination of America’s drug policies, and
Daniel’s study resulted in Congress’ passage of additional, even more
repressive legislation – the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, known as the
Daniel Act. 83 The newly enacted statute eliminated suspended
sentences, probation, and parole for drug violations and, not

65 Stat. 767.
RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP, AMERICA’S FIFTY YEAR FOLLY 14 (1972).
79 Id.; see also, WILLIAM O. WALKER III, DRUG CONTROL POLICY: ESSAYS IN
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 19-20 (2004).
80 WALKER, supra note 78, at 19-20.
81 Id. at 16.
82 SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 246.
83 Narcotic Control Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 567.
77
78
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surprisingly, established new longer mandatory minimum sentences. 84
In addition to raising minimum sentences, the act increased both prison
terms and fines for violations of the drug laws. 85 Heeding Daniel’s
request, Congress also included a provision for imposing the death
penalty against anyone over the age of eighteen who provided heroin
to anyone under the age of eighteen. 86

THE DRUG ABUSE CONTROL ACT OF 1965
The Drug Abuse Control Act created provisions that closely
paralleled the Harrison Narcotics Act in their mandate requiring
registration, inspection, and record-keeping by all persons concerned
with any controlled substance covered under the Act and with the
trafficking of those substances. 87 Pursuant to the statute, the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) assumed responsibility for enforcement of
the addition to America’s drug policies through its newly created
Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, named for the legislation responsible
for its creation. 88 The FDA also promulgated new regulations under the
Drug Abuse Control Act establishing quotas and limiting supplies of
certain narcotics and placing severe restrictions on the manufacture a
pharmaceutical amphetamines. 89 The restrictions did little to forestall
the proliferation of users of illicit psychoactive substances but did
much to motivate the growth of a black market in "speed." 90

THE MODERN ERA OF AMERICA’S DRUG POLICIES
Until the late 1960s, the federal government’s role in drug
enforcement would have been considered minimal, and the U.S.

Id.
Id.
86 Id.; see also, ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE LAW 26 (1965).
87 KING, supra note 77, at 26.
88 Drug Abuse Control Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 226.
89 Id.
90 The supply shortages created by the statute’s restrictions in turn sparked
an escalation in pricing of the black market drugs sufficient enough to make
the street’s profit potential attractive to new criminal organizations, a veteran
business model first developed with alcohol in the 1920s, and later repeated
with the opiates in the 1940s and 1950s. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 22, at
312-13.
84
85
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Department of Justice played no role at all. 91 Federal efforts consisted
predominantly of customs officials seizing what they could at the
nation’s borders, the Treasury Department's Federal Bureau of
Narcotics investigating heroin rings, and the FDA regulating
pharmaceuticals. 92 A “war on drugs” did not exist.
Richard Nixon, however, adopted controlling narcotics as a
sizable plank in his campaign platform, and Nixon’s proclamation of a
nation-wide necessity to restrict the availability, sale and use of illicit
drugs gathered increasingly greater popular accord as his campaign
progressed. 93 After his election, President Nixon unveiled a global
campaign to eradicate drugs and drug traffickers. 94 He established the
National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse in 1970 and the
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. 95 A year later, he
declared drugs to be “public enemy number one,” becoming the first
American president to officially declare a “war on drugs,” and setting
the stage for each executive that followed. 96

THE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL
ACT OF 1970
A hallmark of Nixon’s crusade against drugs was the passage
of the Controlled Substances Act as Title II of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act. 97 In addition to wholly replacing
the Harrison Act as the nation’s chief legislative instrument of drug
control, it positioned the manufacture, importation, distribution, and
possession of certain psychoactive substances under federal authority
and regulation. 98 Congress relied on its authority to regulate interstate
commerce as the basis to subordinate all previously existing drug laws
under federal power, but an immediate effect of the legislation was to
DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF
FAILURE 206-91 (1996).
92 Id.
93 MUSTO, supra note 16, at 253-57. [1988]
94 DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 6, at 421-423.
95 Id.
96 In 1971, Nixon declared “total war . . . on all fronts against an enemy with
many faces.” See, SHULGIN, supra note 42, at 247.
97 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
98 Id. Three years later, Congress consolidated all anti-drug activities under a
newly created Drug Enforcement Administration, further strengthening the
federal bureaucratic mechanism for drug control nurtured by the Nixon
administration. See, Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, 87 Stat. 1091.
91
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“effectively destroy the Federal-State relationship that existed between
the Harrison Act and the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act.” 99
In an effort to restore the balance between state and federal
authorities that existed prior to the passage of the Controlled
Substances Act, the Commissioner on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 100 It replaced the Uniform
Narcotic Drug Act of 1932, and presented an arrangement of
complementary federal and state drug control laws that soon became
the national standard for the control and legislative enforcement of
narcotic and dangerous drugs.
Another feature of the Controlled Substances Act, it introduced
five schedules or categories for drugs, arranged in descending order
based on a substance’s potential for abuse and ascending order
determined by a substance’s approved medicinal use. 101 As an
example, neither of the illicit drugs heroin and Ecstasy have any
accepted medical use, but their potential for abuse is quite high. They
both fall under Schedule I. 102 While substances that are widely
accepted medicinal drugs, like medications that treat diarrhea, fall
within Schedule V. 103
President Gerald Ford’s brief administration brought some
amount of pragmatism to Nixon’s anti-drug measures. Though
President Ford maintained pressure for stronger controls, he
acknowledged that eliminating drug abuse was an illusory exercise. 104
Shulgin, supra note 42, at 247
84 Stat. 1285 (1970); see also, Rufus King, The 1970 Act: Don’t Sit There,
Amend Something,
http://www.druglibrary.ent/special/king/dhu/dhu23.htm. (last visited X)
101 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
102 Arthur J. Lurigio, A Century of Losing Battles: The Costly and Ill-Advised War
on Drugs in the United States (Loyola Univ. Chicago Social Justice Centers,
Loyola eCommons, Working Paper, Paper No. 21, 2014),
http://ecommons.luc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=social
_justice&seiredir=1&referer=https%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fhl%3
Den%26q%3DLurigio%2Bcentury%2Bof%2Blosing%2Bbattles%26btnG%3D
%26as_sdt%3D1%252C25%26as_sdtp%3D#search=%22Lurigio%20century%
20losing%20battles%22. (last visited X)
103 Id.
104 Musto, supra note 16, at 257. [1999] The Domestic Council Drug Abuse
Task Force released its White Paper on Drug Abuse during Ford’s
administration. See, Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, White Paper,
(1975),
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0067/1562951.
99

100
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The more pragmatic tenor of Ford’s administration also found footing
in the subsequent administration of President Jimmy Carter. President
Carter, addressing Congress, urged that “penalties against possession
of a drug should not be more damaging to an individual than the use
of the drug itself; and where they are, they should be changed.” 105
Federal law never reflected President Carter’s suggestions of
decriminalizing marijuana nor his more realistic approaches to drug
control, and any softening positions eventually dissolved.
When President Ronald Reagan took office, he brought with
him an attitude toward drug control reminiscent of the Nixon
administration. America was emerging from the Vietnam War, and the
reach of the Columbian drug cartels was international. American’s fear
of drugs experienced renewed momentum and found respite in
President Reagan’s support of a strong law enforcement approach to
drug control. 106 From the White House Rose Garden in 1982, President
Ronald Reagan declared, “[w]e can put drug abuse on the run through
stronger law enforcement, through cooperation with other nations to
stop the trafficking, and by calling on the tremendous volunteer
resources of parents, teachers, civic in religious leaders, and state and
local officials." 107 Congress’ additions to America’s drug policies
reflected the prohibitionist stance of the Reagan administration.

THE COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984
pdf. (last visited X) The Council’s white paper indicated the problem of drug
abuse was one that the government could only hope to contain, and it
warned that the government’s ability to totally eliminate drug abuse was an
unlikely prospect. Id. at 97-98.
105 Quoted in Musto, supra note 16, at 261. [1999] Carter campaigned on a
platform that included decriminalizing marijuana and repealing federal laws
that penalized people for less than one ounce of an illicit drug. See, e.g.,
MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX (1998). – need more detailed reference
106 Id. at 266-67.
107 President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368,
Concerning Federal Drug Abuse Policy Functions (June 24, 1982) (in William
Richard Files, White House Staff Files, Ronald Reagan Library),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42671. (last visited X)
Nancy Reagan’s antidrug campaign “Just Say No” became a controversial
component of the broad national approach to the elimination of drug abuse
but was very popular with parents, schools and the media. The
administration’s fight focused on white middle-class youth and received
funding from corporate and private donations. Musto, supra note 16, at 26668. [1999]
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In 1984, the Controlled Substances Act underwent change with
a variety of additions known as the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984. 108 The new amendments included provisions for placing
certain “designer drugs” into the scheduling formula and for seizing
the profits derived from criminal acts. 109

THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1986
By signing the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 110 , President
Reagan significantly intensified the federal government’s fight for drug
control and recognized the bipartisan support for tough new penalties
for those who violated the nation’s drug laws. The legislation
established mandatory minimum sentences for violations of heroin and
cocaine statues, and in so doing Congress created marked disparities
in legal penalties for the possession and sales of powder cocaine and
crack cocaine. 111 Congress also established the possibility of a capital
sentence for certain drug offenses. 112

THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988
President Reagan’s intensification of nationwide efforts to
control illicit drugs continued with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988. 113 With this legislation, the Reagan administration sought
98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
Id.
110 100 Stat. 3207. The legislation received almost unanimous congressional
support, partly in reaction to the overdose death of Len Bias. Earlier that
year, Bias, a promising collegiate basketball star, died suddenly from a
suspected cocaine overdose. His death and the prominence played by illicit
drugs garnered front-page news nationwide.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 102 Stat. 4181. President Reagan was adamant about getting “tough on
drugs.” RONALD REAGAN, RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION ON ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND THE WAR ON DRUGS, The American Presidency Project (Oct. 8,
1988), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=34997. (last visited X)
Reagan announced that “we will no longer tolerate those who sell drugs and
those who buy drugs . . . they must pay.” Id. President Reagan’s declaration
was an outward demonstration of his having harnessed the existing public
momentum seeking a crackdown on drug use in America. By 1982, over
3,000 parents’ groups had assembled and organized under the National
108
109
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to prevent the manufacture of scheduled drugs and to further
discourage drug use by adopting even more stringent penalties. 114
Congress opined "the legalization of illegal drugs, on the Federal or
State level is unconscionable surrender in a war in which . . . there can
be no substitute for total victory . . . it is the declared policy of the
United States Government to create a drug-free America in 1995." 115
The United States would spend billions of dollars and convict
thousands of drug offenders, but the notable goal was unattainable.

THE 21ST CENTURY “WAR ON DRUGS”
Each decade of the last century witnessed ever increasing
government effort to eradicate addiction, thwart drug trafficking, and
prevent drug-related crime. The 1990s and the move into the 21st
century continued the pattern – new legislation continues, as does
unprecedented spending, increased numbers of arrests and
incarceration of drug offenders, and even longer prison sentences with
little or no rehabilitative component. The sad reality is that after
billions of dollars, millions of man-hours, and untold numbers of lives,
America’s punitive approach has wholly failed to eradicate drug
addiction, failed to thwart trafficking and failed to prevent drugrelated crime. In fact, the government’s expenditures and efforts have
failed even to reduce these numbers for any sustained period.
Success, however, has not been altogether elusive. Our nation’s
governing bodies, including the individual state governments, have
realized unparalleled accomplishments regarding a variety of drugrelated matters, though these hallmarks cannot truly be counted as
triumphs in the war on drugs. Among those accomplishments, we
have allocated and spent more money, enacted more drug-related
legislation, created thousands of new drug-related crimes, and
prosecuted and jailed more people, all with little in the way of
corresponding victories to claim as a result. The prevalence of drug
use continues, epidemics of drug abuse are spreading, the rise of
incidences of drug offenses and drug-related crimes abound, and the
toll of the public costs escalates. The hard truth is that the costs and
consequences of America’s drug policy, with its increased
Federation of Parents for Drug Free Youth. Gonzales, Laurence, The War on
Drugs: A Special Report, April PLAYBOY 134 (1982).
114 Id.
115 Shulgin, supra note 42, at 250.
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criminalization of drugs and drug-related activities, its ever-exacting
retributive sanctions and the intensified enforcement efforts have
simply failed.

IV. THE COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICA’S WAR ON
DRUGS
America’s national policy on drug control espouses a
commitment to maintaining health, welfare and public safety, a
commitment that arguably provides undergirding for all of the nation’s
drug legislation, regulations, rules, and ordinances. 116
The
implementation of our nation’s drug policy, however, is realized
almost exclusively through prohibitive measures and the application
of severe punishment touted as the best means of eliminating drug
availability and deterring people from drug consumption through fear
of punishment. The upshot is that the entirety of our national drug
policy, supposedly aimed at protecting both individuals and society at
large from drugs and drug-related harm, is based on the myth that
these aims can be achieved through police enforcement. Almost fifty
years of practice reveals a different story, but these lessons are not
affecting a reduction in the allocation of resources—both capital and
human—budgeted for drug control. Below is an overview of some of
the costs and consequences of America’s war on drugs.

INCARCERATION
The United States has the highest incarceration rate per capita
of any country on the planet. 117 Our numbers dwarf those of nearly
every developed country, including those of highly repressive regimes,
such as Russia, China, and Iran. 118 America’s war on drugs is the
driving force of these astounding numbers of mass incarcerations over
the last four decades, the single largest contributor to new prison
The commitment of the United States is not unlike that adopted by the
United Nations. In the preamble of the 1961 United Nations Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, “the health and welfare of mankind” is the
described impetus for the UN drug policies. UNITED NATIONS, SINGLE
CONVENTION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, 1961, 1 (1961), available at
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf.
117 MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6 (rev. ed. 2012).
118 Id.
116
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admissions being drug law violations. 119 The mechanics of these
swelling incarceration rates consist of increased numbers of
convictions in relation to arrests and increases in average sentence
lengths, both influenced by the nation’s drug enforcement policies. 120
The Brookings Institution reported that in sixteen years, between 1993
and 2009, thirty million people were arrested on drug charges. 121 Of
those arrested, more than three million received convictions with
accompanying prison sentences resulting in prison admissions. 122 In
fact, each year during the sixteen-year study period, more people were
admitted to prison for drug law violations than for violent crimes. 123
Considering the last 25 years, the number of federal prisoners
serving time for drug-related offenses has risen by nearly 2,000%, from
approximately 5,000 inmates in 1980 to over 95,000 in 2015. 124 When
state prisons and local jail populations are added to the federal
numbers, our nation’s incarcerated swell from approximately 320,000

DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, THE DRUG WAR, MASS INCARCERATION AND RACE
1 (2016),
http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/DPA%20Fact%20Sheet_Dr
ug%20War%20Mass%20Incarceration%20and%20Race_%28Feb.%202016%29
.pdf. (last visited X)
120 There are a variety of contributing causes to the explosion in incarceration
rates, but regardless of the dynamics that have led to the increase, growing
numbers of non-drug related offenses are not part of the equation. In fact,
the number of non-drug related convictions has remained relatively
constant, if not in a state of decline. The multiplier is a rise in numbers of
convicted drug offenders coupled with longer sentences. Criminal justice
policies, not changes in underlying crime, account for nearly all of the
growth in our nation’s incarcerated population in recent decades. Practices
of law enforcement, prosecutors and the court systems are also contributors
to the growth of America’s prisons. See, e.g., STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A.
STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY AMERICANS IN PRISON? (2013). NOT CLEAR IF THIS
LAST ONE IS A BOOK ETC.
121 Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American Prisons: The Critical
Distinction Between Stock and Flow, Brookings Institution (2015),
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobilitymemos/posts/2015/11/25-drug-offfenders-stock-flow-prisons-rothwell.
(last visited X)
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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in 1980 to over 2.2 million today. 125 Individuals incarcerated for drug
offenses increased more than ten-fold during this same time period. 126
Related to these statistics is an even more dramatic growth in
the numbers of inmates not convicted of a crime and being housed in
local jails. Increases in convictions and increases in bail amounts have
contributed significantly to the rise in the number of individuals
detained in local jails awaiting conviction. Between 1983 and 2014, the
proportion of convicted inmates at the local level grew by 90 percent,
but the numbers of jail inmates not convicted of a crime escalated by
more than 200 percent. 127 Although data indicates that bail may be
assigned more often than it was two decades ago, the bail amounts
have increased pursuant to statutory amendments making it less
financially feasible for defendants to secure bail. For instance, in 1990,
large U.S. counties assigned bail to 53 percent of their felony
defendants, and in 2009, 72 percent of these defendants were assigned
bail. 128 Because of limited resources, a higher percentage of the accused
have been unable to finance bail and must remain incarcerated in local
jails while awaiting conviction.
Additionally, between 1980 and 2011, the average length of
prison sentences for federal drug offenses rose by 36 percent. 129 This is
an increase in prison time from approximately fifty-five months to
seventy-four months. 130 During the same period, the average prison
sentence for all other federal offenders declined. 131 Contributing to the
higher numbers of incarcerated drug offenders is the disappearance of
probation as a sanction for those convicted. In 1980, 26 percent of those
convicted of drug violations received probation. 132 By 2014, judges

THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS
(2016), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trendsin-US-Corrections.pdf. (last visited X)
126 Id.
127 Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1990-2009. Felony Defendants in Large
Counties, Department of Justice. – How can you find this? Not clear from
cite.
128 Id.
129 THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FEDERAL DRUG SENTENCING LAWS BRING
HIGH COST, LOW RETURN (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/08/federal-drug-sentencing-laws-bringhigh-cost-low-return. (last visited X)
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
125
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were sending nearly all those convicted of drug offenses to prison,
reducing the numbers receiving probation to only 6 percent. 133
Vast numbers of drug convictions, longer sentences for those
convicted, and greater numbers of accused being housed in local jails
combine to effect ballooning incarceration costs. In the federal system
alone, one out of every four dollars spent by the U.S. Department of
Justice, more than $6.7 billion per year, is expended on housing federal
convicts. 134 Maintaining state prisons and jails demands an additional
$80 billion, an 89 percent increase since 1988. 135 When considering the
economic costs of America’s “war on drugs,” costs associated with
incarcerating those convicted occupy a single line item among the legal
institutional costs in the pursuit of a drug-free nation.

DRUG USE
According to 2014 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, an
estimated 27 million Americans aged twelve or older were current
illicit drug users, indicating that they had used an illegal drug during
the month prior to the interview. 136 This means that approximately one
out of every ten Americans in 2014 was a current illegal drug user.
These numbers are higher than those in every year since 2002. 137 The
National Institute on Drug Abuse reports that cocaine use among

Id.
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM SHOWS DRAMATIC
LONG-TERM GROWTH (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org//media/Assets/2015/02/Pew_FederalPrison_Growth.pdf. (last visited X)
135 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, STATE AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES ON
CORRECTIONS AND EDUCATION (2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/expenditures-correctionseducation/brief.pdf. (last visited X)
136 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2014
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 4 (2015),
https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUH-FRR12014/NSDUH-FRR1-2014.pdf. (last visited X) The National Survey on Drug
Use and Health is in annual survey civilian, nine institutionalized population
of the United States aged 12 years old or older. It includes residents of
households and individuals in non-institutional groups, but excludes
homeless, active military personnel, and residents of jails, prisons, nursing
homes, mental institutions, and long-term hospitals.
137 Id. at 5.
133
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college-aged adults has risen sharply, 138 and according to the World
Drug Report, heroin use in the United States is up 145 percent. 139
Trafficking numbers in the United Nations’ report are based in part on
drug seizures. The research reports that heroin and morphine seizures
grew from an average of four tons per year from 1998 to 2008, to an
average of seven tons per year between 2009 and 2014. 140

OVERDOSE DEATHS
For the last fifteen years, deaths related to drug overdose have
been on a steep rise, 141 nearly tripling between 1999 and 2014. 142 After
recording alarming increases in drug overdoses, the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) undertook an examination of overdose deaths
in the United States occurring between 2010 and 2015. 143 The drug
overdose death rate in 2010 was 38,329, representing 12.3 deaths per
100,000 people. 144 Five years later, overdose death rates increased to
52,404, or 16.3 deaths per 100,000 people, a 37 percent increase. 145 From
2014 to 2015, deaths resulting from drug overdose increased by 5,349
138 National Institute on Drug Abuse, Drug and Alcohol Use in College-Age
Adults, 2015 MONITORING THE FUTURE (2016),
https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trendsstatistics/infographics/drug-alcohol-use-in-college-age-adults-in-2015. (last
visited X)
139 UNITED NATIONS, WORLD DRUG REPORT 4 (2016), available at
http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_we
b.pdf.
140 Id. at xiii.
141 Press Release, Opioids Drive Continued Increase in Drug Overdose
Deaths, Centers for Disease Control (February 20, 2013),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2013/p0220_drug_overdose_deaths.
html. (last visited X)
142 Rose A. Rudd, Puja Seth, Felicita David, & Lawrence Scholl, Increases in
Drug and Opioid-Involved Overdose Deaths – United States, 2010-2015, Centers
for Disease Control, 65 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1445,
1446 (2016), available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/65/wr/mm655051e1.htm.
143 Id. The CDC report includes drug overdose deaths recorded by the
National Vital Statistics System multiple cause-of-death mortality files..; see
also, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality_public_use_data.htm. (last
visited X)
144 CDC , supra note 140.
145 Id. at 1446.
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persons or 11.4 percent, continuing the rising trend that began in
1999. 146
CDC researchers suggest that heroin and synthetic opioids
(other than methadone) are responsible for the rapid increase in
overdose deaths. 147 They report a frightening increase from 2014 to
2015 in the number of deaths caused from overdoses of synthetic
opioids (including fentanyl), a staggering 72 percent surge in the death
rate in a single year. 148 Heroin overdoses leading to death increased by
nearly 21 percent for the same time period. 149 Combining the deaths as
a result of overdoses of synthetic opioids and heroin, researchers found
increases across all demographic groups, all regions and in twentyeight states. At least one study reports that illicitly manufactured
fentanyl is responsible for some portion of these increased deaths. 150
The increases are consequences, as unintended as they may be,
of failing drug policies and enforcement approaches focused on
punishing offenders. The CDC warns of an
urgent need for a multifaceted, collaborative public
health and law enforcement approach to the opioid
epidemic, including implementing the CDC Guideline
for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain; improving
access to and use of prescription drug monitoring
programs; expanding naloxone distribution; enhancing
opioid use disorder treatment capacity and linkage into
treatment, including medication-assisted treatment;
implement and harm reduction approaches, such as
during services program; and supporting law
enforcement strategies to reduce the illicit opioid
supply. 151
Rose A. Rudd, Noah Aleshire, Jon E. Zibbell, & R. Matthew Gladden,
Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths – United States, 200-2014, Centers
for Disease Control, 64 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1378
(2016), available at
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6450a3.htm.
147 CDC, supra note 141.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 R. Matthew Gladden, P Martinez, P Seth, Fentanyl Law Enforcement
Submission and Increases in Synthetic Opioid-involved Overdose Deaths – 27
States, 2013-2014, Centers for Disease Control, 65 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT 837 (2016), available at
http://dxdoi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6533a2.
151 CDC, supra note 141.
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CONSTITUTIONAL COSTS
The War on Drugs raises constitutional alarms dating back to
the passage of the Harrison Act. Since adoption of our nation’s drug
control strategies, much of the enforcement of the drug policies and the
effort to eradicate drug use have come with substantial costs extending
far beyond monetary expenditures.
There are real questions
concerning the constitutionality of many of the drug control efforts and
the high cost exerted on the Bill of Rights. Legal evolutions of
mandatory minimum sentences, drug courts, drug testing in schools,
and no-knock warrants arguably in violation of the eighth, sixth, fifth
and fourth amendments, respectively, are taking their toll, shrinking
civil rights and civil liberties, and threatening the freedoms associated
with American democracy.
Because the drug industry arises from the voluntary
transactions of tens of millions of people—all of whom
try to keep their actions secret—the aggressive law
enforcement schemes that constitute the war must aim
at penetrating the private lives of those millions. And
because nearly anyone may be a drug user or seller of
drugs or an aider and abettor of the drug industry,
virtually everyone has become a suspect. All must be
observed, checked screened, tested, and admonished –
the guilty and innocent alike. 152
As Professor Wisotsky points out, there is tragic irony in the fact that
“while the War on Drugs has failed completely to halt the influx of
cocaine and heroin, both of which are cheaper, purer, and more
abundant than ever,” 153 America’s drug strategy and crackdown
efforts have systematically curtailed the liberty and privacy of
Americans. The law related to search and seizure provides just one
example of how our civil rights and civil liberties have become yet
another consequence of America’s war on drugs.
STEVEN WISOTSKY, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 180: A SOCIETY OF
SUSPECTS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1992),
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/society-suspects-wardrugs-civil-liberties. (last visited X)
153 Id.
152
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SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court eroded the exclusionary
rule in historic proportions, all but erasing it, upholding the
admissibility of evidence seized during an admittedly unlawful stop
by police. 154 The Court’s holding is simply the latest in a long list of
decisions evidencing a slide toward the “anything-goes-in-the-War-onDrugs attitude.” 155 During the Reagan years, the Court usually upheld
the government’s exercise of power when the power was exercised in
the fight against drugs, notwithstanding constitutional challenges, but
the trend in judicial decisions was not limited to the Reagan
administration and has continued long after President Reagan left
office. We see this trend as the Court failed to find objectionable drug
agents’ use of a drug courier profile to stop, detain, and question
people without a warrant and without probable cause; 156 to subject a
traveler’s luggage to a sniffing examination by a drug-detection canine
without a warrant and without probable cause; 157 to search a public
school student’s purse without a warrant and without probable
cause; 158 and to search ships in inland waterways at will. 159
Homes, too, began to fall to the government’s power as the drug
war escalated. The right to privacy Americans enjoyed in their
residences experienced serious restriction. The Supreme Court
approved the use of search warrants for residences obtained on the
basis of an anonymous tip alone. 160 It also upheld the use of illegally
seized evidence under a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary

154 See, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). In addition to protection from
unlawful search and seizure, the exclusionary rule is also designed to
provide a remedy, short of criminal prosecution, in response to prosecutors
and police who illegally gather evidence in violation of the Bill of Rights.
155 See, Wisotsky, supra note 151.
156 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); see also, United States v.
Montoya, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); and Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984).

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 606, 706 (1983).
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985).
159 United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 US. 579, 593 (1983).
160 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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rule; 161 the right of law enforcement to make a warrantless search while
trespassing in “open fields” that were surrounded by fencing and
posted with “No Trespassing” signs; 162 the right of the police to
conduct a warrantless search of a barn adjacent to a residence; 163 law
enforcement’s ability to conduct a warrantless search of a motor home
occupied as a residence; 164 the power to conduct a warrantless search
of a home on the consent of an occasional visitor lacking legal authority
over the premises; 165 and the ability of law enforcement to conduct a
“knock-and-announce” procedure allowing less than five seconds
before entry. 166 Relatedly, the Court approved the warrantless aerial
surveillance over private property. 167
The Court also significantly expanded the powers of police to
stop, question, and detain drivers of vehicles on suspicion with less
than probable cause, 168 or with no suspicion at all at fixed checkpoints
or roadblocks; 169 to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles and
closed containers situated within the vehicles; 170 and to conduct
surveillance of suspects by placing transmitters or beepers on vehicles
or in containers therein. 171 In another erosive decision, the Court
reversed the Florida Supreme Court in upholding the constitutionality
of the interrogation of a Greyhound bus passenger and the search of
his baggage by armed officers within the confines of the bus. 172

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905 (1984). The Court applied the rule
to the search of a home made pursuant to a defective warrant issued without
probable cause. Id. See also, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
162 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
163 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
164 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985).
165 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
166 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
161

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); see also, Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S.
445 (1989) (allowing aerial surveillance by fixed-wing aircraft at an altitude
of 1,000 feet and by helicopter at 400 feet).
168 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
169 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
170 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
171 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 721 (1984).
172 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
167
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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
Mass incarceration and hyper-criminalization are a catalyst for
poverty in America. Convicted felons are substantially more likely to
face challenging circumstances attempting to re-integrate into society
following their release from incarceration.
The history of
imprisonment and their accompanying criminal record impedes
success in the labor market – employment limitations and depressed
wages severely restrict a convicted individual’s abilities to attain selfsufficiency. A person’s criminal conviction negatively impacts him far
beyond imprisonment and its associated loss of freedoms. Criminal
sanctions affect the felon’s health, debt situation, transportation
options, housing opportunities, nutrition and security. 173 They also
produce adverse consequences for children and contribute to financial
and emotional stresses that undermine marriages and familial
relationships. 174 At the community level, criminal sanctions promote
inequality and often deteriorate citizens’ trust in the government.
Convictions create criminal records that can present significant
barriers to employment, housing, public assistance, education, family
reunification, developing good credit and more. 175 Even a minor
criminal record, such as a misdemeanor or arrest without conviction,
constructs potential barriers that can prevent an individual’s successful
acclamation in society. 176

See, Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice
System 45 (2016). – How can you find this? Seems to need a little more in the
cite.
174 Id.
175 The Sentencing Project, Americans with Criminal Records, HALF IN TEN 1
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-Records-Poverty-andOpportunity-Profile.pdf. (last visited X) In one experiment, researchers
randomly assigned a criminal record to otherwise identical job applicants
finding that those with criminal records were 50 percent less likely to receive
an invitation to interview or job offer; percentages for blacks was even
higher. Devah Pager, Bruce Western, & Naomi Sugie, Sequencing
Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with
Criminal Records, 623 THE ANNALS OF THE ACAD. OF POLITICAL AND SOC.
SCIENCE 195-213 (2009); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108
AMERICAN J. OF SOCIOLOGY 937-975 (2003).
176 Id. An examination of individual earnings before and after arrest suggests
that even arrests without conviction can decrease earning and employment.
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As of July 1, 2015, more than seventy million Americans,
roughly a third of the nation’s adult population, possessed some type
of criminal record. 177 By way of comparison, this number is greater
than the entire U.S. population in 1900; approximately equal to the
number of Americans holding college diplomas; and if criminal record
holders were a separate nation, they would comprise the eighteenth
largest country on Earth (larger than France and Canada and three
times larger than Australia). 178
To further exacerbate the issues for criminal record holders,
recent surveys indicate that more than 70 percent of American
employers conduct criminal background checks as a prerequisite for
employment. 179 The costs of possessing a criminal record include
severely limited employment options. Additionally, individuals with
criminal records are often barred from obtaining occupational licenses
that would assist them not only with employment opportunities, but
also enhance their prospects for improving their socio-economic status.
The American Bar Association estimates that there are over 1,000
mandatory license exclusions for individuals with minor records,
which may include misdemeanor convictions or arrests without
conviction, and nearly 3,000 exclusions for those with felony records. 180
The incarcerated population is comprised largely of individuals
who, even pre-conviction, are disproportionately poor and experience
lower education levels. 181 As few as 10 percent of these individuals
Jeffrey Grogge, The Effect of Arrests on the Employment and Earnings of Young
Men, 110 THE QUARTERLY J. OF ECONOMICS 51-71 (1995).
177 Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal Records
as College Diplomas, Breannan Center for Justice (2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/just-facts-many-americans-havecriminal-records-college-diplomas. (last visited X)
178 Id.
179 Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael, & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality,
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 451, 452 (2006).
180 American Bar Association, National Inventory of Collateral Consequences of
Conviction, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/. (last visited
X)
181 See, Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings 494
(Princeton Univ. – Industrial Relations Section, Working Paper, 2006) – How
can we find this as a working paper? Just checking the cite.; see also, Doris J.
James & Lauren E. Glaze, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Report (2006); and William J. Sabol, Local Labor
market Conditions and Post-prison Employment: Evidence from Ohio (Bureau of
Justice, Working Paper 2007).
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have positive pre-incarceration earnings. 182
The period of
incarceration further reduces any earnings and places additional
strains on families already experiencing a shortage of resources. One
study indicates the incarceration of a father increases by 38 percent the
probability that a family’s economic status will decline to or remain at
poverty level. 183
Incarceration impacts health, posing health risks during
imprisonment and increasing the likelihood of health risks postconfinement. Prisons at maximum capacity or, worse, at greater than
maximum capacity, amplify the risks of the incarcerated magnifying
the possibility of inmate injury, sexual victimization, disease
transmission, and even death. Overcrowded prisons forced to reduce
their inmate population witnessed a reduction of six inmate deaths per
year. 184 Additionally, incidents of sexual assault are higher among the
incarcerated than the general population. 185
Criminal convictions also impact housing, not only for an
individual, but potentially for his family as well. The U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) does not unilaterally bar
individuals with criminal records from residing in public housing, but
it does allow each local Public Housing Authority (PHA) the latitude
to establish its own practice concerning criminal record policies. More
often than not the restrictions of the PHAs are greater than the federal
departmental guidelines, preventing individuals with a criminal
history from qualifying for housing. Even low-level, nonviolent
offenders, like those convicted of alcohol and drug-related crimes, are

Id.
Rucker Johnson, Ever-increasing Levels of Parental Incarceration and the
Consequences for Children, DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER?: THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE PRISON BOOM 177-206 (Steven Rafael & Michael A. Stoll eds.,
2009).
184 Richard T. Boylan & Naci Mocan, Intended and Unintended Consequences of
Prison Reform, 30 J. OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 558-586 (2013).
185 Reports chronicle 3.7 percent of incarcerated men experience sexual abuse,
as compared to 8.5 percent of incarcerated women. Allen J. Beck, Marcus
Berzofsky, Rachel Caspar, & Christopher Krebs, Sexual Victimization in
Prisons and Jails Reported by Inmates, 2011-12, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Department of Justice (2013). Where can we find this document? Seems the
cite needs a little more information.
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included in the PHAs prohibitions, making them ineligible for public
housing assistance. 186
There are other government assistance programs moved
beyond the reach of individuals convicted of crimes. Federal safety net
programs, such as Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) have
restricted access to those with criminal records. Many states have
overridden federal restrictions to provide access to convicted felons,
unless an individual received a felony drug conviction. 187 Thirty states
deny SNAP benefits to convicted drug felons and thirty-six states deny
them access to TANF. 188
Beyond the ramifications related to housing and federal
assistance programs, parental incarceration negatively impacts
children. More than five million children have at least one parent who
is currently or has been imprisoned. 189 The demographics of
incarcerated parents indicate that 1 percent of white children have an
incarcerated parent, 7 to 9 percent of black children, and 2 percent of
Hispanic children. 190 Further, individuals convicted of non-violent
drug offenses are 20 percent more likely to be parents than those
persons serving time for violent or property crimes. 191
For the children, parental incarceration becomes a prominent
risk factor for a number of adverse outcomes that include antisocial and
violent behavior, mental health problems, school dropout, and
unemployment. 192 Boys as young as five years old who had one or
Marah A. Curtis, Sarah Garlington, & Lisa S. Schottenfeld, Alcohol, Drug,
and Criminal History Restrictions in Public Housing, 15 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL.
DEV. AND RES. 37-52 (2013).
187 Rebecca Beitch, States Rethink Restrictions on Food Stamps, Welfare for Drug
Felons, The Pew Charitable Trusts (2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2015/07/30/states-rethink-restrictions-on-foodstamps-welfare-for-drug-felons. (last visited X)
188 Id.
189 David Murphrey & P. Mae Cooper, Parents Behind Bars: What Happens to
Their Children?, CHILD TRENDS (2015).
190 Lauren E. Glaze & Laura M. Maruschak, Parents in Prison and Their Minor
Children, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT, U. S. Department of
Justice (2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf. (last
visited X)
191 Id.
192 Joseph Murray and David P. Farrington, The Effects of Parental
Imprisonment on Children, 37 CRIME AND JUSTICE 133, 133-206 (2008). The
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more parents in prison exhibited higher levels of physical
aggression. 193 Equally disconcerting is a Swedish study reporting
children of incarcerated fathers are more likely to be convicted of a
crime and subsequently incarcerated, continuing perpetual
incarceration throughout generations. 194

V. CONCLUSION
It is all but impossible to portray a true picture of the costs and
consequences of America’s war on drugs without a complete
assessment, and no complete study of the subject has yet to be
undertaken. Certainly, aspects of the costs have been covered over
time, but a comprehensive undertaking of the easily quantifiable costs
alongside the more subjective consequences warrants attention.
Nevertheless, despite the lack of an accurate accounting of the full costs
and consequences, there is little doubt that the government attention,
human capital, fiscal outlay, constitutional erosions, and hosts of
unintended consequences suffered by those convicted and their
families present a bill too large for Americans to pay. The
unquestionable lack of any measurable success demands significant
and expedient reform, and the longer reform is delayed, the greater the
costs that will be extracted.

National Task Force on Children Exposed to Violence found parental arrest
and incarceration were among the traumatic events that increase the risk of
post-traumatic stress disorder in children. ROBERT L. LISTENBEE, REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO
VIOLENCE, U.S. Department of Justice (2012), available at
https://www.justice.gov/defendingchildhood/cev-rpt-full.pdf.
193 Christopher Wildeman, Parental Incarceration and Children’s Physically
Aggressive Behaviors: Evidence from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study, 89 SOCIAL FORCES 285, 285-309 (2010).
194 Randi Hjalmarsson & Matthew J. Lindquist, Like Godfather, Like Son:
Exploring the Intergenerational Nature of Crime, 47 J. OF HUMAN RESOURCES 550,
550-582 (2012).
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